So that TDO members can read this judgment asap, I have posted it in a very raw format.
The PDF version is now available on;
http://www.taxi-driver.co.uk/phpBB2/vie ... hp?t=12402
Neutral Citation Number: [2009] EWHC 2356 (Admin)
CO/6158/2008
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2A 2LL
Friday, 31 July 2009
B e f o r e:
MR JUSTICE BLAKE
Between:
THE QUEEN ON THE APPLICATION OF
(1) ALMA LUNT
(2) ALLIED VEHICLES LIMITED
Claimants
v
LIVERPOOL CITY COUNCIL
Defendant
EQUALITIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
Intervener
Computer-Aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes of
WordWave International Limited
A Merrill Communications Company
165 Fleet Street London EC4A 2DY
Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Fax No: 0207 404 1424
(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
Ms Dinah Rose QC and Mr Gerry Facenna (instructed by Bindmans) appeared on behalf of
the Claimant
Ms Francis Patterson QC and Mr David Hercock (instructed by Liverpool CC) appeared on
behalf of the Defendant
Ms Y Genn (instructed by EHRC) appeared on behalf of the Intervener
J U DG M E N T
(As approved)
Crown copyright©
MR JUSTICE BLAKE:
2.
This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Liverpool City Council
taken through its Licensing Committee in March 2008.
1. Introduction
2.
In 2007 the second claimant, Allied Vehicles Limited, applied to the defendant for
approval of its E7 taxi for use as a public hire taxi in the city of Liverpool. The E7 is a
vehicle developed in consultation with the second claimant and Peugeot based in France.
It is manufactured by the second claimant in the United Kingdom using a chassis base
imported from France that is used in the Peugeot Expert Tepee range of vehicle. The
Expert Tepee is a commercial passenger carrying vehicle that is also used as a taxi in
many European cities. The E7 is a purpose-built design for publicly hired taxis in the
United Kingdom.
3.
The second claimant has imported some 800 vehicles from Peugeot in 2008 into the
United Kingdom, of which 647 were for use as E7 taxis, and 153 for use as Eurobus
private hire taxis.
4.
The first claimant is a resident of the city of Liverpool. She hurt her back some 27
years ago and has a disability that requires her to use a wheelchair. A combination of
factors relevant to her medical history means that she has to distribute her weight by
reclining the back of her wheelchair and using footrests. This means that that her
wheelchair is somewhat longer than what has been known in these proceedings as the
reference wheelchair for public transport purposes, that is 1200mm in length. She is
not alone in having a wheelchair of greater length than 1200mm. A survey conducted
in 2005 on behalf of the Department of Transport Mobility and Inclusion unit of some
1356 occupants and devices showed a range of wheelchair lengths from 775mm to
1604mm; and it appears that a few hundred users had a chair over 1200mm in length.
The longest self-propelled wheelchair noted in that survey was 1534mm, which was
itself an increase in size of the maximum self-propelled wheelchair by some 177mm
since a similar survey in 1999.
5.
The first claimant is the voluntary chair of the Merseyside Coalition of Inclusive Living
and the Treasurer of the Liverpool Wheelchair Users Group. These are both voluntary
organisations concerned with disability issues in the city of Liverpool and beyond.
Amongst other things, she participates in the policy forum of the City Council
concerned with wheelchair access issues.
6.
In the autumn of 2007, she became aware of the application made by Allied Vehicles
Limited, and she tried out the E7 vehicle in order to access it in her wheelchair. She
was impressed with it because she had encountered substantial difficulties in getting
into and travelling safely within the public hire taxis presently available in the city of
Liverpool. The design specification of the 1400 such taxis approved for public hire,
although intended since 2000 to meet the needs of wheelchair users, are confined to the
London-style taxi developed in accordance with the requirements of the London Public
Carriage Office, as they have developed over the years since the 19th century. There
are various authorised models and manufacturers who comply with the specifications,
including the "TX" range of vehicles. But in this judgment, taxis that meet these
requirements will be referred to generally as the "London taxi" or the "TX".
7.
When these proceedings were launched, there was an issue as to precisely what and
how great the difficulties were that the first claimant faced in accessing Liverpool
public hire taxis, and also what precisely she had told the Council and Mr Edwards, its
principal licensing officer, about them. Shortly before the hearing of this application in
June 2009, there was a demonstration attended by Mr Edwards. Since that
demonstration, it has been agreed that the first claimant cannot access the traditional
London taxi in her manual powered wheelchair because she cannot turn her chair to
face the rear and be secured by the straps and seat-belts provided for disabled use in
such a taxi. That means that if she has to travel in such a taxi at all, she can only do so
in a diagonal or sideways position unsecured by a seat-belt or a strap on the wheelchair
itself. It is common ground that this state of affairs not only creates an uncomfortable
ride in the vehicle if it breaks or turn corners sharply, it is an unsafe position and a
breach of the local regulations governing the conveyance of wheelchair users.
8.
The reason for these difficulties is the limited amount of space and the configuration of
the floor plan of the London taxi as it rises to the side. By contrast, she can readily
access the larger E7 taxi; she can face forward in the course of a journey and be
properly secured, and moreover the space is such that she can also be joined by three or
possibly four ambulant passengers in the other seats available in the vehicle, by contrast
again with the London taxi where at most one passenger can travel with the claimant.
The court was provided with a DVD showing a comparison with the E7, a London taxi
and another vehicle that will be mentioned later in this judgment, from which it appears
that the travelling passenger could only travel in a cramped, difficult and uncomfortable
position.
9.
The first claimant has a large family and would like to travel with more members of her
family than just one person if that were possible. She therefore supports the second
claimant's application that would relax the defendant's present policy that generally
only authorises the London taxi for use as a public hire vehicle in Liverpool.
10. The policy was spelt out in a report of Mr Edwards. The first such report being on 31
October 2007, but it is repeated in the second report that he made in March 2008. He
says as follows:
"Before a type of vehicle may be licensed as a hackney carriage it needs to
be approved by the City Council as a suitable vehicle for use as a taxi cab
in Liverpool. The Council has accepted that purpose-built taxis which
comply with the conditions of fitness of the London Carriage Office are
suitable for such use. Other types of vehicle are considered on their merits,
but to date no vehicle which is unable to meet the conditions of fitness has
been approved by the Council."
11. Mr Edwards also referred to the policy of the defendant Council in a document that he
had prepared in March 2008, which was the Equality Impact Assessment document. He
notes that the standard of the London conditions of fitness:
SMITH BERNAL WORDWAVE
"lays down critical standards which vehicles must attain before being licensed as a
hackney carriage. The Licensing Committee makes reference to those standards. If a
vehicle falls short of those standards it will generally not be approved for use as a
hackney carriage".
2. The impugned decision
12. On 31 October 2007, the defendant’s Licensing Committee first considered the
matter. It heard a presentation from Mr Fryer, an employee of the second claimants. It
heard from the first claimant, Mrs Lunt, and from a Mr Bruce, who was chair of the
Liverpool Wheelchair Users Group.
13. The minutes record in summary form the gist of what they were being told, which
includes the following:
"They are in favour of the E7. Not all TX vehicles are wheelchair
accessible."
14. Other people, including the manager of the TX range, opposed the application. It
was adjourned for further information to be obtained and consultation with others,
including other authorities on the types of vehicle they licence.
15. On 4 March 2008, there was a meeting of some few hours in length between Mr
Edwards, Mr Bruce and Ms Price, who was another wheelchair user active in disability
issues in the city of Liverpool and its surrounding region, and Mrs Lunt, the first
claimant. As already indicated, there is some difference of recollection between those
three on the one hand and Mr Edwards on the other as to precisely what was said at a
meeting. Mr Edwards does not recollect anyone saying to him that wheelchairs could
not be safely secured in the taxis as the statements of the three wheelchair users indicate
they did inform them. But I am satisfied that it is at least clear that the difficulties
created by the physical limitations of space were emphasised by all three, although not
everyone had the scale of difficulty that Mrs Lunt, the first claimant, had.
16. Following that meeting, Mr Edwards completed the Equality Impact Assessment to
which reference has already been made. He said as follows:
"A specific application for the approval of a Peugeot E7 vehicle to be used
as a hackney carriage presents the potential for a dis-benefit to wheelchair
users if the vehicle is not approved. Those wheelchair users who wish to be
accompanied by several of their ambulant friends have move
manoeuvrability and be able to travel in a forward as well as a rear facing
position would not be able to do so by access to the current wheelchair
accessible fleet. The Peugeot E7 is a larger vehicle and by virtue of its size
creates more space for manoeuvre and placement of such wheelchairs.
However due to the vehicles size and the engineering considerations
associated with the design, it can not conform to the minimum turning
circle requirements associated with hackney carriages and is higher off the
ground creating increased wheelchair ramp angles."
Under the section of the Equality Impact Template headed "Please list the actions taken
to remove or remedy the above effect", Mr Edwards wrote:
"The Licensing Committee will consider any application on its merits
submitted by any vehicle manufacturer who designs and builds a vehicle
which is constructed to be used for public hire activity."
17. That report was dated the 18th March 2008 and was before the Licensing
Committee when it met to take its decision later that month. It does not appear to have
been supplied to the first claimant or others with whom there had been consultation
before the decision was taken. Mr Edwards prepared a further report for the meeting of
the Council in which similar language was used and pointing out, as is apparent from the
Equality Impact Assessment, that the E7 does not meet the tight turning circle
requirements of the London Public Carriage Office specifications and the London taxi.
That is agreed between the parties. The benefits of the turning circle and its impact on
health and safety are not agreed.
18. It is pertinent to point out some matters in the report which have been the subject
of critical comment and appear to in part be inaccurate.
i. The report states that the "Merseyside Police has inspected Euro 7 and has indicated
that they have reservations about the vehicle's use as a hackney carriage". It
subsequently transpired that the police as a body do not have concerns and are neutral as
to the merits of the matter, but it is undoubtedly the case that a Mr Gore, who was the
Merseyside Force Vehicle Examiner, did inspect the E7 and made a statement identifying
matters of concern to him.
ii. The report before the Council indicated that a previous version of the E7 had been
inspected by the Council's senior vehicle inspector who raised concerns about the ramp
angle. However, the ramp angle had been the subject of representations by the second
claimant between Mr Edwards' first report and the second report, pointing out that the
matter had been substantially altered since the earlier inspection, and the ramp that is now
built-in to the version of the E7 for which authority was being sought is longer and
consequently has a shallower angle than the London taxi. It was noted in the report that
it also has the additional feature of lips to the edge of the ramp edge that wheelchair users
considered was of assistance in bringing their chairs up the ramp into the vehicle.
iii.Mr Edwards' report noted the danger of sliding doors, which is a feature of the E7, and
the fact that use by passengers of such doors when descending fail to warn oncoming
traffic that passengers are exiting the vehicle, by contrast with the hinged doors of the
London taxi. It is right that the second claimant also pointed out that that issue had been
addressed by them by the insertion of a warning light visible to following traffic saying
that the door was open.
19. The views of the first claimant and others who had discussed the matter
on behalf of the voluntary organisations with Mr Edwards are summarised in the second
report in the following terms:
SMITH BERNAL WORDWAVE
"The Liverpool Wheelchair Users Group in conjunction with Merseyside
Coalition of Inclusive Living has made representations in support of the E7
and has requested that the vehicle be approved as it provides more room
and comfort for both wheelchair users and those ambulant friends who
accompany them. The groups have expressed the view that the ramps
associated with the E7 vehicle are more reassuring than normal TX ramps.
The Wheelchair Users Group advised the Licensing Unit that some 12,000
wheelchair users would find the alternative choice of the E7 to be a positive
benefit in terms of accessible transport."
20. It is a theme of the various reports made by Mr Edwards whilst the matter was under
consideration that Liverpool's fleet of London taxis is wheelchair accessible and
Liverpool has an enviable reputation in so requiring since at least 2000.
21. The second claimant had by this time prepared a written report that it presented to the
Council for consideration of its application. That report contains a number of
appendices which is quoted from in the summary of the report, and it contains a letter
from Mr Bruce of 6 September and a media release of 29 November 2007, which more
accurately set out the concerns of the wheelchair users than Mr Edwards' summary of
the consultation does in that report. It is unnecessary in this judgment to quote every
relevant passage of the report, but the following themes emerge. It said:
"1.1.2 The present public hire taxi fleet is not inclusive for many
wheelchair using residents and visitors. This is because the only existing
vehicles ... make it awkward and time consuming to load wheelchair users
and make it difficult to turn and secure the wheelchair and occupant
correctly within the cab.
...
1.1.7. A survey of 100 journeys was undertaken by wheelchair users in
London-style hackney cabs. This showed that, due to the lack of turning
space to manoeuvre the wheelchair within the vehicle, only on four
occasions was the wheelchair user turned into place in the correct direction
for travel and on only one occasion were the wheelchair and passenger
restraints correctly applied.
1.1.8. The Lowland Report therefore provides firm evidence that in 99 per
cent of journeys wheelchair using passengers were left to travel in a
manner which is clearly highly dangerous, with no seat belt for the
passenger and not even anything to hold his/her seat to the vehicle.
...
1.1.12. The practice of carrying wheelchair passengers facing sideways,
entirely unsecured and with no seat belt, places all such passengers using a
publicly licensed service at grave risk of injury or death in the event of an
accident. Disabled groups and Taxi Association representatives alike
confirm that a key barrier giving rise to this appalling situation is the
limited turning area available in the rear of a London-style taxi.
1.1.13. Numerous organisations have commented on the important
contribution made by modern-style hackney taxis to improving
accessibility for wheelchair users. In particular, organisations representing
12,000 wheelchair users in the report argue strongly against a one size fits
all approach in specifying services or products to meet the needs of
everyone in society. Having tested modern-style hackney taxis, wheelchair
users recognise clear access and safety benefits for many wheelchair users
compared with the existing Liverpool taxi fleet."
22. There is then reference to the disability legislation to which this judgment will turn in
due course.
23. The Lowland Report referred to in that document was a report commissioned by
Lowland Market Research of wheelchair user taxi journey experience. It indicates that
a total of 100 taxi journeys were undertaken using a reference wheelchair (that is the
1200mm wheelchair, slightly smaller than Mrs Lunt's own wheelchair in the present
case). The 100 taxi journeys were split between Manchester and London with 50
journeys in each city. The journeys started at a variety of locations, including shopping
centres, taxi ranks and hailing the taxi on the street.
24. Under the heading "Summary of results", the following bullet points are made:
"• In only four of the 100 taxi journeys taken was the wheelchair turned to
face rearwards in the correct direction of travel. In all cases this required a
degree of bumping and shuffling in order to get the wheelchair turned,
which was uncomfortable for the wheelchair occupant.
• In only one journey was the wheelchair both turned to face away from the
direction of travel and also properly secured within the taxi.
• In only one journey was the seat belt and seat belt extension provided and
correctly fitting.
• In all other journeys (96 per cent) the wheelchair either remained side on
or at some other angle. In these situations neither the wheelchair nor the
passenger could be safely secured and the passenger tended to feel uneasy
at bends and when stopping.
• For those taxi drivers that did not turn the wheelchair to face away from
the direction of travel they either made no comment regarding this or stated
that the wheelchair was too large to turn inside the vehicle.
• In 94 per cent of the journeys taken the wheelchair passenger stated that
they felt either fairly or very unsafe during the journey.
Concluding comments
SMITH BERNAL WORDWAVE
• The experience of a wheelchair user whilst travelling on a London-style
taxi was, almost without exception, uncomfortable and, in particular,
unsafe. The predominant issue contributing to this situation was the lack of
space available in which to manoeuvre the wheelchair and occupant into a
safe travelling position."
25. The general tenor of the second claimant's submissions in the Lowland Report
were supported by other documentary material before the Committee, including the letter
from Mr Bruce and the media information release to which reference has already been
made. The Committee also heard evidence from another wheelchair user currently
unconnected with the interest groups that Mr Bruce, Mrs Price and Mrs Lunt were
connected with, and that was a Mr Cronin. He in fact wrote to the Council on 7 April
2008 indicating that the minutes mis-recorded the nub of what he was saying, and said
that he did not support either side in this debate and has never even seen the E7-style cab.
His letter says:
"I merely inform the Committee that I was unable to be seated correctly by
Mr Kelsey and this would have necessitated me travelling sideways, untethered.
I further stated that sideways travel was, in the experience of my
peer group, very much the norm when using a London-style taxi."
26. On this second occasion as well, the Committee heard from Mrs Lunt herself, though it
seems only for a very short period, but she had apparently handed in photographs which
were made available to the court showing the difficulties of securing her wheelchair, or
a wheelchair of her size, in the London-style taxi by contrast with the E7. One of the
photographs showed the wheelchair user in the E7 with two other ambulant passengers,
and it may be that two to three is the number of extra passengers that can be fitted into
that vehicle.
27. Mrs Price also spoke to the Committee, but despite this material, the minutes note that
the chair of the meeting interjected to state that he thought that the problems being
described were all driver error that could be addressed by training. A similar point is
made subsequently in the correspondence before this claim was lodged.
28. The written submissions of the second claimant also made the point that 383 local
authorities had licensed the E7 for use as a public hire taxi by 2008, and in some cases
going back to 2000. Those include such large cities as Edinburgh, Glasgow, Leeds and
Newcastle, and it also includes all the local authorities who licence public hire taxis
surrounding the City of Liverpool itself, those at least include the authorities for the
Wirral, Knowsley, St Helens, Sefton and West Lancashire. Thus it seems that the E7
was considered both safe and appropriate by these authorities, and as a result was
permitted to make journeys ending in Liverpool City Centre, but not beginning there or
being hailed on the streets there. It is to be noted that both Manchester and London
have retained the London taxi design with its turning circle.
29. The Committee having met on 28 March and heard all this material, then excluded the
public in order to consider its decision, and decided by a vote of four to two to refuse
the application. In due course, the minutes of its reasons, and a letter in explanation
indicated that it was conscious of the need to give due regard to the Disability
Discrimination Act, but three features caused it concern about the E7: firstly, the sliding
doors and safety issues arising therefrom (the Council, it should be noted, had looked at
the E7 itself); secondly, the size of an intermediate step; and thirdly, the turning circle
needed in Liverpool where some ranks in the City Centre would need a three-point turn
without the tight London-style turning circle.
30. Following further correspondence, this judicial review challenge was brought.
3. The challenge
31. Ms Rose QC has developed four essential bases of challenge that may be
summarised as follows:
1. The decision amounted to unjustified discrimination contrary to section
21D and E of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA), as amended
with effect from 4 December 2006.
2. It failed to have due regard to its duty under section 49(1) of the DDA,
introduced in June 2006, of the need to eliminate discrimination and
promote equality of opportunity.
3. It exercised its public law discretion as to whether to license the E7 on
the basis of a material and undisputed error of fact. Its judgment was thus
based on a decisive error. There were also other grounds of unfairness
argued.
4. In reaching the decision that it did, the City Council breached Article 28
of the European Union Treaty in that it imposed a product requirement (or
similar requirement) that had equivalent effect to a quantative restriction on
imports of material from an EU state without justification.
32. Although those four submissions raised some disputed issues of law to be
addressed by this court in due course, the challenges at common law under the DDA and
under community law all eventually shared a common factual foundation, and it is
submitted that, in each case, the decisions were undermined by the error of fact made by
the Council that at least includes the following:
1. The defendant through its officer, Mr Edwards, and consequently the
chair, failed to understand that not all its licensed hackney carriage fleet
was accessible to all wheelchair users, irrespective of their particular
conditions and the size and characteristics of their wheelchairs.
2. The defendant misunderstood and therefore mis-stated the impact of the
maintenance of the present practice as merely restricting the choice and the
convenience of wheelchair users as opposed to the ability of some users,
including Mrs Lunt, to use the present licensed taxis in Liverpool at all in
the safe position. It could therefore reach no lawful judgment on the merits
of the application and the extent to which it constituted discrimination, and
SMITH BERNAL WORDWAVE
the comparative safety benefits when considering the matter more
generally.
3. Insofar as in its response to the DDA point and the Community law
claims the Council sought to base a justification of its decision on safety
considerations, the material upon which it relied was inadequate, and it
failed to obtain relevant evidence from a competent source to advise it on
the question.
33. Ms Patterson QC for the defendants responds by submitting, amongst other
things:
1. The section 21 challenge is unsuitable for determination by judicial
review, and a damages claim by the first claimant in the County Court is
the appropriate venue for the first of the four challenges made.
2. Although the section 49 duty is a public law duty that can be enforced
by judicial review, the Council was aware of its duty and came to a
decision on the merits that it was entitled to reach.
3. Even if it misunderstood the degree of difficulty Mrs Lunt faced in
gaining access to a London-style taxi, it was entitled to conclude that all its
taxi fleet was wheelchair accessible in general terms, and accordingly there
was no duty to modify in accordance with section 21E of the DDA.
4. The claim fell outside the reach of Article 28 as it was not a sufficiently
substantial interference with use.
5. In any event the Council was entitled to refuse the licence on safety
grounds, even if other local authorities took a different view. In particular,
the Council was entitled to use its local knowledge of what it would
consider was appropriate for Liverpool to make the decision it came to.
4. Suitability for Judicial Review
34. I accept the claimant's submissions that claims against public authorities under
Part 3 of the DDA do not have to proceed by way of private law action for torts alone.
There are a number of reasons for that conclusion. First, and most relevantly, that is
because DDA Schedule 3, paragraph 5 says so. It provides as follows:
"(1) Except as provided by section 25 no civil or criminal proceedings may
be brought against any
person in respect of an act merely because the act is unlawful under Part
III.
(2) Sub-paragraph (1) does not prevent the making of an application for
judicial review."
35. Second, the law on the comparable duty in race relations claims demonstrate that a
challenge can be made by way of judicial review even where there is a factual dispute as to
what the defendant's practice amounts to: see Roma Rights [2004] UKHL 55; [2005] 2 AC
1 at paragraphs [96] to [97]; see also the decision in R(E) v Governing Body of the JFS
[2008] EWHC 1535/1536 (Admin), a decision of Munby J reversed by the Court of Appeal
on other grounds. The conclusion of suitability for judicial review was not challenged or
disturbed in the Court of Appeal.
36. Third, I do not accept that the factual disputes that exist between the parties as to what
was said to Mr Edwards in consultation prevents this challenge in judicial review
proceedings. I do not need to resolve all the differences in the witness statements,
although I find the witness statements of Mrs Lunt, Mrs Price and Mr Bruce
compelling, whereas that of Mr Edwards is far less clear and precise, and his reports
have been shown to be inaccurate in a number of ways on one or two other topics.
37.However, in my judgment, at least the following conclusions results from the
examination of the materials in the case:
(i) There was sufficient documentary evidence before the Committee that some
wheelchair users could not access the London taxi for space reasons, and that was not a
question of either driver error or mere convenience or preference of wheelchair users.
(ii) Since it is now an agreed fact that Mrs Lunt cannot access a London taxi in her
wheelchair, save with the difficulty and in the unsafe sideways manner that has been
demonstrated, and that there has been no material change of circumstances since October
2007 and today, then at the least Mr Edwards must have seriously misunderstood what
was being said to him. If he did not understand what was being said to him, in my
judgment he was required to explore the basis of the physical difficulties with
manoeuvring the taxi to a safe position that was being described to him.
38. Judicial review enables the court to intervene where there has either been a
procedural failure to explore the relevant question fairly and effectively or at all, or
having explored it, bases a decision on a critical factual question that proves by the time
the judicial review proceedings are brought to have been wrong: see in that context the
decision in the case of E v the Secretary of State [2004] EWCA Civ 49; [2004] QB 1044,
which provides, so far as material:
"61. As the passage cited by Lord Slynn shows, the editors of the
current edition of De Smith (unlike Wade and Forsyth) are somewhat
tentative as to whether this is a separate ground of review:
"The taking into account of a mistaken fact can just as easily be
absorbed into a traditional legal ground of review by referring to
the taking into account of an irrelevant consideration or the
failure to provide reasons that are adequate or intelligible or the
failure to base the decision upon any evidence." (para 5/-094).
62. We are doubtful, however, whether those traditional grounds
SMITH BERNAL WORDWAVE
provide an adequate explanation of the cases. We take them in turn.
(i) Failure to take account of a material consideration is only a ground
for setting aside a decision, if the statute expressly or impliedly requires it
to be taken into account (Re Findlay [1985] AC 318, 333-4, per Lord
Scarman). That may be an accurate way of characterising some mistakes;
for example, a mistake about the development plan allocation, where there
is a specific statutory requirement to take the development plan into
account (as in Hollis). But it is difficult to give such status to other
mistakes which cause unfairness; for example whether a building can be
seen (Jagendorff), or whether the authority has carried out a particular form
of study (Simplex).
(ii) Reasons are no less "adequate and intelligible", because they reveal
that the decision-maker fell into error; indeed that is one of the purposes of
requiring reasons.
(iii) Finally, it may impossible, or at least artificial, to say that there
was a failure to base the decision on "any evidence", or even that it had "no
justifiable basis" (in the words of Lord Nolan: see above). In most of these
cases there is some evidential basis for the decision, even if part of the
reasoning is flawed by mistake or misunderstanding.
63. In our view, the CICB case points the way to a separate ground of
review, based on the principle of fairness. It is true that Lord Slynn
distinguished between "ignorance of fact" and "unfairness" as grounds of
review. However, we doubt if there is a real distinction. The decision
turned, not on issues of fault or lack of fault on either side; it was sufficient
that "objectively" there was unfairness. On analysis, the "unfairness" arose
from the combination of five factors:
(i) An erroneous impression created by a mistake as to, or ignorance
of, a relevant fact (the availability of reliable evidence to support her case);
(ii) The fact was "established", in the sense that, if attention had been
drawn to the point, the correct position could have been shown by objective
and uncontentious evidence;
(iii) The claimant could not fairly be held responsible for the error;
(iv) Although there was no duty on the Board itself, or the police, to do
the claimant's work of proving her case, all the participants had a shared
interest in co-operating to achieve the correct result;
(v) The mistaken impression played a material part in the reasoning.
64. If that is the correct analysis, then it provides a convincing
explanation of the cases where decisions have been set aside on grounds of
mistake of fact. Although planning inquiries are also adversarial, the
planning authority has a public interest, shared with the Secretary of State
through his inspector, in ensuring that development control is carried out
on the correct factual basis. Similarly, in Tameside, the Council and the
Secretary of State, notwithstanding their policy differences, had a shared
interest in decisions being made on correct information as to practicalities.
The same thinking can be applied to asylum cases. Although the Secretary
of State has no general duty to assist the appellant by providing information
about conditions in other countries (see Abdi and Gawe v Secretary of
State [1996] 1 WLR 298, he has a shared interest with the appellant and the
Tribunal in ensuring that decisions are reached on the best information. It is
in the interest of all parties that decisions should be made on the best
available information (see the comments of Sedley LJ in Batayav, quoted
above).
(We have also taken account of the judgment of Maurice Kay J in R
(Cindo) v Secretary of State [2002] EWHC 246 para 8-11, drawn to our
attention since the hearing by Mr Gill, in which some of these issues were
discussed.)"
39. In my judgment, no other obstacle to proceeding by judicial review exists in this
case, and in the light of the other issues under section 49 and Community law being
properly advanced by judicial review, it is clearly appropriate that one action disposes of
the question rather than two.
40. The court, in my judgment, will not be substituting its own conclusions on
disputed questions of fact or policy, since the remedy sought is to quash the decision and
remit it for reconsideration in accordance with the law set out in this judgment.
41. A different objection was faintly advanced by Ms Patterson that, as the Secretary
of State had power to make Regulations about accessibility under Part V of the DDA and
section 32, and there is a consultation now underway as to what the required
specifications for taxis should be, it would be wrong to explore the issues in a
discrimination claim under Part III.
42. I am satisfied that such a submission is wholly misconceived for the reasons
given by Ms Rose in response. The claimant's case is not a challenge to the minimum
conditions for taxi specifications. The claimant does not submit that all taxis should have
the space features of the E7. It is clear that many wheelchair users can access the
London-style taxi and have no expressed concerns about it, but this case is concerned
with a class of persons who cannot do so in safety and without difficulty. They merely
want the opportunity to be able to use the E7 as a public taxi alongside the London-style
taxis, and are not seeking a minimum one size fits all approach.
5. Error of fundamental fact
43. I accept Ms Rose's primary submission that this decision is liable to be quashed
because the judgment of the Committee was based on the fundamental misunderstanding
as to the true factual position. In my judgment, that true factual position was a
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mandatory relevant consideration, both under section 49A of the DDA and at common
law, applying the approach in E v the Home Secretary (already cited).
44. A lawful exercise of discretion could not have been performed unless the Committee
properly understood the problem, its degree and extent. The margin of discretion as to
fact and policy that the common law affords to decision-makers under the test in the
Wednesbury Corporation case only applies to decision-makers who have acted fairly
and directed themselves accurately on the relevant considerations to be weighed in
making a matter of judgment or exercise of discretion. However, whether the failures
came about as a result of the deficiencies in Mr Edwards' report, or a failure by the
Committee to take into consideration and understand the factual position emerging from
the documentary submissions and annexes in the second claimant's written submissions,
the result is the same.
45. The Committee clearly based its decision on the erroneous belief that:
1. all its existing fleet of 1400 London-style taxis were accessible to
wheelchair users generally, and that must mean to all wheelchair users;
2. problems as to the safe position and strapping of wheelchairs were the
result of driver error rather than the result of constrictions of space;
3. it was dealing merely with a wish by wheelchair users to greater choice
rather than something that restricted their ability to access the benefits
provided by the licensing regime at all.
46. Since this error was critical to its decision in respect of its DDA duties, the balance of
competing considerations if EC law was engaged and generally, it must be quashed and
the matter remitted for reconsideration unless Ms Patterson could satisfy me that it
could make no difference to the outcome. I conclude that she cannot so satisfy me.
47. In reaching that conclusion, I bear in mind that, following my conclusion on the legal
issues considered below, the inadequacy of the material relied upon to support safety
objections can now be supplemented by three pieces of post-decision evidence that the
claimants have placed before the court.
48. The first of those is a London Transport survey done in 2003 on the accessibility of the
London taxi in respect of six wheelchairs. The following relevant information can be
gleaned:
"2. Background
Although this report covers only the experiences of the six wheelchair
users a range of wheelchairs were included -both manual and electric. It
emerged very clearly that there are three major difficulties to be taken into
account when designing vehicles to meet the needs of wheelchair users: (a)
differences in the individual's size and weight; (b) differences in the nature
of the disability; and (c) differences in the wheelchair design. These
difficulties were compounded by the fact that the individual's size and the
nature of their disability may require the wheelchair to be set up differently
to meet the individual's needs. So, even though the wheelchair design may
be standard, if (for example) the occupant requires the foot rests to be
raised this can make it difficult or impossible for the passenger to get into
or turn around in the vehicle. Another passenger with the same wheelchair
would not have such difficulties.
It should also be noted that two of the wheelchairs used in this study were
large electric wheelchairs. These were of the same design but set up very
differently. While these large, electric wheelchairs may not be as widely
used as smaller, manual wheelchairs, they are increasing in popularity. It is
also likely that for people wishing to travel independently on public
transport they represent a greater proportion of wheelchairs in use than for
the general disabled population. It is essential, therefore, that any future
vehicle designs are able to accommodate large, electric wheelchairs.
Previous research conducted by Surface Transport has shown that a major
issue for disabled passengers on public transport is the desire to travel with
their partner, friends and to be able to carry on and store shopping, luggage
and/or medical supplies and aids. It should be recognised also that for
many wheelchair users their friends or partners are also wheelchair users.
Therefore, a taxi that can only accommodate one wheelchair is not
acceptable. Fully accessible taxis need to be evaluated not simply as to
whether the vehicle is accessible and comfortable for the wheelchair user
but also whether it meets all their travel wishes and requirements.
...
3.2. In the taxi
Once the wheelchair user had managed to get into the taxi they were then
faced with the problem of turning the chair around to use the safety
harness. This was impossible in the two standard, London taxis even for
the manual wheelchairs (and the electric wheelchairs could not be
accommodated at all). The occupant, therefore, was forced to ride
sideways to the direction of travel and without a safety harness. During
this study no vehicle was allowed to move off where it was felt that the
occupant was unsafe or the seating arrangement illegal.
The drivers said, however, that on the street they would be prepared to
carry a wheelchair user in a sideways position without a safety harness if
the passenger was prepared to take the risk. Consideration should be given,
not only to the safety and legal issues, but also the validity of insurance
under these circumstances."
49. The second new piece of material is the strikingly different approach displayed to both
equal opportunities assessment by the Council in an application which is presently
outstanding for a licence for another vehicle for approval as a taxi cab. This is a
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Mercedes vehicle, which has a larger rear space available for wheelchairs than the
London-style taxi although the space is still smaller than the E7. Like the E7, it has
sliding doors, though those are button rather than manually operated. It appears from
the DVD supplied to the court that Mrs Lunt cannot properly access even the Mercedes
vehicle, although it could be said that the Committee’s consideration of that vehicle is
moving in the right direction.
50. It is noticeable that this is a vehicle with sliding doors, although it appears that none of
the safety concerns about exiting from sliding doors were noted by Mr Gore in his
comment on that vehicle. The Mercedes vehicle does however meet the turning circle
requirements of the Public Carriage Office, and in that respect is similar to the London
taxi.
51. The third, is the information collected by the second claimant from a number of local
Councils, including those adjacent to Liverpool itself, indicating that no safety concerns
arose regarding the E7 either as regarding sliding doors, turning circle or anything else.
Particularly cogent amongst that material is a report prepared for Edinburgh District
Council in May 2006 examining whether the turning circle requirement of the standard
London taxi gives rise to safety considerations. The relevant part of that report
provides as follows:
"2.8.8. If it is was shown that the TRC was unequivocally unsafe, we
would recommend a licensing condition that forbids the use of U-turn
manoeuvres by taxis. However we agree with the PCO conclusions that
there is no over-riding evidence either way regarding the safety risks of
U-turns against 3 point turns. Nevertheless, unlike the PCO, we do not
consider this a reason to retain the TCR.
2.8.9. In any case, all vehicles used as taxis must meet the appropriate
standards for European Whole Vehicle Type approval. This includes
vehicles used as taxis that do not have the TTC property. Although very
useful, the results from our surveys our consultation exercise and the
details and arguments from the PCO report reviewed above have not
persuaded us that the TCR is essential to the taxi trade in terms of
providing a safe working environment. Given that its inclusion may be
detrimental to the broader interests of the trade, especially in the longer
term, we adhere to our original recommendation that Condition 181 should
be removed from The City of Edinburgh Council's taxi licensing
conditions."
52. On reconsideration of this matter, all this material will be available along with the
material originally supplied. I therefore propose to quash the decision and remit it for
reconsideration. What then follows in this judgment are my conclusions on the disputed
legal issues that should inform that reconsideration.
6. Relevant class under section 21(B) and (E)
53. A detailed exposition of the DDA section 21 is not now necessary. Ms Patterson
did not dispute Ms Rose's suggested six-step approach to section 21 that a court and a
public authority will need to address in making decisions under it.
1. Did the Council have a practice policy or procedure?
2. Did that practice policy or procedure make it impossible or
unreasonably difficult for disabled persons to receive any benefit that is, or
may be, conferred by the Council?
3. If so, is it under a duty to take such steps as is reasonable in all the
circumstances of the case for it to change that practice policy and
procedure so it no longer has that effect?
4. Has the Council failed to comply with its duty to take such steps?
5. If so, is the effect of that failure such as to make it unreasonably
difficult for Mrs Lunt to access such benefit?
6. If so, can the Council show that its failure to comply is justified in that
either(
a) it reasonably holds an opinion that the non-compliance is necessary in
order not to endanger the health or safety of any other person; or
(b) its failure is justified as a proportionate means of achieving another
legitimate aim?
54. That sequence of decisions is identified in the legislation and is supported by the
decision of the Court of Appeal in Roads v Central Trains [2004] EWCA Civ 1541. In
that case a wheelchair user sued the train company because he complained that he could
not cross over from one track to another in order to catch a train to Norwich. It was
common ground that he could not use the footbridge. There was a track that crossed the
line that could be used, but the uneven ground presented perils to wheelchair users in
general and the claimant in particular.
55. The train company contended that it did not have to provide a wheelchair
accessible vehicle to enable the claimant to cross the line but that a reasonable adjustment
was to require him to travel in the opposite direction and change trains there in order to
continue his journey.
56. Sedley LJ upheld the finding of discrimination made in the County Court and
made the following observations:
"11. It is desirable first to say something about the cross-appeal.
Manifestly no single feature of premises will obstruct access for all
disabled persons or -in most cases -for disabled persons generally. In the
present case, for instance, the footbridge is not likely to present an
insuperable problem for blind people. The phrase 'disabled persons' in
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section 21(2) must therefore be directing attention to features which
impede persons with one or more kinds of disability: here, those whose
disability makes them dependent on a wheelchair. The reason why it is
expressed in this way and not by reference to the individual claimant is that
section 21 sets out a duty resting on service providers. They cannot be
expected to anticipate the needs of every individual who may use their
service, but what they are required to think about and provide for are
features which may impede persons with particular kinds of disability impaired
vision, impaired mobility and so on. Thus the practical way of
applying section 21 in discrimination proceedings will usually be to focus
the question and the answer on people with the same kind of disability as
the claimant.
12. The personal right created by section 19 of the DDA
operates by fastening a cause of action on to the section 21 duty if the
effect of a breach of the duty is "to make it impossible or unreasonably
difficult for the disabled person to make use" of the service in question.
Thus there is a double test, albeit both limbs use the same phraseology: first
(in paraphrase), does the particular feature impede people with one or more
kinds of disability; secondly, if it does, has it impeded the claimant?
...
26. ... I do accept, however, that it is not necessary, in order to trigger the
section 21(2) duty, for the feature in question to cause unreasonable
difficulty for all or most disabled persons: any significant impact on, say,
wheelchair users as a class will in my judgment suffice. The question may
often have to be answered without reference to direct evidence from which
some kind of statistical analysis can be made: indeed the assembly of such
evidence, whether pro or con, may well be invidious or arbitrary and
therefore an inappropriate exercise to attempt. Judges are likelier to be
assisted by their own appraisal and, where necessary, expert evidence."
57. In my judgment, Sedley LJ was not there stating that, as a matter of law that in
every case of this sort the relevant class was the group of wheelchair users was the group
of wheelchair users as a whole, and for s.21 (2) to bite there has to be a denial of access
to a benefit by that class as a whole undifferentiated as to the size of the chair or the
particular disability that may distinguish one group of wheelchair users from another. I
observe that the distinction between types of wheelchairs was not the issue in that case,
and such an approach would be contrary to the whole tenor and purpose of the Act.
58. The court has been assisted by the intervention of the intervenor (now called the
Equalities and Human Rights Commission). Ms Genn appeared for them and drew the
court's attention to some material, including the Code of Practice issued by the former
Disability Rights Commission that is an aid to decision-making in this field. Paragraphs
6.4 and 6.36 provide as follows:
"6.4. The policy of the Act is not a minimalist policy of simply ensuring
that some access is available to disabled people; it is, so far as is reasonably
practicable, to approximate the access enjoyed by disabled people to that
enjoyed by the rest of the public. Accordingly, the purpose of the duty to
make reasonable adjustments is to provide access to a service as close as it
is reasonably possible to get to the standard normally offered to the public
at large.
...
6.36. However, when considering whether services are unreasonably
difficult for disabled people to use or whether disabled people’s
experiences are
unreasonably adverse, service providers should
take account of whether the time, inconvenience
effort, discomfort, anxiety or loss of dignity
entailed in using the service would be considered
unreasonable by other people if they had to
endure similar difficulties ..."
I note that paragraphs 7.11 and 11.40 of the Code reflect a similar approach.
59. The intervenor emphasises the importance of access to public transport by people
with disabilities if the policies and purposes of the Act are to be promoted and not
frustrated. It is not, in my judgment, a minimal duty, but seeks broadly to put the disabled
person as far as reasonably practicable in a similar position to the ambulant user of a taxi.
That submission is also reflected in another passage of the judgment of Sedley LJ in the
case of Roads at paragraph 13:
"Where there is only one practicable solution, it may have to be treated as
reasonable even if it is demeaning or onerous for disabled people to use it.
If on the other hand there is a range of solutions, the fact that one of them,
if it stood alone, would satisfy section 21(2)(d) may not be enough to
afford a defence. This is because the policy of the Act, as I would accept,
is what it was held to be by Mynors Ch (albeit by way of restricting the
duty) in In re Holy Cross, Pershore [2002] Fam 1, §105: "to provide access
to a service as close as it is reasonably possible to get to the standard
normally offered to the public at large". While, therefore, the Act does not
require the court to make nice choices between comparably reasonable
solutions, it makes comparison inescapable where a proffered solution is
said not to be reasonable precisely because a better one, in terms of
practicality or of the legislative policy, is available. That was this case.
60. I accordingly conclude that it is misdirection for the Council to consider that
SMITH BERNAL WORDWAVE
because some wheelchair users can access the London taxi in dignity and safety that there
is accessibility to wheelchair users as a class, and that any problem that Mrs Lunt has
must be regarded as entirely individual to her. I accept that there must be a class of
persons rather than mere problems encountered by a single individual, but the written and
oral evidence presented to the Committee and its officers upon its true construction, as in
the witness statements on behalf of the claimants in this case, showed serious difficulties
for a class of wheelchair users that was wider in extent than Mrs Lunt personally, and that
of that class there are some, like Mrs Lunt, who could not access the safe and secure
position at all. As already indicated, that evidence has increased with the post-decision
material now available for consideration.
7. Duty to give due consideration under section 49
61. Section 49A(1) of the DDA 1995 provides as follows:
"Every public authority shall in carrying out its functions have due regard
to –
(a) the need to eliminate discrimination that is unlawful under this Act;
(b) the need to eliminate harassment of disabled persons that is related to
their disabilities;
(c) the need to promote equality of opportunity between disabled persons
and other persons;
(d) the need to take steps to take account of disabled persons’ disabilities,
even where that involves treating disabled persons more favourably than
other persons;
(e) the need to promote positive attitudes towards disabled persons; and
(f) the need to encourage participation by disabled persons in public life."
62. Both sides accept that this is a mandatory relevant consideration to be considered, even
apart from section 21 duties. Clearly a proper analysis of the section 21 duties on
reconsideration may well reveal unjustified discriminatory treatment that requires
addressing. The Council's retention of the turning circle requirement in its policy is one
that makes it more difficult for a class of wheelchair users to access public hire taxis.
63. It is agreed that the proper approach to section 49 is set out in the decision of the
Divisional Court in the case of R(on the application of Judy Brown) v Secretary of State
for Work and Pensions [2008] EWHC 3158, given on 18 December 2008. All of the
judgment of Scott Baker LJ at paragraphs [79] to [96] is of interest, but the passages at
[90] to [96] are particularly relevant for the guidance of the decision-makers and
provide as follows:
"90. Subject to these qualifications, how, in practice, does the public
authority fulfil its duty to have "due regard" to the identified goals that are
set out in section 49A(1)? An examination of the cases to which we were
referred suggests that the following general principles can be tentatively
put forward. First, those in the public authority who have to take decisions
that do or might affect disabled people must be made aware of their duty to
have "due regard" to the identified goals: compare, in a race relations
context R(Watkins -Singh) v Governing Body of Aberdare Girls' High
School [2008] EWHC 1865 at paragraph 114 per Silber J. Thus, an
incomplete or erroneous appreciation of the duties will mean that "due
regard" has not been given to them: see, in a race relations case, the
remarks of Moses LJ in R (Kaur and Shah) v London Borough of Ealing
[2008] EWHC 2062 (Admin) at paragraph 45.
91. Secondly, the "due regard" duty must be fulfilled before and at the
time that a particular policy that will or might affect disabled people is
being considered by the public authority in question. It involves a
conscious approach and state of mind. On this compare, in the context of
race relations: R(Elias) v Secretary of State for Defence [2006] 1 WLR
3213 at para 274 per Arden LJ. Attempts to justify a decision as being
consistent with the exercise of the duty when it was not, in fact, considered
before the decision, are not enough to discharge the duty: compare, in the
race relations context, the remarks of Buxton LJ in R(C) v Secretary of
State for Justice [2008] EWCA Civ 882 at paragraph 49.
92. Thirdly, the duty must be exercised in substance, with rigour and
with an open mind. The duty has to be integrated within the discharge of
the public functions of the authority. It is not a question of "ticking boxes".
Compare, in a race relations case the remarks of Moses LJ in R(Kaur and
Shah) v London Borough of Ealing [2008] EWHC 2062 (Admin) at
paragraphs 24-25.
93. However, the fact that the public authority has not mentioned
specifically section 49A(1) in carrying out the particular function where it
has to have "due regard" to the needs set out in the section is not
determinative of whether the duty under the statute has been performed: see
the judgment of Dyson LJ in Baker at paragraph 36. But it is good practice
for the policy or decision maker to make reference to the provision and any
code or other non -statutory guidance in all cases where section 49A(1) is
in play. "In that way the [policy or] decision maker is more likely to ensure
that the relevant factors are taken into account and the scope for argument
as to whether the duty has been performed will be reduced": Baker at
paragraph 38.
94. Fourthly, the duty imposed on public authorities that are subject to
the section 49A(1) duty is a non -delegable duty. The duty will always
remain on the public authority charged with it. In practice another body
may actually carry out practical steps to fulfil a policy stated by a public
authority that is charged with the section 49A(1) duty. In those
circumstances the duty to have "due regard" to the needs identified will
SMITH BERNAL WORDWAVE
only be fulfilled by the relevant public authority if (1) it appoints a third
party that is capable of fulfilling the "due regard" duty and is willing to do
so; and (2) the public authority maintains a proper supervision over the
third party to ensure it carries out its "due regard" duty. Compare the
remarks of Dobbs J in R (Eisai Limited) v National Instituted for Health
and Clinical Excellence [2007] EWHC 1941 (Admin) at paragraphs 92 and
95.
95. Fifthly, (and obviously), the duty is a continuing one.
96. Sixthly, it is good practice for those exercising public functions in
public authorities to keep an adequate record showing that they had
actually considered their disability equality duties and pondered relevant
questions. Proper record -keeping encourages transparency and will
discipline those carrying out the relevant function to undertake their
disability equality duties conscientiously. If records are not kept it may
make it more difficult, evidentially, for a public authority to persuade a
court that it has fulfilled the duty imposed by section 49A(1): see the
remarks of Stanley Burnton J in R(Bapio Action Limited) v Secretary of
State for the Home Department [2007] EWHC 199 (Admin) at paragraph
69, those of Dobbs J in R(Eisai Ltd) v NICE (supra) at 92 and 94, and those
of Moses LJ in Kaur and Shah (supra) at paragraph 25."
64. The duty is to have regard rather than merely to achieve the improvement of the
equality considerations at stake, but it is to have due
regard, which must mean proper
regard and full weight to the issue must be given.
8. Is Article 28 of the EC Treaty engaged?
65. The defendants have come a long way towards accepting the claimant's
submissions since the lodging of the summary grounds and skeleton argument. In my
judgment, the previous indications of the UK case law (namely the first instance he case
of R v Metropolitan Borough Council of the Wirral [1983] 3 CMLR 150, and a decision
of the Court of Appeal in Quietlynn v Southend-on-Sea District Council [1990] 3 All ER
207) that were formerly relied upon by the defendants in their pleadings and skeleton
argument can no longer be considered relevant in the light of the development of the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice.
66. Two recent decisions of the European Court of Justice define and curtail the potential
exemptions to the principle set out in (case C-120/78) Cassis de Dijon (case C-120/78);
Rewe-Zentrale AG [1979] ECR 649, as modified by the exclusions identified in cases
C-267 and 268/91, Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR 1-6097.
67. First, there is a decision of the European Court of Justice in case C110/05 Commission
v Italy, given on 10 February 2009 and reported at 2 CMLR 34, where the Grand
Chamber distinguished between mere selling arrangements that fell outside the scope of
Article 28 and product requirements that were in it and therefore required justification.
68. Secondly, in the very recent decision in case C-142/05 Aklagaren v Mickelsson and
Roos 4 June 2009, where the ECJ has developed and explained the distinction between
general non-discriminatory conditions attached to the selling of goods in a member
state on the one hand, and conditions attached as to product requirements and restricting
use of imported goods on the other. Paragraphs [26] and [27] of that judgment provide
as follows:
"26. Even if the national regulations at issue do not have the aim or effect
of treating goods coming from other Member States less favourably, which
is for the national court to ascertain, the restriction which they impose on
the use of a product in the territory of a Member State may, depending on
its scope, have a considerable influence on the behaviour of consumers,
which may, in turn, affect the access of that product to the market of that
Member State (see to that effect, Commission v Italy, paragraph 56).
27. Consumers, knowing that the use permitted by such regulations is very
limited, have only a limited interest in buying that product (see to that
effect, Commission v Italy, paragraph 57)."
69. Ms Patterson accepts that these rules apply to local emanations of the state such
as local authorities, if the restrictions resulting from the maintenance of the licensing
policy requiring the turning circle requirement to be met have the effect set out in the
judgment of the ECJ, namely did they prevent or greatly restrict the use of the product?
70. There is some .....
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