Taxi Driver Online

It seems a tad strange that one certain author considers the Ogwr BC v Baker and M.Keynes vs. Barry Jugdements as wrong and is currently advising a LA in N.Yorkshire there is little they can do about PHV's parked on the streets and sending pre bookings back to their operators by way of radios.

CC

_________________
Think of how stupid the average person is, and realize half of them are stupider than that.
George Carlin

Who is giving that advice and whats the circumstances?

Regards

JD

THOUGHTS ON THE DEFINITION OF “STREET” AND “PUBLIC PLACE”

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

1) The Town Police Clauses Acts 1847-1889 are construed as one with the Public Health Act
1875 (Section 171 of the PHA 1875);

2) Section 4 of the PHA 1875 [the definitions section] defines “street” as any highway… and
public bridge… and any road, lane, footway, square, court, alley or passage whether a
thoroughfare or not:

3) Section 4 of the PHA 1875 [the definitions section] defines “road” as a road to which the
public have access and which has houses at either side of it;

4) Section 4 of the PHA 1875 [the definitions section] defines “house” as including
buildings where persons are employed;

5) Section 3 of the Town Police Clauses Act 1847 defines “street” as extending to and
include ANY road, square court alley or thoroughfare, or public passage within the limits
of the special Act.

6) Section 192 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 [the interpretation section] defines “road” as in
relation to England and Wales means any highway and any other road to which the public
has access and includes bridges over which a road passes.

7) Section 192 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 [the interpretation section] defines both
“bridleway” and “footpath” by reference to a public right of way albeit a restricted one.

Section 167 of the Criminal Justice & Public Order Act 1994 [Touting for taxis and hire
cars] defines a “public place” as anywhere to which the public have access whether by
payment or not.

9) Statutory Instrument 2000, No. 726 is as follows:

Council Directive 72/166/EEC (OJ No. L103, 2.5.72, p. 2), as modified by Council Directives
84/5/EEC (OJ No. L8, 11.1.84, p. 17) and 90/232/EEC (OJ No. L129, 19.5.90, p. 33) requires a
Member State to take all appropriate measures to ensure that civil liability in respect of
the use of motor vehicles normally based in its territory is covered by insurance.

Under section 143 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 ("the 1988 Act") it is an offence to use, or to cause or
permit someone to use, a motor vehicle on a road unless its use is covered by an appropriate policy of
insurance or security ("the insurance requirement"). "Road" is defined in section 192(1) of the
1988 Act, in relation to England and Wales, as any highway or other road to which the
public has access and, in relation to Scotland, as any road or other way to which the public has
access. In the case of Cutter v. Eagle Star Insurance Company Ltd, [1998] 4 All ER 417, it was held
by the House of Lords that the expression did not include a car park or similar public place.

For the purpose of complying with the directives these Regulations amend the 1988 Act first by
extending the insurance requirement to the use of vehicles in public places other than roads and,
secondly, by making provision for the reporting of accidents and the production of insurance

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documents where an accident occurs in a public place.

PERTINENT CASE LAW

1) Young v Scampion [1988] RTR 95 and references contained therein;
2) Strettle v Knowsley MBC
3) Cutter v. Eagle Star Insurance Company Ltd, [1998] 4 All ER 417;


SKELETON POINTS TO CONSIDER

1) The purpose of the Act-to protect the public at large by licensing controls;
2) The enforcement authority is the Council for the District;
3) The date of the Young decision and the changes brought about by the new requirements to


give EEC legislation effect within national law;
4) The latest parliamentary definition of “road” and;
5) The mischief rule of statutory interpretation.

ARGUMENT FOR CONSIDERATION

1) The RTA 1988, S192 defines “road” without reference to public right of access [unlike

the definition of bridleway and footpath] but by reference merely to public access.
2) The TPCA 1847, S3 defines “street” as including ANY ROAD……;
3) The PHA 1875, S4 defines “street” again as ANY ROAD……;
4) SI 2000, 726 gives effect to the requirement on all member states to ensure civil liability

is covered by insurance whether on a road or other public place.

In Young and Scampion [107B-E] the learned judges cited Curtis v Embery [1872] as
requiring proof that the street must be a public street. It should be noted Curtis v Embery
concerned a railway property case and the position on that type of site was specifically
amended by S76 of the Public Health Act 1925. It is my contention that that case can be
distinguished from the Strettle v Knowsley MBC decision of recent date.

In Strettle the carriage was on a road to which the public were permitted access albeit that this
was by licence and not a right. I am informed that, in the absence of obstruction or
misbehaviour, no traveller along the road would be prevented from going wherever he wished
on the roads within the hospital grounds by anyone at any hour of the day or night. No
barriers are installed on the roads. I am informed it is possible for persons to use the grounds
as a short cut without ever attending any part of the hospital and so I submit it falls both
within the definition of thoroughfare and also road.

As an aside until 1966 the House of Lords held that it could not over rule its previous
decisions. The Practice Direction of that year changed that to allow for changes in
circumstances in Society and practice. It now can in exceptional circumstances over rule itself
and has done so. The law of 100 years ago is open to challenge.

CONCLUSION

In 2001 in reality any person may enter the grounds of Whiston Hospital with a car and drive
upon those roads. The law now requires such use to be covered by insurance. Since 1988 the

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main definition of a road is “a place to which the public have access” and not a place to
which the public have a right of access.

Street is defined in the 1847 and 1875 Acts as a total of 15 types of place of which only 2 are
connected to the word “public”. The learned judges in Young, I respectfully submit, stand to
be over ruled or at least distinguished.

Any vehicle used or standing for hire in a street, where the public may be found, [privately
owned or otherwise] should therefore fall within the S45 TPCA 1847 offence. I submit that
the decision of the Crown Court, if challenged, could be over turned and distinguished from
Young & Scampion in the circumstances of the Strettle case.

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Justice for the 96. It has only taken 27 years...........repeat the same lies for 27 years and the truth sounds strange to people!

Thought this one would tempt your tastebuds JD

Our old friend JB from the IOL.

The circumstances are that a certain market town in N.Yorkshire has PHV's parked in town centre locations.

The public are approaching these vehicles and basically the drivers are blowing the jobs in over the radio. The job is then dispatched to the nearest car (guess which one is nearest!).

The LO on the advice of JB says its all kosha!

I saw the mention of 'Ogwr BC v Baker' in the infamous book and on this thread.

I wonder why JB doesnt consider what is going on in N. Yorkshire, as the same as what went on in Bridgend.

And I wonder why he considers the judgement in this case and the Milton Keynes case strange?

regards

CC

_________________
Think of how stupid the average person is, and realize half of them are stupider than that.
George Carlin

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
( DIVISIONAL COURT )
CO/1348/83
Royal Courts of Justice.
Tuesday, 3rd July, 1984.
Before:
LORD JUSTICE WATKINS
and
MR. JUSTICE McCULLOUGH
D Crown Office List
MILTON KEYNES BOROUGH COUNCIL
-v
E PAUL BARRY
F (Transcript of the Shorthand Notes of Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd.,
36/38, Whitefriars Street, London EC4Y 8BJ. Telephone Number: 01-583 7635.
Shorthand Writers to the Court.)
MR. S. HOCKMAN {instructed by Sharpe, Pritchard & Co., London WC2,
Agents for Mr. G.M. Pettigrew of Milton Keynes) appeared on behalf of the
appellant.
G MR. M. SELFE (instructed by Messrs. Pictons & Co., Milton Keynes)
appeared on behalf of the Respondent.
JUDGEMENT
(As approved by Judge)

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LORD JUSTICE WATKINS: This is an appeal by case stated from the justices
of the County of Buckingham acting for the Petty Sessional Division of Milton
Keynes, in respect of a decision they made as a Magistrates' Court sitting at
Fenny Stratford, Milton Keynes. On the 20th June 1983 an information was
preferred by the appellants against the respondent that he, on the 7th May,
1983, at Bletchley, Milton Keynes, did ply for hire with a certain Hackney
carriage for which a licence to ply for hire had not previously been obtained
contrary to section 45 of the Town Police Clauses Act 1847. The hearing took
place on the 12th October 1983. The justices found these facts. At about 6.45

p.m. on the 7th May 1983 the respondent was the driver of a red Vauxhall
private hire vehicle. Somewhere upon the front doors the words "Quick Cars"
were displayed. He stopped the car close to an appointed Hackney carriage
stand situated at South Terrace, Bletchley. It was not parked on the Hackney
carriage stand itself. The respondent had very shortly before delivered
passengers to the bus station adjacent to the Hackney carriage stand. Instead of
moving away after his passengers had alighted, the respondent remained there,
used his car radio to inform his controller that he was clear and awaited
further instructions from his employers. Approximately two minutes later a
couple of people approached the respondent and asked to be taken to a
destination which the justices do not identify. The respondent told them that
he could not do that but he informed his controller, a fellow employee, via his
two-way radio, of the request of these two people. The controller told the
respondent that he could undertake the journey. The new passengers entered
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the respondent's car and were driven to their destination.
Inquiries were set on foot as to the lawfulness of the respondent’s
conduct. Questions were asked of the controller and an examination

made of his records. No written record was found of the
conversation authorising the new journey because, so he
maintained, the controller did not make a note of it.

There was, in other words, no docket, as it is called, evidencing
that conversation and order of authorisation.
A taxi driver who happened to be near the respondent at the
relevant time in his cab gave evidence to the justices, about the
way in which he said the respondent, behaved. The justices rejected
that evidence and preferred the respondent's version of events.
They also found that the respondent, as is common ground, was not
licensed to ply for hire. In the case they include a short statement
of the evidence which was heard by them. It came from Mr.
Twomey, the taxi driver I have already mentioned and a Mr.
Hillsdon, the appellants' Vehicle Licensing Officer who
interviewed the controller and the respondent himself who told the
justices that after the couple of people had approached him and
asked to be taken to a certain destination, he told them that he
could not take them there without a prior booking. It was only after
that that he got in touch with the controller with the consequences
I have described. The controller, Mr. Charlie, also gave evidence
and explained why it was that he had not made a record of the
conversation which both he and the respondent said took place.
The justices were addressed by advocates for both the appellants
and the respondent. It was submitted on the

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appellants' behalf that regardless of what effect the transaction
between the respondent and the two people who approached him
could have had, the situation of the respondent beforehand and his
reason for being in that situation were sufficient to justify them in
coming to the conclusion that the respondent at the material time
was plying for hire. A contrary submission was made on behalf of
the respondent.
The justices were referred to Cogley v. Sherwood, (1959) 2 Q.B.

311. At page 325 Lord Parker C.J. said:
In the ordinary way, therefore, I should, apart from authority, have
felt that it was of the essence of plying for hire that the vehicle in
question should be on view, that the owner or driver should
expressly or impliedly invite the public to use it, and that the
member of the public should be able to use that vehicle if he
wanted to. Looked at in that way, it would matter not that the
driver said:

“Before you hire my vehicle, you must take a ticket at the office”,
aliter, if he said: “You cannot have my vehicle but if you go to the
office you will be able to
get a vehicle, not necessarily mine”. There are however some cases
which point to a different conclusion. For my part, however, I find
it unnecessary to go into them".
It cannot therefore be said in respect if the material incident I , so
far as it went immediately prior to the respondent being approached
by the two people, that the minds of the justices were not directed
to the law as explained by
Lord Parker.
There has been, in the course of the hearing of this appeal,
considerable argument directed to the effect, or possible effect, of

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two people upon the issue as to whether or not it could be said that
the respondent was plying for hire. Unfortunately, the justices
were not similarly addressed. They were therefore not instructed on
the possible legal consequence which arose from that circumstance.
I decline to express any opinion upon it solely because I have
reached a conclusion which makes it unnecessary for me to do so.
One of the three questions is: 3(a) It is claimed that the finding of
fact that the respondent had not been plying for hire cannot be
supported by the evidence and (b) Whether on the remaining
findings of fact the respondent was guilty of an offence under
Section 45 of the Town Police Clauses Act 1847 of plying for hire
with a Hackney carriage for which a licence to ply for hire had not
previously been obtained.
We have been referred also to Clarke v. Stanford (1871) Q.B. 357,
Foinett v. Clark (1877) 41 J.P. 359 and to Rose v. Welbeck Motors
Ltd. and Another (1962) 1 W.L.R.1010.
It is abundantly clear from those cases that the question of what is
meant by plying for hire has occupied the courts from time to time
for well over a century . Decisions go back to the days when
broughams and landaus were used. What is meant by plying for hire
is, for taxi drivers who are licensed to operate to take part in a
taxi service, of great importance. It is well-known that no one can
in any neighbourhood ply for hire unless he, or his employer, or
both are licensed to do so. As has been said already this respondent
was not licensed and neither was his employer.
The appellants, the local authority, are properly concerned to
ensure that only licence holders operate taxi businesses.

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temptation, no doubt, to those who do not have a licence and who
are employed by private car hire firms, to take as passengers,
people who have not previously arranged or agreed with the owner
of the car to be carried; in other words, to behave as though they
were licensed and accordingly to pick up passengers when and
where the opportunity arises upon the streets.

Mr. Hockman contends that no reasonable bench of justices' could
have come to the conclusion, which this bench did, namely, that in
the circumstances as they found them to be including the
respondent being at rest before the two people approached him,
there was in fact and in law no plying for hire.
If this court comes to the conclusion that these justices could not
be said to have acted as a reasonable bench with regard to the facts
and the proper inferences which should be drawn from them, then
he says we should interfere, set aside the judgment of the justices
and remit the case to those justices with a direction to convict. The
question is therefore: Can it be said that no reasonable bench of
justices could draw the inferences-which these justices obviously
did? That inference obviously was that the respondent was in the
position adjacent to the Hackney carriage rank for a wholly
innocent purpose and was entitled to be there for that purpose
without it being found that he was plying for hire – the innocent
purpose being that he was awaiting instructions from his employers
as to where he should proceed from the place where he had dropped
off passengers.
In coming to my conclusion, I ignore altogether, of course, the
evidence which the justices rejected; that is to say

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the evidence of the taxi driver which was clearly hostile to the
respondent. Nevertheless I fail to understand how any reasonable
bench of justices could have avoided inferring from the
circumstances as found that the respondent, in remaining where he
was, adjacent to the Hackney carriage rank, was there in the hope
and expectation that be would be able, within a relatively short
period of time, to attract custom to himself and avail himself of it
as and when presented.
It was not known nor could it have been by anyone just how long
he would have to wait for further instructions from his employers.
It may have been two or three minutes. It may have been quarter of
an hour or a good deal longer than that. Presumably, therefore, the
respondent would have remained where he was for whatever period
of time elapsed between his arrival at the bus station and further
instructions coming from his employers. It cannot have been
without his contemplation, in my judgment, that during that time,
he being in the position he was and bearing all the hallmarks upon
his cab of a person who was employed for the purpose of carrying
passengers, that he would be approached or was likely to be
approached by people who wished to avail themselves of the
services of a taxi. Taking all those considerations into account and
looking squarely at them, I do not comprehend how any reasonable
bench of justices could have avoided coming to the conclusion that
this respondent was plying for hire. In coming to the conclusion
which they did then it seems to me failed to see what was staring
them in the face, namely, a less than innocent sojourn by this
respondent in his position adjacent to the Hackney carriage rank.
Accordingly I would allow this appeal, set aside the

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judgment of the justices, and remit the case to them with a
direction to convict this respondent.
MR. JUSTICE McCULLOUGH: I agree.
On the facts found a strong prima facie case was raised that Mr.
Berry was parked where he was with the intention that members of
the public would see his vehicle and, in particular, its sign saying
"Quick Cars", and would approach him in the belief that his vehicle
was available for immediate hire.
Within one or two minutes that is exactly what happened. A couple
approached him and after a brief radio call to his controller a
contract of hire was entered into. By the time the couple
approached him the driver had already told the controller that he
had completed his previous engagement. Nevertheless he remained,
waiting for his next engagement. 'How long would he have stayed
had the couple not approached so soon?
The inference is that he would have remained until, as would be
likely early on a Saturday evening, someone passing through the
bus station wanted to hire his taxi. I see nothing in the evidence to
rebut, the strong presumption that he was intending to exhibit his
vehicle to potential hirers as a vehicle which might there and then
be hired.
In my judgment, therefore, conviction was inevitable.

I decline to answer questions 1 and 2 in the case.

Question 1 is in general terms and not capable of a simple answer
of yes or no. Plying for hire is largely a matter of fact and degree.
Each case depends on its own facts. Similarly I decline to answer
Question 2. It is not necessary to do so. It to is posed in general
terms. I can visualise cases in which it might be held that a
contract is made in such circumstances led, on its own, to a finding
that the vehicle was plying for hire

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in the period of the conversations. I can visualise other
circumstances in which such a conclusion could not properly be
drawn. In any event, the argument addressed to us by Mr. Hockman
on this question was not addressed to the court below.
I too would send this case back to the justices with a direction to
convict.
MR. HOCKMAN: Would you allow the appellant's costs from
central funds?
LORD JUSTICE WATKINS: It must follow must it not?
MR. SELFE: If the application is for costs from central funds then
obviously, I have nothing to say about that. The respondent in this
case is legally aided.
LORD JUSTICE WATKINS: There is no point in doing anything
about that. Have your costs from central funds.
MR. SELFE: So far as the respondent's costs are concerned, it is of
course open to the court to order that they be paid out of central
funds, notwithstanding the outcome or to order lega1 aid taxation.
LORD JUSTICE WATKINS:
Legal aid taxation

_________________
Justice for the 96. It has only taken 27 years...........repeat the same lies for 27 years and the truth sounds strange to people!

Well we can only go off established case law and such case law is not there for the fun of it. The question we have to ask ourselves is, "do we believe in case law already established" or do we believe the advice of JB? Always assuming JB did give that advice, which I find very strange?

Regards

JD

If you ask me, I am starting to think that some are deliberately trying to may LA's believe there is nothing they can do about anthing involving HC's & PHV's without changing licensing laws.

Take the above points in N. Yorkshire, the advice given to Carlisle CC regarding the 'Pinkies' and the thoughts on the Gladen judgement.

All three cases have definate caselaw and all three cases have been deemed as not worth pursuing because their in loopholes!

regards

CC

_________________
Think of how stupid the average person is, and realize half of them are stupider than that.
George Carlin

It does appear that certain LA's are looking at these cases and deciding they are too complex to prosecute. That train of thought especially applies to Pink Ladies and Gladen. I'm not so sure about the case in Yorkshire because the way you describe the circumstances I would say it was an open and shut case. There are many cases referring to similiar circumstances, you might wish to look at CHORLEY BOROUGH COUNCIL v THOMAS.

Regards

JD

Thanks JD, I spotted the Chorley one when I was looking through them, I notice you said something about out of borough Hackneys.

Are you starting to think the JB view of the Gladen judgement may be being over read into, or do you still believe it has affected the status of a hackney carriage operating as an unlicensed PH in another district?

regards

CC

_________________
Think of how stupid the average person is, and realize half of them are stupider than that.
George Carlin

On a personal note I would like to see the Gladen judgement cleared up because I'm not so stupid as to totally disregard the Wilson case. None of us know what would happen if a Gladen type case was prosecuted under the Wilson scenario? Therefore both you and I and everyone else for that matter can only guess at what might happen? However whatever did happen would be far better than the situation we have at the moment.

There is a scenario in Coventry that could well lead to such a case coming before the courts but you will have to wait until the publication of the December edition of Taxi Today to find out exactly what that scenario might be?

Regards

JD

I actually think sections 37 & 38 of the 1847 act clear it up (now what were you telling me about fresh legislation )

The term 'Prescribed distance' to me is the key.

regards

CC

_________________
Think of how stupid the average person is, and realize half of them are stupider than that.
George Carlin

I disagree but I have to go out so I'll tell you why probably over the weekend...but concentrate on the words "licensed to ply for hire". Then ask yourself does a private hire operator ply for hire when he takes a radio booking and then direct yourself to the Gladen case and the judges reasoning that hackney carriages do not need an operators license in order to take any form of booking including telephone bookings?

Then look up the legal definition of "plying for hire" which can be found on this website.

Regards

JD


JD

I disagree, but look forward to your reasoning.

The one thing that probably persuades me is the intention of licensing to ensure vehicles within the prescribed distance are regulated.

To go from the prescribed distance, to HC's should have PH Operators licenses (when the Judge stated clearly his suprise at that aspect not being questioned in 28 years), to the presumption that because a HC doesnt need a PH Operators license means they can operate anywhere, is I think simply a wrong conclusion.

As ever your views are appreciated.

regards

CC

_________________
Think of how stupid the average person is, and realize half of them are stupider than that.
George Carlin

From the Gladen judgement;

[35] The district judge posed this question for the opinion of the High Court:

"Whether it is necessary to hold a licence under section 55 of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976, in an area where that Act is in force, to operate a hackney carriage duly licensed as such under the Town Police Clauses Act 1847 as a private hire vehicle."

[36] The answer to that question is: no. Accordingly, I would dismiss this appeal.


[11] Part II of the 1976 Act is careful throughout to distinguish what is required for those who have hackney carriage licences and for those who simply deal in private hire. But it is also clearly recognised that hackney carriages can be used for the purposes of private hire. So much is clear from s 67 of the 1976 Act, which has the side note "Hackney carriages used for private hire" and provides by subsection (1):

"No hackney carriage shall be used in the district under a contract or purported contract for private hire except at a rate of fares or charges not greater than that fixed by the byelaws or table mentioned in section 66 of the Act, and, when any such hackney carriage is so used, the fare or charge shall be calculated from the point in the district at which the hirer commences his journey."

[12] Subsection (2) creates an offence for the knowing contravention of that provision. In subsection (3) it is provided:

"In subsection (1) of this section 'contract' means -

(a) a contract made otherwise than while the relevant hackney carriage is plying for hire in the district or waiting at a place in the district which, when the contract is made, is a stand for hackney carriages appointed by the district council under section 3 of this Act; and

(b) a contract made, otherwise than with or through the driver of the relevant hackney carriage, while it is so plying or waiting."

That section clearly recognises the possibility that hackney carriages can be obtained otherwise than through being flagged down in the street or approached when standing on a stand.

[10] The 1976 Act, Part II, deals with the licensing of vehicles being used for the purposes of private hire. That imposes a requirement that the vehicle and the driver be licensed, much as in the case of hackney carriages, but, in addition, it requires that the operator should be licensed. The purpose behind that is, as Mr Findlay submits, to enable a check to be kept to ensure that the operation is being carried out properly and the public are getting a proper service and the matter is being dealt with in terms of safety in an appropriate manner. But the operator's licence is an additional licence which was not required for the purposes of the 1847 Act for hackney carriage operators. That, perhaps, is not altogether surprising since the concept behind a hackney carriage would not easily, on the face of it, include the situation where one rings up a central office and a hackney carriage, or a taxi which has a hackney carriage licence, is dispatched to pick someone up.But by 1976 it is apparent that such means of getting taxis was common place and Parliament must be taken to have appreciated that. The whole purpose behind the 1976 Act, as I understand it, was to bring within licensing control those who were operating private hire; it being recognised that hackney carriages already had the controls under the 1847 Act.It was regarded as not in the interests of the public that there should be the possibility of a separate provision of private hire vehicles which was outside any licensing scheme.


CC

_________________
Think of how stupid the average person is, and realize half of them are stupider than that.
George Carlin

I haven't forgot the reply I promised you Captain, my excuse is that I've been extremely busy and I assume that applies to you also? Never the less that little piece you posted above speaks volumes because you are probably thinking that the comment refers to a license in a particular authority? But it doesn't say that, what it does say is

"Whether it is necessary to hold a licence under section 55 of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976, in an area where that Act is in force"

Excepting Plymouth and London there are approx 341 licensed areas where that act is in force, so are the courts saying that no such license is necessary in any of these areas, or just the area in which you happen to have a hackney carriage license? Interesting isn't it? lol

Regards

JD