Taxi Driver Online

Anyone got this lying about? I could do with a quick look at it.

Its on here and the NTA website

CC

_________________
Think of how stupid the average person is, and realize half of them are stupider than that.
George Carlin

All the links on here are old and dead, but TBH I'm not sure reading it will help, as it deals with street traders and an act not relating to our trade.

That said the 1982 act is similar in relation to fees as the 1976 act, which is why it is used to set fees for drivers.

Hopefully the Captain can send you a copy, and if he sends me it I will pop it up on here.

_________________
IDFIMH

696 Reg. v. Manchester City C. ex p. King (QBD)

Queen's Bench Division 27 March 1991. © LGR

Nolan LJ. and Roch J.

MANCHESTER CITY COUNCIL [R] –v-KING

'

Local authority-Licensing-Street traders-Increase in licensing charges - Whether
council acting “Ultra Vires” - Whether council bound to observe rules of natural
justice- Scope of council's power to increase licence fees Local Government
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982(c.30) Schedule 4, Para 9(1).

The Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982 provides by Schedule 4,
Paragraph 9:

(1) A district council may charge such fees as they consider reasonable, for the
grant or renewal of a Street trading licence or a street trading consent.
A council, having resolved that Schedule 4 of the Local Government (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act 1982 should apply to their district, resolved to increase fees for street
trading licences by more than 1,000 per cent. Neither individual street traders nor their
association were given an opportunity of making representations before the decision
was made. The applicant, on behalf of the street traders' association, sought judicial
review both of the decision to increase the licence fees and of a subsequent decision to
reduce the level of the new fees by 20 per cent made by the council after hearing
representatives of the street traders’ association.

.

Held: (1) That the rules of natural justice did not apply to the determination of
licence fees for street trading. Parliament having refrained from
requiring the local authorities to hear representations from street
traders on that matter; that consideration by a local authority of such
fees was an administrative matter.

R. v Wear Valley District Council ex parte Binks [1985] 2 All E.R. 699 and
Mahon v. Air New Zealand Ltd [1984] A.C. 808, distinguished
(2) That schedule 4, paragraph 9(1) of the Local Government (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act 1982 did not empower a local authority to raise general
revenue by way of street trading licences and consents; that in determining
the level of fees under that paragraph a local authority might take into account
the costs of operating the street trading scheme, including the costs of
prosecuting unlicensed traders; that it was for the local

697 Reg. v. Manchester City C. ex p. King (QBD)

authority to judge what was a reasonable fee for the purpose of recouping the
cost of operating the street trading scheme; that both decisions were flawed
because the council were seeking to set a commercial charge for street trading;
and that accordingly the decision should be quashed.

APPLICATION for Judicial Review.

By notice of application dated 21 August 1990 the applicant, Donald King, representing the
Manchester Street Traders’ Association sought judicial review of resolutions made by
Manchester City Council between 16 January and 27 February 1990, to vary fees for
street traders' licences. The grounds of this application were, inter alia, that the decisions
were out with section 9(1) of schedule 4 of the Local Government (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act 1982 in that the proposed new rates for street trading licences exceeded
what could be considered reasonable for the grant or renewal of a street trading licence;
that no council properly directing themselves on the relevant law could have reached the
decision complained of; and that the council failed to comply with the rules of natural
justice in that they gave no opportunity to the street traders of Manchester or their
association to be heard.

Schiemann J. granted leave out of time to move on this application on 6th December 1990.

Following representations to the council by the applicant’s association, the council decided
to reduce the fees by 20 per cent. By a further notice of application dated 14th January
1990 the applicant sought judicial review of that decision also on the grounds, inter alia,
that no reasonable council properly directing itself on the relevant law could have reached
the decision; that the council had acted contrary to the rules of natural justice in reaching
their decision; that the council had acted ultra vires and in excess of their powers. Leave in
the second application was granted by Schiemann J. on 24 January 1991. The court heard
the applications together.

Paul STINCHCOMBE for the applicant.

Charles CROSS for the council.

ROCH J.

Until 31 March 1990, street trading in Manchester was subject to the relevant provisions of
the Greater Manchester Act 1981. Section 130(1) of that Act provided that:

“With his application for the grant or renewal of a street trading licence… the applicant
shall pay such reasonable fee to cover the expense of Manchester City Council in dealing
with such


698 Reg. v. Manchester City C. ex p. King (QBD)

applications as the council may by resolution prescribe; and different fees may be
prescribed for applications of different kinds.”


The fee set for street trading licences for the year 1989 was £169 and for the year 1990
£196, albeit that that fee applied only to the first quarter of the year 1990. The fees for
annual licences for street trading prior to 1989 had been these: 1989, £30; 1987, £32;
1988, £169;


From 1 April 1990 street trading in Manchester has been governed by Schedule.4, of the
Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982: section 3 of the 1982 Act enabled
a district council to resolve that Schedule 4 of the Act should apply to their district on such
day as might be specified in the resolution. The council passed such a resolution adopting
a recommendation by the environmental health and consumer services committee to that
effect made on 28 November 1989.


Paragraph 9(1) to schedule 4 of the Act of1982 provides:
A district council may charge such fees as they consider reasonable for the grant or
renewal of a street trading licence or a street trading consent”.


On the 7th March 1990 the Manchester City Council resolved that the fee for a street
trading licence within the outer zone of the parking area in the centre of the city should be
£1,000 per annum and that within the inner zone of the parking meter area the fee for a
street, traders licence should be £2,000 per annum, except in the case of one road Market
Street where the licence fee was to be £2,500 for the year. That decision is the subject
matter of Mr King's first application for judicial review.
The steps by which those fees were fixed were these:
First, a report by the Director of environmental health and consumer protection and the city
solicitor was prepared for the meeting of 16January 1990 of the licensing and legal
proceedings subcommittee, of the environmental health and consumer services
committee. In this judgment I shall refer to the Manchester City Council as "the council", to
the environmental health and consumer services committee as "the committee" and to the
licensing and legal proceedings subcommittee of that committee' as "the subcommittee".


That report contained suggestions as to those streets which should be designated
“prohibited”, that is to say, streets in which no street trading would be permitted, those
streets to be designated as “consent streets”, (consent street means a street in which
street trading is prohibited without the consent of the district council) and those streets to
be designated “licensed streets” (a “licensed street” means a



699 R v. Manchester City C. ex p. King (QBD)

street in which street trading is prohibited without a licence granted by the district council).
These definitions and the power to designate streets in this way are contained in
paragraphs 1 and 2 of schedule 4, to the Act of 1982. The report informed the members of
the subcommittee by paragraph 2, 14.

“Under the provisions of schedule 4 members must consider what fees are to be levied for
licences to trade in various goods at different locations. Whilst the fee must be reasonable
it need not be restricted to the recovery of the cost of administering street trading”.

The report went on in the next paragraph, (paragraph 2.15):
"Members may wish to consider the following proposals:

(a) That within the outer zone of the parking meter area, including the market zone but
excluding the inner Zone the fee be £1,000 per year.
(b) That within the inner zone, the fee be £2,000 per year”.
With regard to street trading consents the report at paragraph 5.3 said:
"Members may wish to consider a fee of £300 as being appropriate”
The report contained no explanation as to how these sums had been chosen. The council
has an "anti-poverty” policy and in the early part of the report it was stated that the anti-
poverty implications were nil.


The subcommittee of 16 January 1990 adopted the suggested designation of streets and
areas in the city contained in that report, revoked an earlier decision to use the Greater
Manchester Act 1981 to control street trading within the city with effect from midnight on 31
March 1990, and resolved that approval be given to the proposed licence fees as detailed
in paragraphs 2.15 and 5.2 of the report. The subcommittee also resolved that approval be
given to the attachment of 12 conditions to a street trader’s licence.

The matter came before that subcommittee a second time on 27th February 1990. At that
meeting it was resolved that Market Street be designated a licence area; that the fee for a
street trading licence for Market Street be increased to £2,500 for the year and that the
wording of the tenth condition to be attached to a street trading licence relating to
collection and disposal of refuse from Street trading sites be amended.

Both those meetings of the subcommittee were in private, it being resolved under section
100(A) (4) of the Local Government Act 1972 that the press and the public be excluded
because of the likely disclosure of exempt information. Following the decisions taken on


700 R v. Manchester City C. ex p. King (QBD)

16 January 1990, notices appeared in local newspapers of the decision concerning the
designation of streets, but no mention was made of the licence fees that the subcommittee
were to invite the city council to adopt.


In these proceedings, Mr King, the applicant, acts as representative of the Manchester City
Street Traders Association. I shall refer to that body in this judgment as "the association".
A Mr Grimshaw is the secretary of that association. Following the council's approval of the
scheme proposed by the committee for the control of street trading in Manchester, on 7
March 1990, Mr Grimshaw wrote to the council on behalf of the association and to
Councillor Warren, the chairman of the committee. Meetings were held between
representatives of the association and councillors and officers of the council between 7
March and 22 March 1990. On 22 March Councillor Warren wrote to the association:


“All fees are reviewed annually, but as a result of changes in the way Local Government is
financed the city council has thoroughly reviewed all fees and these now more accurately
reflect the costs of administration and enforcement of legislation.
You made two demands:


Firstly, that the level of licence fee for street trading within the city centre be reduced by
75 per cent; Secondly, that the facility should be available to pay such fee on weekly or
monthly basis.


Unfortunately it is not possible to reduce the licence fee, and the payment of fees in
weekly or monthly instalments would impose to great a burden on the administrative
system.


However, it is possible to accept payment in four equal quarterly instalments as a
transitional arrangement. This provision would only be available for the year commencing
1 April, 1990.”


Mr Grimshaw's reply to that letter on the following day was to the effect that the
association were deeply concerned that the result of such an increase in fees would be
that: "The vast majority of our members will cease to trade or more than likely; will have to
pass it on to our customers who are mostly of the lower income bracket."


At that time the solicitors of the association were not their present solicitors. The solicitors
of that time advised the association that they had no means of challenging the council's
decision relating to fees for street trading licences and the association accepted that
advice.
In July 1990 the Manchester Private Hire Association, an association of owners and
operators of taxi cabs, successfully challenged the council’s decision relating to fees
payable by taxi cab



701 R v. Manchester City C. ex p. King (QBD)

operators in Manchester. The solicitors of that association, Messrs Aubrey Isaacson and
Co. The Manchester City Street Traders Association retained that firm of solicitors in
July 1990 with the result that on 21 August 1990, application was made by Mr King for
leave to move this court for judicial review of the decision of the council relating to fees
for street traders' licences: The relief sought was a declaration that the decisions were
invalid or ultra vires and an order of certiorari for the purposes of quashing the
decisions. The application also sought an extension of the period within which the
application could be made.

The application was considered by Schiemann J. at an oral hearing on 6 December
1990. When granting Mr King leave to move Schiemann J. indicated that it might be
desirable if the street traders sought the opportunity to make representations relating to
street trading licence fees to the council.

Following that indication by Schiemann J. the city council sent letters to all licensed
street traders inviting them to attend a meeting of the subcommittee on 19 December for
the purpose of making representations. The council also invited the Manchester City
Street Traders Association to make representations to their Subcommittee through its’
solicitor Mr Isaacson.

Prior to the meeting of the subcommittee on 19 December 1990, the members of the
subcommittee were sent a report prepared by the city solicitor. That report began by
stating that the purpose of the meeting was to reconsider fees for street trading licences
for the year 1990 to 1991 in the light of representations made by the traders and to set
the licence fees for street trading licences for the year 1991 to 1992. The
recommendation was that the subcommittee set reasonable fees for street trading
licences having regard to representations made by the street traders. The report
recorded that leave to apply for judicial review had been granted by Schiemann J on 6th
December on the basis that there was:

“(a) an arguable case; and (b) that the decision makers had not taken into account the
effect such an increase in fees would have on the livelihoods of street traders”

The report further informed the members of the subcommittee- that representations had
been invited from all licensed street traders concerning the level of licence fees for the
current year and the next year, which would enable them to show what effect an
increase in fees might have upon their livelihoods.

At the start of the subcommittee meeting and before the street traders and their solicitor
were admitted to the meeting the members of the subcommittee were provided with the
affidavits sworn by Mr


702 R v. Manchester City C. ex p. King (QBD)

Grimshaw, Mr King and Mr Isaacson in support of the application for judicial review and
had the opportunity to read those affidavits. Mr Grimshaw, Mr King and Mr Isaacson
were then invited into the meeting. Mr Grimshaw then addressed the meeting briefly and
handed in a petition signed by some 8,000 persons in support of street trading.
Mr Isaacson, then addressed the subcommittee at greater length, submitting the
accounts of six street traders who had produced trading accounts so that they might be
disclosed to the subcommittee, making the point that those accounts showed that the
increased fees would take up a large proportion of the net profits of those traders, and in
the case of one trader the whole of the net profit. These accounts were said to be
representative of the turnover and profit of street traders in Manchester.

Following those representations considerable discussion took place in the subcommittee
in the absence of the representatives of the association. The committee then resolved to
reduce the licence fees for street trading already, fixed for the year 1990 to 1991 by 20
per cent but to increase those fees by 11 per cent for the year 1991 to 1992, such
increases being in line with other increases in other licence fees for that year. One
councillor dissented, that councillor being in favour of the licence fee for street trading
being reduced to £196 for the year 1990 to 1991, that is to say, to the figure that had
been adopted under the Greater Manchester Act 1981.

The subcommittee’s, decision was adopted by the council on 30 January 1991.
However, prior to that time Mr King had applied for leave to move this court for judicial
review of the decision of the subcommittee of 19 December 1990, that leave being
granted by Schiemann J on 24 January 1991. This court gave the applicant leave to
move in respect of the decision of the full council at the commencement of this hearing.

The benefit of street trading to the community is that street traders provide inexpensive
goods for those with low incomes, that is to say, for "people to whom pennies mean a
lot". In particular, street traders are a source of inexpensive food for those with low
incomes.

It is the belief of street traders in Manchester that the increases in the fees for street
trader’s licences passed by the council are so large, (the new fee of £2,000 represents
an increase of 1,083 per cent) that they must have been introduced, if not to put an end
to street trading in the centre of Manchester then to effect a substantial reduction in the
number of street traders in the centre of Manchester.

The council’s counsel accepts that the use of exorbitant fees to implement such a policy
would be ultra vires the authority's power given by paragraph 9 of schedule 4 of the Act
of 1982. The council


703 R v. Manchester City C. ex p. King (QBD)

say that they adopted the Act of 1982 primarily to help combat unlawful street trading
outside the city centre as the provisions of the Act of 1982 in this regard are more
effective than those of the Act of 1981.

Although the report in which the new fees were first suggested contained no explanation
of how those figures were derived, Mr Button, an assistant solicitor with the council has
deposed that the proposed fees were fixed having regard to the fees charged for stalls
within the various markets controlled by the council and also having regard to tenders
which had been received by the markets department for a one-year licence to trade from
one of four barrows to be owned by the council and stationed in Albert Square in the
centre of the city. Mr Button exhibited to his affidavit a list of the weekly charges, made
for stalls in various open and covered markets in the city of Manchester. Those charges
range between £20 per week and £229 per week. Mr Button also exhibited a list of
offers received for stall licences in Albert Square, those offers ranging between £400
and £6,500. Councillor Warren, the chairman of the subcommittee has deposed that the
factors which influenced the subcommittee were: first, the charge for stalls in council-
operated markets: second, the tenders received for the stalls in Albert Square, and third,
the proximity of the street traders to the city centre which is the major shopping centre in
the north west of England.

The council accepts that the street traders were not heard before the fees were fixed by
them on 7 March 1990. The council point out that there is no requirement that they
advertise the proposed fees or that they invite representations or consult street traders
or their association in schedule 4 to the Act of 1982. That is in contrast to the position
relating to the designation of streets and the recovery from licence holders of reasonable
charges for the collection of refuse, the cleansing of streets and other services rendered
by the authority to the licence holder in his capacity as licence holder, where the council
is under a statutory obligation to give notice of the proposals, publish notice of the
proposals in the local newspaper, to specify a reasonable period within which
representations concerning their proposals may be made to them and to consider any
representations which are made. The council submit that despite the absence of any
statutory obligation to listen to representations as to the amounts of fees for street
trader’s licences, they did entertain representations from the association on 22 March
1990 as a result of which they introduced the concession relating to quarterly payment
of fees.

The council say that the street traders and their association had no legitimate
expectation that they would be consulted prior to the


704 R v. Manchester City C. ex p. King (QBD)

fixing of street trading licence fees because no promise had been made to them by the
council that they would be consulted, nor was there any established practice of prior
consultation. In any event, submit the council the street traders were heard and fully
heard on 19 December 1990. Councillor Warren in his second affidavit has deposed that
members of the subcommittee took full account of the affidavits of Mr Grimshaw and Mr
King together with the representations made on behalf of the association by Mr
Isaacson; and that regard was had to the effect that the fees charged for street trading
licences might have upon the livelihoods of street traders. The council has no desire to
drive street traders from the streets.

Councillor Warren refutes totally the allegation that the subcommittee on 19 December
was motivated by bad faith or improper motive.

Mr Cross who appeared for the Council, said that the council had had regard to market
forces in fixing the street traders' licence fees and that that was not unlawful. He went
further and said that a local authority are under a fiduciary duty to their charge payers to
maximise their income: The local authority can say that they have a right to fix fees and
to take into account what the market will bear and that they will in doing that consider
what the street traders can afford to pay. Mr Cross went on to say that there was an
argument that a local authority would be in breach of their fiduciary duty to their charge-
payers if they did not obtain by way of licence fees what the market will bear. The Local
Authority discharge their duty if they ask themselves “What will the market bear?” In
answering that question councillors, use their judgment and their knowledge of street
trading conditions in their area. Mr Cross pointed to subparagraph 2 of paragraph. 9, of
schedule 4, which provides:

“A council may determine different fees for different types of licence or consent and in
particular, but without prejudice to the generality of this subparagraph, may determine
fees differing according-(a) to the duration of a licence or consent; (b) to the street in
which it authorises training; and (c) to the descriptions of articles in which the holder is
authorised to trade."

Mr Cross submitted that the provisions of that subparagraph indicated that the Council
may and should take into account market factors.

In support of the council’s contention that the fees they fixed were reasonable, affidavit
evidence has been served to indicate that the number of street trading licences has
increased from 42 in the year 1989 to 48 in the year 1990 to 1991. Of the 48 current
street trading licences, 14 licence holders have paid the new fees in full and 31


705 R v. Manchester City C. ex p. King (QBD)

have undertaken to pay the new fees by instalments. All of those who have given that
undertaking have paid two instalments but no more. The council sent out reminders to
those persons in December of last year. In addition 29 further applications for street
trading licences were received by the Council over and, above the 48 which had been
issued. Those applications had been refused because the applicant or the application
site or the nature of the goods were unsuitable. In addition over 100 further inquiries
have been received by the markets department of the council. The council have also
submitted affidavit evidence as to charges for street trading licences made by other
comparable local authorities which shows that the fees that they have fixed are in the
middle of the range of such fees. The Council accept that the four street trading licences
in Albert Square were issued at fees of £ 100 each, those fees being paid by the
markets department of the council, and that all four persons who took up those licences
ceased to trade in Albert Square after some three or four months. Nevertheless the
council say that they were entitled in the early months of 1990 to look at the sums which
street traders had been prepared to offer for pitches in Albert Square as an indication of
the state of the market for street traders’ licences in the centre of Manchester

In her second affidavit Mrs Davenport, a principal environmental health officer with the
council stated:
“Street trading licence fees1 charged by Manchester City Council include amounts to
reflect the cost to enforcement, administration and street cleansing.”
Mr Button in his fourth affidavit stated that he had been informed that a certain
proportion of the street trading licence fee is used by operational services as a payment
towards street cleansing, which is general litter collection and street cleaning as
opposed to specific refuse collection.

At first sight those passages in the council's affidavits suggest that there has been a
breach of the terms of paragraph 9 of schedule 4. By subparagraph (8) of paragraph 9
the council may determine that charges under subparagraph (6) of paragraph 9, that is
to say, such reasonable charges as the council may determine for the collection of
refuse, the cleansing of streets and other services rendered by the council to the street
trader in his capacity as a licence holder; should be included in the fee payable under
paragraph for the street trading licence or street trading consent. Alternatively the
council may recover such charges separately. By Subparagraphs (9), (10) and (12) of
paragraph 9 of schedule 4 the council must give notice of the proposed charges;
advertise such charges in a local newspaper and


706 R v. Manchester City C. ex p. King (QBD)

specify a reasonable period within which representations may be made, and consider
such representations before determining such charges.

A further affidavit from Mrs Davenport was filed during the hearing explaining that it is a
term of the street trader's licence that the street trader is responsible for the removal of
waste and litter generated by his stall. Consequently, the affidavit goes on to say, the
matters referred to in paragraph 18 of Mrs Davenport's second affidavit and in Mr
Button’s fourth affidavit are not charges made under paragraph (9) (6) of Schedule ,4 to
the Act of 1982. Therefore the council have not been ID breach of their obligations under
subparagraphs (9), (10) and (11) of paragraph 9. The services covered by “the certain
proportion of the street trading licence fee used by operational services" was not a
charge for services rendered to him by the council in his capacity as licence holder. I
simply observe that whereas in respect of general street cleaning as opposed to specific
refuse collection this explanation is readily understood, it is difficult to see how this
explanation can apply to "the cost of enforcement” because the enforcement of the
street trading scheme and the prevention of illegal street trading would appear on the
face of it to be a service rendered by the council to the street trader in his capacity as a
licence holder. Nevertheless, that was not an aspect of the case pursued by Mr
Stinchcombe on behalf of the applicant.

Inquiry of Mr Cross revealed that no figures have ever existed to show what proportion
of the Street trading licence fee represents the cost to the council of those matters
referred to in paragraph 18 of Mrs Davenport’s second affidavit.

On behalf of the applicant, Mr Stinchcombe submitted that the council’s decision of 7
March 1990 was defective and should be quashed for several reasons. First, the
increases in fees were unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense [Associated Provincial
Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 K.B. 223; 45 L.G.R. 635 that no
reasonable local authority could have decided upon them on the information before the
council's subcommittee in January and February of 1990. Second, the council by their
subcommittee had failed to consider a material matter before fixing the new fees,
namely, the probable impact of such substantial increases in the licence fees on existing
and potential street traders.

Thirdly, there is a breach of the rules of natural justice in that no opportunity was
afforded to existing holders of street trading licences of street trading licences to make
representations to the subcommittee before the subcommittee reached their decisions.
The rules of natural justice are to be applied because this is a case where the livelihood
of persons will be affected


707 R v. Manchester City C. ex p. King (QBD)

by the acts or decision of the public authority. Here Mr Stinchcombe relied on two
authorities R. v Wear Valley District Council ex parte Binks [1985] 2 All E.R. 699 and
Mahon v. Air New Zealand Ltd [1984] A.C. 808

Mr Stinchcombe submitted that the council's decision of 31 January 1991 should be set
aside because it also was unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense, being simply a
decrease by 20 per cent of fees that had been fixed by decisions that were themselves
flawed.

Further, the subcommittee on 19 December 1990 had received evidence from existing
street traders which all pointed to the catastrophic effect on existing street traders' of the
proposed increases. The reductions were not sufficient on the evidence presented to the
subcommittee and, apparently, accepted by it.

Further, in so far as the level of fees determined by the subcommittee was based on
factors other than the probable effect on existing street traders, the decisions were
flawed because the street traders were not informed of those other factors and given an
opportunity to make representations on them.

Mr Stinchcombe's principal submission was that the Council had misconstrued the
statute in applying the test of "What will the market bear?” when determining the level of
fees for street trading licences. The discretion given to the local authority by paragraph
9(1) of schedule 4 to the Act of 1982 is to charge such fees as they consider
reasonable, but that must be such fees as will promote the policy and objects of the Act.

Mr Stinchcombe argues that it is not the purpose of the Act of 1982 to provide the local
authority with a power to raise money irrespective of the impact of the level of fees
charged upon street traders and street trading. Mr Stinchcombe meets Mr Cross's
argument founded on subparagraph 2 of paragraph 9 by saying that, far from enabling
the local authority to look simply at market forces, the purpose of subparagraph 2 is to
ensure that street trading is not confined to a few prime streets and to those types of
article which may produce high profits for street traders.

Subparagraph (2) enables the local authority to have a scheme or pattern of street
trading within their district which provides a range of goods in a number of different
places to meet the needs of those living within the local authority's area, and in particular
of those with low incomes. Thus the local authority can ensure that each licensed street
has one or more traders dealing in fruit and vegetables by adjusting the licence fees
charged for street trading if necessary, so that street traders in fruit and vegetables pay
lower fees than those dealing in goods which provide more lucrative rewards for the
dealer.

I accept the submission of Mr Cross that this is not a case of


708 R v. Manchester City C. ex p. King (QBD)

breach of a legitimate expectation on the part of the street traders of Manchester that they
would be heard before the fees for street trading were fixed, because there was no
promise to that effect by the council nor was there any practice of consultation with
street traders before licence fees were set. Mr Stinchcombe for the applicant did not
place reliance upon the doctrine of a legitimate expectation when making the
submission that the decision should be set aside for procedural irregularity. Mr
Stinchcombe relied upon a failure to observe the .rules of natural justice.

In my judgment there is no question of the rules of natural justice having application in
this case, despite the fact that the livelihoods of street traders were affected by fees for
street trading licenses and consents, set by local authorities. Parliament in the Act of
1982 has required authorities to invite and to consider representations from street
traders in two situations but has refrained from making such requirements part of the
process of the determination of licence fees unless the licence fees include those
matters set out in subparagraph (6) of paragraph 9 of Schedule 4.

The two cases relied upon by Mr Stinchcombe can both be distinguished from the
present case. In R v Wear Valley District Council, ex parte Binks, (supra) the case
concerned the revocation of an informal licence or permission given to a particular street
trader, where the effect of the revocation was to deprive the street trader of her
livelihood. There the court held that the council's failure to give the applicant prior notice,
or an opportunity to be heard or any reasons for their decision amounted to a denial of
natural justice and consequently the decision giving her notice, to quit would be
quashed. The second case of Mahon v Air New Zealand (supra) concerned the making
of an order that Air New Zealand should pay $150,000 towards the costs of a Royal
Commission investigating the cause and circumstances of an air disaster made by a
judge of the High Court of New Zealand and who had been appointed by the governor-
general as Royal Commissioner to investigate the air crash.

Both cases concerned the making of decisions which affected a single legal person and
are to be contrasted with the administrative act of setting a licence fee which will apply
generally to a class of persons. Further, in the first case the effect of the local authority's
decision was to prevent the applicant from trading altogether.

If I am wrong in this matter, then in my judgment the council remedied any procedural
defect in their decision of 7 March 1990 by the meeting of the subcommittee held on 19
December 1990. I do not accept the criticisms made on behalf of the applicant of the
subcommittee's conduct at that meeting. I accept Mr Cross's


709 R v. Manchester City C. ex p. King (QBD)

submission that consideration by the subcommittee of a local authority of the proper
level of licence fees for street trading is an administrative matter and does not require
the subcommittee to follow procedures which would be appropriate to a hearing in a
court of law. The evidence indicates that the street traders were given every opportunity
to make any representations that they cared to make which they considered to be
relevant to the fixing of the licence fees, and the members of the subcommittee listened
to and took account of those submissions.

This case turns on the proper interpretation to be given to paragraph 9(1) of schedule 4
to the Act of 1982. The critical questions, in my opinion are:

1. Were the subcommittee given correct advice in the initial report by the officers of
the council when they said “Whilst the fee must be reasonable, it need not be
restricted to the recovery of the cost of administering street trading"?
2. When the council set the licence fees for street trading by asking themselves,
"What would the market bear?” were the council applying the correct criterion?
The Greater Manchester Act 1981 section 130(1) required the Manchester Council to
"prescribe fees which were reasonable to cover their expense in dealing with such
applications.” Clearly the wording of paragraph 9(1) of schedule 4 to the Act of 1982
reflects Parliament’s intention that the local authority in determining reasonable fees for
street trading licences are no to be restricted to fees which will cover their expense in
dealing with such applications." But does the wording of paragraph 9 (1) enable a local
authority to raise general revenue by way of fees for street trading licences and
consents? In my judgement it does not.

First, it would be surprising if Parliament had intended to include a general revenue-
raising provision in a schedule which deals solely with street trading. The purpose of that
part of the Act is to establish a general scheme for street trading which local authorities
may adopt, if they so desire: see section 3 of the Act. The fees which a district council
may charge are "such fees as they consider reasonable for the grant or renewal of a
street trading licence or a street trading consent." The fees charged, in my judgment,
must be related to the street trading scheme operated by the district council and the
costs of operating that scheme. The district council may charge such fees as they
reasonably consider will cover the total cost of operating the street trading scheme or
such lesser part of the costs of operating the street trading scheme as they consider
reasonable. One consequences of the wording used is that, if the fees levied in the
event exceed the


710 R v. Manchester City C. ex p. King (QBD)

cost of operating the scheme, the original decision will remain valid provided that it can
be said that the district council reasonably considered such fees would be required to
meet the total cost of operating the scheme.

That the provision is not a provision enabling a local authority to raise revenue for
purposes other than street trading is confirmed by the fact that Parliament has not
required the local authority to give prior notice of the fees they intend to charge or to
invite representations concerning those fees or to take account of such representations
unless the fees include charges referred to in subparagraph (6) of paragraph 9 of
Schedule 4. Had Parliament intended paragraph 9(1) to be a general revenue-raising
provision, or had Parliament intended that the district council should be able to charge
"what the market would bear”, then Parliament could have used terms similar to those of
section 123 of the Local Government Act 1972, which deals with the disposal of land by
local authorities where the local authority must seek a consideration that is the best that
can reasonably be obtained.

Mr Cross's submission on the wording of paragraph 9(2) of schedule 4 does not
persuade me that that indicates that Parliament intended the local authority to take
account of market considerations when determining fees for street trading licences. I
prefer the counter submission made upon this point by Mr Stinchcombe on behalf of the
applicant.

What considerations do local authorities have to take into account when determining the
level of fees under paragraph 9(1)? The local authority are no longer confined to the
cost of issuing licences. They may take into account the costs which they will incur in
operating the street trading scheme, including the prosecution of those who trade in the
streets without licences. However, if they take into account those costs they may need
to comply with the provisions of paragraph 9(8), (9), (10) and (11) as the prosecution of
those who trade in streets without street trading licences or consents may be services
rendered by the local authority to street traders in their capacity as licence holders within
the meaning of paragraph 9(6).

The weighing and placing of a monetary value on the various facets of the street trading
scheme and the judgment of what is a reasonable fee for the purpose of recouping in
whole or in part the cost of operating the street trading scheme are matters for the
members of the local authority.

My conclusion is that the initial decision was flawed because the council sought to set a
commercial charge for a street trading licence rather than determining a reasonable fee
to recover the whole or part


711 R v. Manchester City C. ex p. King (QBD)

of their costs in operating a street trading scheme. Further the council failed to have any
regard for fees charged prior to 31 March 1990. Consequently, in my judgment, the
council took into account an irrelevant consideration and failed to have regard to a
relevant consideration when reaching the decision of 7 March1990. The first flaw exists
in the decision made on 31January 1991. Consequently I would quash both
decisions and send the matter back for reconsideration in the light of the terms of
the judgements given by this court.

There remains the issue of the delay in bringing the first application for judicial review.
That matter can be dealt with shortly. As my view is that the decision of 31 January of
this year is flawed in the same way as the decision of 3 March last year and there can
be no question of delay in bringing the application for judicial review of the council's
second decision relating to street trading fees for the year 1990-91, and as the decision,
of the council of 31 January 1991 has had the effect of superseding or revoking the
decision of 7 March 1990, the lateness of the application for judicial review of the earlier
decision, even if unjustifiable, should not result in this court refusing the relief sought in
respect of the later decision.

NOLAN L.J.

I agree that these applications should be granted. I agree in particular that the case
turns on the meaning which should be given to paragraph 9(1) of schedule 4 to the
Local Government ((Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982, which reads:

“A district council may charge such fees as they consider reasonable for the grant or
renewal of a street trading licence or a street trading consent.”

The substance of the submissions put forward by Mr Cross on behalf of the council was
that, in deciding what was a reasonable fee to charge, the council were entitled and
indeed bound, to have regard to the fact that a street trading licence or consent is a
valuable commodity. The evidence, he said, was that the council considered solely what
was reasonable, having regard to what was a fair price to ask for a facility in respect of
which there was a market. The council are under a fiduciary duty to maximise their
income. The council own the highway, and should charge a proper amount for its use.
He referred, by way of analogy, to section 123(2) of the Local Government Act 1972
which provides that, subject to specified exceptions: "...a council shall not dispose of
land …for a consideration not less than the best that can reasonably be obtained.”

The argument was most attractively put by Mr Cross, but I must say at once that in my
judgment rests upon a fallacy. The fallacy


712 R v. Manchester City C. ex p. King (QBD)

lies in believing that paragraph 9(1) authorises the council to use their licensing powers
as an income-producing asset. Had this been the intention of Parliament the extent of
the fund-raising powers conferred upon the Council would be enormous, since they
have a monopoly over the granting of street trading licences in the Greater Manchester
area. They have a similar monopoly in respect of the granting of other licences,
including, for example, those for music and other entertainments and for sex
establishments. In these cases also the Act of 1982 authorises them to charge
reasonable fees for the grant or renewal of licences: see paragraph 7 of schedule 1 and
paragraph 19 of Schedule 3. If the arguments of Mr Cross about the meaning of
paragraph 9(1) and other similarly worded provisions are correct, then the Act of 1982
has provided the council and other licensing authorities with golden opportunities to
augment their revenues.

In my judgement this was not the intention of Parliament. I accept the submission of Mr
Stinchcombe that the powers conferred upon the councils by schedule 4 must be
understood and exercised in accordance with the policy and objects of the Act. So far as
schedule 4 is concerned, the policy and object of the Act is to control street trading. The
power of the council to grant licences and consents is coupled with a duty to ensure that
street trading is conducted and the highway is used in a manner which serves the public
interest. The Act is not a fiscal measure. The purpose of paragraph 9(1) is to enable the
council to charge a reasonable fee for the service which they render in granting or
renewing licences and consents. Paragraph 9(2) enables the council to charge different
fees to different traders, depending upon the type of goods which they sell and the place
where they sell them with a view to ensuring so far as possible that the public are
supplied with the right goods in the right place. But the level of fees overall must be
related to the cost to the council of operating the street trading scheme. I fully agree in
this respect with the views expressed by Roch J. Counsel were unable to refer us to
any other case in which the point has arisen, but I note that the conclusion which we
have reached appears to be in line with the approach adopted by the Divisional Court,
albeit without argument to the contrary, in R v Greater London Council ex parte the
Rank Organisation Ltd, The Times, 19 February 1982.

That ought to dispose of the matter but I would add for the sake of completeness that I
see considerable force in the applicant's complaint that fees were, raised by something
like 1,000 per cent without sufficient regard, to the ability of street traders to absorb the
additional cost. I think that it may fairly be said that the


713 R v. Manchester City C. ex p. King (QBD)

council failed in this respect to take account of a material consideration when they
arrived at their initial decision of 7 March 1990. The affidavits filed by the applicant
indicate that for some traders at least the additional cost would be ruinous. But these
affidavits, together with the oral representations made by and on behalf of the applicant
and others, were taken into account by the licensing and legal proceedings
subcommittee before it reached the decision which was approved by the council on 30
January 1991.

Moreover, it had become clear by then that, despite the hardship which the proposed
increase in fees would have presented to the applicant and those similarly placed, it had
produced no reduction in the number of traders applying for licences, but rather the
reverse. Accordingly, I would not set aside the final decision of the council on the ground
that material considerations had been left out of account, nor on the ground, which was
also suggested by Mr Stinchcombe, that the decision was irrational. But, for the reasons
given, I consider that both decisions were based on an incorrect interpretation of
paragraph 9(1) and must therefore be quashed.

Solicitors for the applicant –
Aubrey Isaacson & Co, Prestwich, Manchester.


Solicitor for the council –

R. Ingham, City Solicitor, (Manchester City Council.
Reported by John Spencer Esq._ Barrister-at-Law

_________________
Justice for the 96. It has only taken 27 years...........repeat the same lies for 27 years and the truth sounds strange to people!

[1989] Road Traffic Reports 285- 295

17 APRIL 1989

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION

REGINA V MANCHESTER CITY JUSTICES, Ex parte McHUGH MANCHESTER CITY COUNCIL

(Intervening)

REGINA v MANCHESTER CITY COUNCIL, Ex parte REID

SIMON BROWN J

Hackney carriage- Licence- Conditions -Requirement for special adaptation of vehicle to carry
wheelchair-bound passengers -Imposition on new licences as recognising lessened value of old
licences -Whether valid -Town Police Clauses Act 1847 s 37 Local Government (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act 1976, ss 47(1). 60 -Transport Act 1985 s 16

Section 37 of the Town Police Clauses Act 1847 [as amended by section 16 of the Transport Act
1985] provides:
'The [licensing authority} may from time to time licence to ply for hire. . . hackney. . . carriages...
provided that the grant of a licence may be refused, for the purpose of limiting the number of
hackney carriages in respect of which licences are granted, if, but only if, the person authorised to
grant the licences is satisfied that there is no significant demand for the services of hackney
carriages (within the area to which the licence would apply) which is unmet:


Section 47 of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 provides:
'(1) A district council may attach to the grant of a licence of a hackney carriage under the Act of


1847 such conditions as the district council may consider reasonably necessary . . .

(3) Any person aggrieved by any conditions attached to such a licence may appeal to a
magistrates' court.'
Section 60 provides:
'(1) a district council may. . . revoke, or . . . refuse to renew a vehicle licence on any of the following

grounds. . . (c) any. . . reasonable cause. .. (3) Any proprietor aggrieved by a decision of a
district council under this section may appeal to a magistrates' court.'

A council, which had granted 450 hackney carriage licences, resolved to grant 100 new such
licences in accordance with section 37 of the Town Police Clauses Act 1847, as amended by
section 16 of the Transport Act 1985, in order to meet an unmet demand for hackney carriages. To
provide transport facility for certain disabled persons the council, in accordance with section 47(1)
of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976, imposed on the grant of each new
licence a condition, which was endorsed on the licence, requiring the vehicle to be specially
adapted to carry wheelchair-bound disabled passengers and for the necessary work to be
completed within 12 months of the date of issue of the licence; also endorsed on the licence was a
statement that, if a hackney carriage was transferred to another proprietor during the period of a
licence, the licence for the vehicle would be transferred to the new owner for the unexpired period
of the licence but the licence might well not be renewed to the new owner, such renewal being a
matter for the unfettered discretion of the council. The condition requiring adaptation was not
imposed on the old licences, since their value was severely cut by the grant of the 100 new
licences. Two applicants, who were each granted one of the new licences, applied for judicial
review by way of declarations that the condition requiring conversion was unlawful and that noncompliance
was no ground for revoking or refusing to renew the new licence under section 60 of
the Act of 1976.


© [1989] Road Traffic Reports 285- 295

On the application:

Held, refusing the application, that no objection existed to the council having regard to the existence or lack
of alternative facilities for the disabled when deciding to exercise the condition-making power under section
47 of the Act of 1976 (p 292F); that the imposition of the condition requiring adaptation of the vehicle was
not invalidated by its imposition merely on the new licences and was not inconsistent with the requirements
of section 47(1) (p 292K); that, since the council was properly able to make that condition, the council could
decide among competing new applicants by reference to their ability and willingness to fulfil the condition (p
293 F-G); and that the council was entitled to impose the condition on new licence holders and not on the
existing licence holders in recognition of the impact of the new licences on the value of the old licences (p
294E). ' .
Held further that, albeit the endorsement expressly warning about the risk of later non-renewal of a
transferred new licence discouraged prospective purchasers and was objectionable by using language
suggesting that the council could refuse to renew otherwise than for reasonable cause, by implying that the
final decision on renewal rested with the council and in omitting reference to a right of appeal to the
magistrates' court, a specific order was unnecessary and inappropriate in the circumstances of the objection
being made late and an offer by the council to omit the endorsement from all future grants or to modify it in
accordance with section 60 and to impose it on all licences (p 295K-L); and that, accordingly, the decisions
challenged being valid the application failed (p 2960E).

Cases referred to in the judgment:

Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948J 1 KB 223; [1947J 2 All ER 680,
CA
Pyx Granite Co Ltd v Ministry of Housing and Local Government [1958]1 OB 554; [1958J 2 WLR 371..
[1958J 1 All ER 625, CA


Reg. v Metropolitan Borough Council of Wirral, Ex parte The Wirral Licensed Taxi Owners
Association (1983-3)38 CMLR 150.
Reg. v Great Yarmouth Borough Council, Ex parte Sawyer (Note) [1989] RTR 297, CA

No other case was cited in argument.

MANCHESTER CITY JUSTICES, Ex parte McHUGH MANCHESTER CITY COUNCIL (Intervening)
Application for judicial review

The applicant, Anthony McHugh, sought an order of certiorari to quash the decision of Manchester City
Justices on 4 March 1968 to dismiss the appeal of the applicant McHugh against conditions attached to the
issue of his taxi licence and for a declaration that the condition attached to the grant of his licence, namely,
that he adapt his vehicle so as to accommodate a wheelchair, was unlawful. The grounds on which the relief
was sought were stated as follows:

(1) Bias in Composition of Bench
(i) Subject-Matter of Appeal (a) Section 47 of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976
states that '(1) A district Council may attach to the grant of a licence of a hackney carriage under the
Town Police Clauses Act of 1847 such conditions as the district council may consider reasonably
necessary:
Section 47(3) at the Act of 1976 provides that 'any person aggrieved by any conditions attached to such
a licence may appeal to a magistrates' court' (b) The appeal of the applicant McHugh to the magistrates
was against a condition, attached to the grant of his hackney carriage licence by Manchester City
Council, that he convert his car to accommodate a wheelchair so as to be able to carry disabled
persons. This condition had originally been attached to the grant of some 100 new licences Issued by
the council in response to an initiative from the equal opportunities disabled steering group".
(ii) Interest of Chairman of Justices of the Bench (a) the chairman of bench of Justices that dismissed the
appeal was himself employed by the Manchester social services as an instructor for the mentally
retarded and was therefore an employee of the respondents to the appeal. His wife was a city councillor
and deputy chair of the social services committee. (b) The chairman of the bench did not declare the
aforesaid interest at the outset of the proceedings. Later however when the bench retired to consider its

© [1989] Road Traffic Reports 285- 295

decision - that information was drawn to the attention of the applicant McHugh's solicitor who informed
the clerk to the justices. The chairman later apologised for his failure to declare an interest. (c) Given
the foregoing, the fairness of the proceedings was vitiated by the fact that the chairman was employed
by the respondents to the appeal and his wife was a representative of the respondents' council.
Moreover, the very special nature of the chairman's employment in work with a special handicapped
group, and his wife's position as deputy of the council's social services committee, further added to the
likelihood or possibility of bias on his part. Further, or in the alternative, justice could not be seen to be
done, and was not seen to be done when a person employed by the respondents to the appeal in the
special employment of the chairman, sat with the other justices to determine this appeal.

(2)
Unlawfulness and unreasonableness of the condition Further, or in the alternative, the justices
misdirected themselves in law in directing themselves that the condition attached by the council was
'reasonably necessary for the reasons stated below: (i) the provision of special services for the
wheelchair-bound is not a legitimate end to achieve by the exercise of the power to attach conditions to
the grant of taxi licences conferred by section 47(1) of the Local Government (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act 1976; alternatively if it is a legitimate end, then it is unfair and unreasonable to achieve
that end by a selective imposition of financially burdensome conditions on some taxi-drivers whilst no
such condition has been imposed on others; (ii) furthermore, the imposition of the aforesaid conditions
is inconsistent with the underlying statutory purpose of section 16 of the Transport Act 1985; the
purpose of the Act of 1985 was to remove numerical limits on the amount of taxi licences issued save
when they were justified by the fact that all significant demands were already met; there was no
evidence before the justices, or the council, that the only significant unmet demand was that of those
requiring to use wheelchairs; the evidence was that the new group of taxis -for which licences were
only granted subject to the wheelchair conversion condition -would have met an unmet significant
demand, whether or not they had been converted for use by the wheelchair-bound; the effect of
imposing these conditions was to impose a more onerous financial burden on a particular group of taxi-
drivers before they would be allowed to compete at all; this is quite contrary to the object and
intendment of section 16 which is to ensure that henceforth market forces would be the only factor
determining the numerical limits on taxi licences, and on the number of taxis operating; (iii) further, or in
the alternative, the imposition of these burdensome conditions for the conversion of vehicles by all new
licence holders was so unfair and unreasonable as to be' unlawful for the following reasons: (a) it
discriminated against the applicants for new taxi licences unfairly; (b) it "imposed an oppressively heavy
financial burden on all applicants for new taxi licences.
REGINA v MANCHESTER CITY COUNCIL Ex parte REID Application for judicial review

The applicant, Leslie Reid, sought a declaration that the condition attached to the grant of his hackney
carriage licence, namely, that he convert his vehicle to carry wheelchair-bound passengers, was unlawful
and a declaration that his non-compliance with that condition would not afford a lawful ground for the council
to revoke or refuse to renew his licence under section 60 of the Local Government (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act 1976. The grounds on which the relief was sought were stated as follows:

(1) Section 16 of the Transport Act 1985 provides that the grant of a hackney carriage licence may be
refused . . . if, but only if, the person authorised to grant licences is satisfied that there is no significant
demand for the services of hackney carriages (within the area to which the licence would apply) which
IS unmet: The effect of this section is to make the grant (and subsequent renewal) of a hackney
carriage licence mandatory unless the licensing authority IS satisfied that there would be no significant
unmet demand for the services of hackney carriages if the licence was refused.
(2) On 9 December 1980 the Manchester City Council's environmental and
consumer services legal
proceedings sub-committee made a positive finding that 'there was an unmet need for hackney
carriages in the city and therefore passed the resolution that 100 new licences should be granted. The
applicant was to be granted one of these 100 new licences in order to help satisfy the unmet demand
which the sub-committee found to exist.

© [1989] Road Traffic Reports 285- 295

(3) On 29 December 1986 the aforesaid sub-committee passed a further resolution qualifying the earlier one
of 9 December to the effect that 'approval be granted to the 100 new licences being issued only for
vehicles which had been specially adapted to carry wheelchair-bound passengers:
(4) The licence eventually granted to the applicant Reid was subject to the condition that he adapt his
vehicle to carry wheelchair-bound passengers. The condition purportedly imposed in pursuance of the
powers conferred by section 47(1) of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 which
states that 'A district council may attach to the grant of a licence of a hackney carriage . . . such
conditions as the district council may consider reasonably necessary.'
(5) The applicant Reid has not complied with the aforesaid condition because of the prohibitive expense
involved in carrying out the aforesaid condition and because he does not consider the said condition to
be reasonable or lawful, the council has written to him threatening not to renew his licence when it
expires on 31 May unless he complies with the aforesaid condition. His continued livelihood is therefore
at stake.
(6) The council is empowered to revoke or refuse to renew a hackney carriage licence-holder's licence
under section 60(1)( c) of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 for “any other
reasonable cause”.
(7) The applicant Reid submits that the original imposition of the condition (requiring the conversion of the
vehicle for wheelchair-bound passengers) was not a lawful exercise of the council's powers to impose
reasonably necessary conditions for the following reasons: (i) the provision of special services for the
wheelchair-bound is not a legitimate end to achieve by the exercise of the power to attach conditions to
the grant of taxi licences conferred by S 47(1) of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act
1976. Alternatively if it is a legitimate end, then it is not reasonable to achieve that end by imposing the
burden of compliance on applicants for hackney-carriage licences. Moreover it is neither reasonable nor
fair to impose such a condition on some hackney carriage owners and not on others; (ii) Furthermore,
the imposition of the aforesaid condition is not consistent with the statutory purpose and provisions of
section 16 of the Transport Act of 1985. Section 16 establishes that the only legitimate ground for
refusing a hackney licence (other than the unfitness of the applicant) is a finding that there would be no
significant unmet demand for the services of taxis: if the licences were granted then the council had
specifically found that there was a significant unmet demand and therefore was under a mandatory duty
to grant the hundred licences they deemed to be necessary to meet that demand; the effect of the
condition imposed was to create a further ground for refusing to grant or renew licences, namely, the
failure of a licensee to meet the financial demands of converting his car to accommodate wheelchair-
bound passengers; the said grounds were not one countenanced by section 16 of the Transport Act of
1985; In the light of Section 16 the condition cannot be deemed to be 'reasonably necessary' within the
meaning of that expression in Section 47(1) of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act
1976; (iii) Furthermore, the imposition of the aforesaid condition undermines the purpose of section 16
of the Transport Act 1985 since it serves to discriminate against a particular group of licence holders namely,
the newcomers- and therefore to frustrate that opening up of the market to competitive forces
which was the purpose of Section 16 (iv) further or in the alternative, the imposition of the condition
requiring the conversion of vehicles by all new licence-holders was so unfair and unreasonable as to be
unlawful for the following reasons: (a) it discriminated against the applicants for new licences unfairly;
(b) it imposed an oppressively heavy financial burden on all new taxi licences.
(8) For all the reasons set out in paragraph 7 above the condition with which the applicant Reid has failed to
comply was unlawful . Therefore his failure to comply with the condition does not afford the council with
“any reasonable cause” to revoke or refuse to renew his licence under section 60 of the Local
Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976. The applicant Reid seeks a declaration to that effect.

© [1989] Road Traffic Reports 285- 295

Manchester City Council were given leave to intervene in the application Ex parte Reid. The applications
were heard contemporaneously.

Edward Fitzgeraid for the. applicants in both cases.
John Hugill QC and Richard Pearce for Manchester City Council.


The justices did not appear and were not represented.

The hearing took place on 6 and 7 April 1989.

Simon Brown J

This is in essence a challenge to the imposition of a condition upon the grant of new hackney carriage
licences in the City of Manchester. The condition objected to requires that the licensed vehicle be specially
adapted to carry wheelchair-bound disabled passengers and any necessary conversion work will be
completed within 12 months of the date of issue of the licence.' This condition (the conversion condition) is
said upon various grounds to be ultra vires the condition-making power. Before turning to those grounds I
must relate something of the facts of these applications.

In January 1986 section 16 of the Transport Act 1985 came into force. It amended section 37 of the Town
Police Clauses Act 1847 and was designed to introduce into the licensing of hackney carriages the concept
of free market competition. The terms and effect of the new legislation I gratefully take from Woolf LJ's
unreported judgment in the Court of Appeal in Sawyer v Great Yarmouth Borough Council16 June 1987 now
Reg. v Great Yarmouth Borough Council, Ex parte Sawyer (Note) [1989J RTR 297, 298D-H

“ When the provisions of section 37 of the Act of 1847 are considered in the light of the amendment, the
effect is that the licensing authority may, from time to time, licence to ply for hire hackney coaches or
carriages, "provided that the grant of a licence may be refused, for the purpose of limiting the number of
hackney carriages in respect of which licences are granted, if, but only if, the person authorised to grant
licences is satisfied that there is no significant demand for the services of hackney carriages (within the
area to which the licence would apply) which is unmet." Clearly, the policy of the Transport Act 1985 is
to restrict the ability of the licensing authority to refuse a licence for the purposes of limiting the number
of hackney carriages except in circumstances where the authority is satisfied that there is no significant
demand for the services of the hackney carriages which is unmet. .. it is to remove restraints and allow
market forces to take their course in a way which did not exist before section 16 of the Transport Act
1985 came into effect. It is, however, to be noted that notwithstanding the amending provisions of
section 16, the licensing authority still retains a discretion. Its discretion is only limited where the refusal
is "for the purpose of limiting the number of hackney carriages.. ,

When this new licensing regime came into effect most, perhaps all, licensing authorities reviewed the
demand within their respective areas. Certainly the City of Manchester did so. Their limit at that time was
450 licences. There was clearly unmet demand. This was indicated not least by the value of the existing
licences; these were changing hands for as much as £10,000, excluding the cost of the cab itself. Taking
matters shortly, on 9 December 1986 the council resolved to grant 100 new licences. There was no
shortage of applicants. Indeed by the end of the year at least 350 had applied although, in the event, the
council interviewed only the first 140, 5 August 1986 being taken as the cut-off point.

The committee responsible for administering and enforcing the hackney carriage trade legislation was the
environmental and health consumer services committee. Its chairman was Mr Keith Bradley, since 1987 a
Member of Parliament. Throughout 1986 Mr Bradley and his committee gave careful consideration of the
interests and concerns of disabled people, a significant minority of the population of Manchester. Very little
transport provision was accessible to them in the city. In particular Manchester's taxi service was unable to
carry any wheelchair-bound disabled person without bodily lifting him or her out of the chair and placing him
separately in the vehicle. As the evidence before me states: “'This can be both embarrassing and physically
painful depending upon the nature of a person's particular disability.”


© [1989] Road Traffic Reports 285- 295

In February 1986 Mr Bradley learnt that the standard make of taxicab – the FX4 - could be converted in
such a way as to enable disabled people to be both loaded and carried whilst remaining in their wheelchairs.
This facility he regarded as 'very desirable.' His committee genuinely wanted to assist disabled people in
Manchester to help them to gain a measure of independence particularly in transport: In the result, on 29
December 1986, shortly after deciding to issue 100 new licences, the committee resolved that they should
be issued only for vehicles which were specially adapted to carry wheelchair-bound passengers. This was to
increase the quality and quantity of transport provision for disabled people within the city:

The committee meanwhile had been interviewing some of the 140 selected applicants. These interviews
began on 26 September 1986 and were finally completed on 30 December 1986. Amongst the questions
asked of each applicant was whether he was willing to operate a vehicle adapted for the disabled. The
council contends that each applicant was also asked whether he was in a position to provide the necessary
finance to convert the vehicle himself. This however is in issue, as I shall relate hereafter. On 7 January
1987 the successful 100 applicants, including the two now before the court, were notified of the council's
resolution to grant them their hackney carriage drivers' licences. Each was required to confirm in writing
whether or not he was willing to take up the offer within the time permitted, six months. The letter then set
out the conditions to be attached to the licence, including that which I have already recited.

Within a very few days both applicants wrote accepting the offer and agreeing to the conditions attached,
although that, of course, does not debar them from now challenging the council's power to impose such
conditions. Pursuant to section 300(3) of the Public Health Act 1936 (applied to the relevant legislation by
section 77(1) of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976) the council's letters of 7
January 1987 should have notified the applicants of their right of appeal to a magistrates' court against the
conditions imposed. Unfortunately that notification was omitted from the letters, an omission apparently
common to the grant of all of Manchester City Council's 550 licences.

At one stage that failure was itself made a ground of challenge in these proceedings. Finally, however, and
in my view sensibly, it was not persisted in. Indeed, despite the want of statutory notification of his rights one
of the applicants now before the court did in fact appeal and the other was called as a witness. On 4 March
1988 that appeal was dismissed by the Manchester City Magistrates' Court. Following those proceedings
the council on 12 April 1988 resolved to take steps to enforce compliance with the conversion condition.
That finally precipitated this application for judicial review, leave for which was given on 23 June 1988.
Despite the relative simplicity of the points at issue the proceedings have, as all too often, attracted an
avalanche of affidavits and a wealth or documentation.

At this stage it is convenient to set out the relevant condition making power, which is contained in section 47
of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976:
'47(1) A district council may attach to the grant of a licence of a hackney carriage under the Act of 1847

such conditions as the district council may consider reasonably necessary.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing subsection, a district council may require any
hackney carriage licensed by them under the Act of 1847 to be of such design or appearance or bear
such distinguishing marks as shall dearly identify it as a hackney carriage.
(3) Any person aggrieved by any conditions attached to such a licence may appeal to a magistrates'
court.
At the heart of Mr Fitzgerald's submissions on behalf of the applicants lies the proposition that the council
could not in law properly regard the conversion condition to be 'reasonably necessary.' The argument is put
in many different ways. In the first place it is submitted that for a condition to qualify it must be reasonably
necessary for the safe, comfortable and convenient functioning of the taxi as a means of travel for the
general public - assuming always it is not imposed for the purposes of identification such as is expressly
permitted by section 47(2). In support of this proposition Mr Fitzgerald invokes the terms of section 48 of the
Act of 1976 - which I need not cite but which I note expressly introduces such considerations into the
licensing of private hire vehicles - and the decision in Reg. v Metropolitan Borough Council of Wirral, Ex
parte The Wirral Licensed Taxi Owners AssocIation (1983-3) 38 CMLR 150.


© [1989] Road Traffic Reports 285- 295

Glidewell J there cited this celebrated passage from Lord Denning's judgment in Pyx Granite Co Ltd v

Ministry of Housing and Local Government [1958J 1 OB 554, 572:

'Although the planning authorities are given very wide powers to impose such conditions as they think fit-

upon planning permissions nevertheless the law says that those conditions, to be valid, must fairly and

reasonably relate to the permitted development. The planning authority are not at liberty to use their

powers for an ulterior object, however desirable that object may seem to them to be in the public interest.'

He then asked:

'What are the council's functions under this legislation in relation to the licensing of taxi cabs? As I see it

they are to achieve so far as they can the safety, convenience and comfort of passengers in hackney

carriages, the safety of other road users and to ensure that there is some way in which those who wish to

use either hackney carriages or private hire vehicles can readily distinguish the one type of vehicle from

another. That the last is a proper object is to my mind made clear by section 47(2} of the 1976 Act.'

Mr Fitzgerald's reliance on this passage seems to me ill-founded. The decision is, of course, authority for
saying that a council is obliged to have regard to safety and convenience, but not for the converse
proposition that the safety, convenience and comfort of passengers are the only considerations -apart from
the section 47(2) question of identification - open to council determining what conditions to impose. As it
seems to me, conditions imposed for other considerations could well be legitimate, for instance those
controlling the display of advertisements, such, indeed, as formed part of the council's own standard
conditions. Even, however, were this not so, I have no difficulty whatever in regarding a facility for
transporting the wheelchair-bound disabled as directly relating to the 'safe, comfortable and convenient
functioning of the taxi' and thus squarely within Mr Fitzgerald's own formulation. Nor am I in the least
attracted to the submission that the wheelchair-bound disabled (or rather that proportion of them who are
particularly advantaged by being enabled to remain in their chairs) are too small a minority of the population
to be properly regarded as an integral part of the general public; On the contrary, I prefer Mr Hugill's
approach that the general public must be taken to comprise many physical minority groups, including for
instance the obese, the unusually tall, young children and the disabled. Ultimately it must always be a
question of fact and degree whether the minority is so small or the advantage to them is so slight or the cost
of complying with the provision is so great that the imposition of such a condition cannot be justified.

Mr Fitzgerald further stresses the phrase 'reasonably necessary' within the condition making power. He
contends that even putting the council's case at its highest it was their conclusion only that the proposed
facility was an ideal rather than a necessity, their evidence being couched in the explicit language of
desirability, not need. This submission also I reject. It seems to me that desirability shades into necessity:
what is clearly desirable in the interests of safety and comfort can by the same token properly be regarded
as reasonably necessary.

Nor do I accept M r Fitzgerald's argument that the conversion condition can be impugned as not reasonably
relating to the purpose of the condition making power but imposed rather for an ulterior object, that of
solving the wider and more general problem of the disabled within Manchester's public transportation
system. The contention here is that the council were exercising the power of compulsion over new taxi
drivers to make good deficiencies elsewhere in the transport system. But I can see no objection, to the
council having regard to the existence or lack of alternative facilities for the disabled when deciding how to
exercise this condition-making power.

Next Mr Fitzgerald points to the council's decision to impose this condition solely upon the 100 new licensed
vehicles and not upon the existing 450 vehicle licence holders. I may say at once that the reason for this
decision was so as to act fairly towards the larger group, many of whom were known by the council to have
bought their licences at very high financial premiums. It was recognised that the value of these existing
licences would be severely cut by the grant of 100 more which were expressly designed to meet unmet
demand. Understandably it was thought unfair to the existing licence holders to require them in addition to
convert their vehicles to use by the disabled, the cost of which was then variously estimated at between
£600 and £1,500. Furthermore, although the new applicants for licences were able to be consulted
individually about their preparedness to undertake this additional expense, no such consultation had by then


© [1989] Road Traffic Reports 285- 295

been possible with e various representative bodies acting for the established proprietors.

Whilst, therefore, the council would have preferred to impose the condition on all hackney carriages
operating within Manchester, they felt that in the first instance at least this would not be appropriate.

Does that view invalidate the imposition of the conversion condition upon the 100 new licences? Mr
Fitzgerald submits that it does. He contends in terms that “a selectively imposed condition to make some
taxis more useful than others is inconsistent with section 47(1).

The submission is two-fold. In the first place it is suggested that if a requirement is 'reasonably necessary'
then by definition it must be equally necessary for the whole taxi fleet and thus improper to impose it
selectively. The power, he submits, is only available to achieve a universally required standard. Imposing
conditions to make some taxis more useful than others is impermissible. Again, I disagree. I can see no
difference between the instant case and the situation which would arise if a new and improved cab came on
to the market: surely it would be open to the licensing authority then to stipulate that new applicants must
buy and use the new cab without requiring existing owners to discard their vehicles and do likewise.

The other limb of Mr Fitzgerald's submissions concerning selectivity focuses upon section 16, itself. The
contention is that the selective imposition of the conversion condition frustrated the central purpose of the
legislation. By discriminating financially against the new licence holders, it is argued, the council frustrates
the opening up of the market to competitive forces which was the purpose underlying section 16. I confess
to finding this argument almost impenetrable. Provided only and always that the council were prepared to
Issue sufficient new licences to ensure that there remained no significant unmet demand - providing that is
in the terms of the statute, that no one was being refused 'for the purpose of limiting the number of hackney
carriages' - there was no question of the council's decision frustrating the purposes of section 16. Nor do I
see any substance in Mr Fitzgerald's allied point that 'the effect of the condition was to create a new ground
for refusing licences, namely, the inability or unwillingness of a new licensee to meet the financial demands
of conversion,' a ground said not to be countenanced by section 16. But section 16 says nothing as to the
basis upon which the authority can properly distinguish between applicants for a given limited number of
licences: provided the condition is one properly able to be made within the enabling power, as l have held it
to be, then in my judgment it is perfectly permissible to decide' amongst the competing new applicants by
reference to their ability and willingness to fulfil it. There was no question whatever here of the council failing
to find 100 new applicants who were ready, willing and able to do so.

Mr FitzgeraId's final submission on this part of the case raises the factual issue to which I have already
briefly referred. The submission runs, as I understand it, essentially as follows. The imposition of the
conversion condition upon 100 new licence holders is discriminatory against them compared with the, rest of
the fleet. It is therefore Wednesbury unreasonable within Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v
Wednesbury Corporation [1948J 1 KB 223, 229j unless there is some good reason for selecting this
particular group of 100. The good reason contended for by the council is that the successful applicants
expressly indicated in advance of their being granted these conditional licences that they would be prepared
to undertake the cost of the conversion works. But, these applicants assert in their evidence, they in fact
undertook no such thing. Mr Reid says in terms:

'I have certainly been given no reason to believe that it would be made a condition of obtaining a licence

that I pay for the conversion myself.'
This is clearly inconsistent with the council's evidence on the point. Miss Blears, one of their senior assistant
solicitors, says that all applicants were asked:

“... whether they were in a position to provide the necessary finance to provide a vehicle and to carry out

the conversion works to ensure the vehicle was specially adapted to carry disabled passengers.”

Mr Bradley deposes that at interview on 26 September 1986 Mr Reid:

“ ... said that he would be willing to operate with an adapted vehicle and that he would be able to provide
the necessary finance.


© [1989] Road Traffic Reports 285- 295

The evidence bearing upon this factual dispute has proliferated. The affidavits keep returning to it and
various contemporary notes are exhibited which, It is suggested, tend to indicate, by reference to both these
and other applicants, precisely what they must or are likely to have been asked depending upon the dates of
their respective interviews.

I propose to deal with this matter very shortly. In the first place it seems to me quite impossible to accede to
Mr Fitzgerald's invitation to conclude that the issue can safely be resolved in the applicants' favour solely
upon the basis of the affidavits. I accept his submission that If, upon careful consideration of this evidence, I
was clearly of the view that Mr Reid's contention was to be preferred then, even without cross-examination
of the deponents, I could give effect to that view. But that is not my conclusion.

Suffice to say, without going into the details of the evidence and the competing contentions upon the
probabilities, that there seem to me to be points available to each side and I feel quite unable to arrive at a
clear preference for the evidence of either. But I must add this. Even were I able to resolve this factual issue
in the applicants' favour I would still not be disposed to condemn the council's decision upon Wednesbury
grounds [ie, Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223]. Even
without any express advance consent to the cost of conversion work on the part of the new applicants, it
seems to me that the council were entitled to impose the condition upon them and not upon the existing
licence holders simply in recognition of the impact of the new licences upon the value of the old ones.

That disposes of the applicants' main challenge. But it does not quite dispose of the whole application.
There is one other term of the grant of these new licences which has attracted Mr Fitzgerald’s criticism.
Whether it is properly to be regarded as a further 'condition' of the licence may be doubted although it was in
fact so described in the letters of grant dated 7 January 1987. What is objected to is an endorsement
appearing, as does the conversion condition itself, on the back of the licence. It is in these terms:

”Proprietors are advised that, in the event of a hackney carriage being transferred to another proprietor

during the period of a licence, the licence for that vehicle will be transferred to the new owner for the

unexpired period of the licence, but that such licence might well not be renewed to the new owner, such

renewal being a matter for the unfettered discretion of the local authority.”
No such endorsement has appeared in respect of the original 450 licences even upon their annual renewals
from time to time since 7 January 1987. This point was not raised in the original challenge. It first surfaced in
Mr Reid’s second affidavit dated 24 February 1989. He there referred to this particular endorsement and
continued thus:

“This means that we are unable to transfer our licences for value, whereas the old licence holders are.

Thus the cost of buying an old licence does not justify discriminating against licence holders. The value

of old licences which were purchased remains, and often increases whereas the new licences are

unlikely to be bought at all, because of the conditions attached to them about 'both renewal and

conversion.”
He returned to the point in his final affidavit of 3 April 1989 and asked to amend the proceedings if
necessary 'in order to challenge the legality of this selective attachment of a notice warning that these new
licences will not necessarily be renewed after transfer.'

The council's evidence does not touch upon this point save only that Miss Blears in her final affidavit dated 4
April 1989 deposes:

“The members of the sub-committee have been advised that any decision not to renew after transfer

would have to be considered individually having regard to the particular circumstances of the case

before them. I would respectfully suggest that any appeal against the sub-committee's decision not to

renew a licence should be instituted by the relevant appellant at the appropriate time.'

That, however, hardly meets the complaint: what troubles the applicants is their apparent present inability to
sell their licences because prospective purchasers are put off by the express warning about the risk of later

non renewal.


© [1989] Road Traffic Reports 285- 295

The essence of Mr Fitzgerald's complaint about this particular endorsement is not merely that it is
discriminatory against the 100 as against the 450 but rather that it positively misleads the reader about the
true position in law. Renewal is expressly dealt with in section 60 of the Local Government (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act 1976, so far as relevant, in these terms:

(1) a district council may suspend or revoke, or . . . refuse to renew a vehicle licence on any of the following
grounds:
(a) that the hackney carriage or private hire vehicle is unfit for use as a hackney carriage or private
hire vehicle;
(b) any offence under, or noncompliance with, the provisions of the Act of 1847 or of this Part of this
Act by the operator or driver; or
(c) any other reasonable cause.'
(2) requires the council to give notice of the grounds of any suspension, revocation or refusal to renew.
(3)
any proprietor aggrieved by a decision of a district council under this section may appeal to a
magistrates' court.'
The endorsement complained of, apart from the selectivity of its imposition, is objectionable in two respects.
First, by using the language of 'unfettered discretion”, it suggests, at least to a layman such as a candidate
transferee that the council could decline to renew the licence otherwise than for reasonable cause. Second,
it implies that the final decision on renewal rests with the council and signally fails to mention the proprietor's
right of appeal to a magistrates' court. And no doubt these objections are in turn accentuated by the
selectivity of the endorsement: a candidate transferee, realising that no such warning notice afflicts the main
body of licences, would be all the more inclined to treat the 100 new ones as second class and less valuable
-and that would be so even when conversion to disabled use had been completed.

I well recognise the force of these contentions. Indeed they appear to me irresistible. Mr Hugill tells me, and
of course I accept, that he advised upon this matter and intended the endorsement in question to appear
upon all future licences, both new and renewed. Furthermore no possible derogation from the section 60
position was intended by it. That I can readily understand: the phrase 'unfettered discretion' to a lawyer
versed in the principles of administrative law inevitably connotes that such discretion will nevertheless not
be exercised arbitrarily or Wednesbury unreasonably {Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v
Wednesbury Corporation {1948] 1 KB 223]. But from the standpoint of the lay reader the endorsement to my
mind remains at best ambiguous and, I conclude, most unsatisfactory, not least having regard to the
selectivity of its imposition. In the circumstances Mr Hugill unsurprisingly volunteers on behalf of the council
to omit the endorsement from al future grants, alternatively to modify it to accord very much more closely
with the provisions of section 60, including making reference to the right of appeal, and to impose it in future
across the board.

In the result it seems to me unnecessary and inappropriate to make any specific order upon this late and
subsidiary aspect of challenge;

I quash nothing and I make no formal declaration; the terms of this judgment will of course
speak for themselves

_________________
Justice for the 96. It has only taken 27 years...........repeat the same lies for 27 years and the truth sounds strange to people!

I'm looking for how much the local Council can charge regarding the processing of a HC/ PH licence..

The cost of the product i.e. plastic cover and processing machine, and the time it takes an official to do it i.e. 20 minutes at (say, £15 an hour) £5.

In my view it should never be more than £40 a year.

Send them a FoI Act request asking how long it takes to process, and how much the actual product costs.

_________________
IDFIMH

Did that last week I'm just waiting for the letter to come back to me.

Just in case anyone doesn't want to spend the rest of their life trying to read Mr T's post, the judgement is on TDO now.

Manchester-v-King 1991

_________________
IDFIMH

Top man cheers.

Fees charged must be reasonable and no more than sufficient in the aggregate, in respect of S70, to cover the Council’s costs in whole or in part.

It has been established in a number of cases before the courts that a Council may not derive a profit or surplus from such licensing activity.

While the question of what is ‘reasonable’ can only be resolved by challenge, it seems clear that ‘costs’ charged to accounts to be recovered by licence fee income must be commensurate with the actual and necessary expenditure of human and material resources.

It follows that the Council must be able to demonstrate that those costs charged directly or by apportionment can be identified as being relevant and proportionate

Although a council has a statutory power to levy a fee this does not give it an absolutely free hand in relation to the scale of the fee that is levied.the impact of any increase upon the livelihood of those affected has to be taken into account,as does the scale of the increase.CONSULTATION must take place with interested parties,whether this is a statutory requirement or not, and results of that consultation must be considered by the council before the decision is made.it is important that any consultation is done fairly and the results considered properly by the council.ANY suggestion that the cosultation is a sham would be grounds for an application for leave to seek a judicial review of the final decision.
the judge in kelly v liverpool said although s53 contains no requirement for consultation, a local authority would be ill-advised not to embark upon some element of consultation with those persons who would be affected by an increase in fees (eg the drivers of BOTH hackney carriages and private hire vehicles).
Remember you only have28 days to object from the date on which the notice is first published, so keep your eye out for it.


I would also put in an enquiry under the Freedom of Information Act 2000.asking for a copy of any report submitted by Licensing officers to the Head of Function or any Council body to request authority to implement the most recently revised scale of fees.Also ask them to provide a copy of the financial estimates for the operation of the Taxi Licensing function.Also ask them to provide details of the number of vehicle licences, driver licences and operator licences the Council envisages issuing in the current year.Also ask them to provide a copy of the Subjective Cost Centre(s) Budget(s) for taxi licensing activity showing the estimated costs and income for that year against each relevant nominal ledger code. Also ask them to supply a copy of the year to date outturn to the last available accounting period and any forecast outturn for the current financial year. that should keep them busy, always remember they are not allowed to make a profit so you have a right to see where your cash is going

I would also be interested to have details of any ‘best value’ comparison the council has carried out in respect of its licensing functions and how it compares with the authorities it may have used as a ‘benchmark’

By virtue of the Local Government Act 1999 the authority is required to carry out such comparison

Got the FOI letter back from the Council this morning and it went like this.

Dear Mr Nidge.

We do not hold cost information specifically for the processing of Taxi / Private Hire licences and it is therefore not reasonably practicable to provide data purely for the processing of licenses.

If you have any queries please feel free to contact me.

Are they trying to take my pants down or what?? I thought all costs were recorded and were available through the FOI act?

they have to keep at least two identifiable accounts relating to the fees levied under each section.in relation to drivers,the costs of issue and admin can only be recovered,in relation to vehicles, the costs of inspection, ranks, control and supervision,including enforcement,and admin can be recovered, in relation to ops licenses it is difficult to see what can be recovered at all.
It would appear you have got them by the short and curlys
no more licence fee increases for you.
why did you want the info are they increasing your fees?

That is utter b*llocks......you have a duel license ffs

CC

_________________
Think of how stupid the average person is, and realize half of them are stupider than that.
George Carlin

I suppose that the next question could be, if you don't hold cost information, how do you work out what the cost is?

_________________
Grandad,
To support my charity text MAYORWALK to 70085 to donate £5