Taxi Driver Online

I'm going to ask Alex and Dusty to make this a sticky and in it I'm going to place shortened transcripts which highlight legal decisions that we on TDO have already highlighted and of course some that we haven't. Therefore instead of subscribers reading the whole case they can just read the shortened notation. Both English and Scottish condensed transcripts will be placed in this section.

I'm going to start off with one pertinent case of interest.

Transcript corner will hopefully be a feature of the new newsletter we hope to bring out as soon as time allows.
______________________________

Mingeley v Pennock & Ivory (Employment Appeals Tribunal/1170/02, 18 June 2003) concerned the employment status of a taxi driver.

This was not under the ordinary definition of 'employee' under the Employment rights act 1996, but under the extended definition in discrimination legislation (here the Race Relations Act), which is similar to the 'worker' definition elsewhere.

The driver provided his own car with its own taxi licence.

He could determine his own hours of work and could use a substitute driver.

He paid the taxi firm £75 pw for its booking facilities, and kept the customers' fares. He wore the firm's logo and was subject to the firm's procedures for handling customers complaints.

The question that arises out of this case is whether he Could bring a claim for race discrimination?

Applying the old authority of Mirror Group Ltd v Gunning [1986] ICR 145, CA, with its emphasis on whether the dominant purpose of the contract was for the personal supply of work or labour, the EAT held that he could not, for two reasons.

(1) that dominant purpose here was for the supply of services by the firm to the driver, in order to allow him to ply his (self employed) trade.

(2) in any event, there remained a basic requirement of mutuality of obligations even in this extended definition of employment (as there is in the 'worker' definition, see Byrne Bros v Baird [2002] IRLR 96, EAT at Baili) and here that was absent, the taxi driver being a free agent in relation to accepting fares.

See the full transcript in the licensing and legal section
________________________________

Bugbugs Ltd v Transport for London

Queen's Bench Division

21 December 2007

Abuse of process; Licences; Public transport; Taxis

Public transport; Taxis; Legal status of pedicabs

Abstract: The appellant (B) appealed against the refusal of its application to strike out as an abuse of process a claim by the respondent (T) for a declaration that a pedicab was a hackney carriage for the purposes of the Metropolitan Public Carriage Act 1869 s.4 . A pedicab was an adaptation of a rickshaw, tricycle-like in appearance and having a passenger compartment over the back wheels. Whilst most pedicabs relied on pedal-power, a few were electronically assisted. B leased a number of pedicabs to self-employed riders who plied them for hire. Fares were charged at a set rate per passenger and, unless arranged in advance, the fare did not cover the hire of the whole pedicab, merely a seat therein. T was the public body responsible for licensing hackney carriages, and had sought a declaration that pedicabs were hackney carriages in order that they could be brought within the hackney carriage licensing regime. Prior to T's application, the courts had twice considered the legal status of pedicabs. T's predecessor had been involved in the first case, and T had been invited, but had declined, to intervene in an appeal in respect of the second. Moreover, T had explored the possibility of securing legislation for a separate regime for the licensing and regulation of pedicabs, and had contributed to a draft bill providing for the enforcement of traffic and parking legislation against them. It had not, however, informed either B or the Opposed Bills Committee of its intention to seek, by way of declaration, to bring pedicabs within the hackney carriage regime. In respect of the declaration, the issue was whether the effect of the Transport Act 1985 Sch.1 para.16 was to import the construction of a "stage carriage" contained therein into the definition at s.4 of the 1869 Act so as to bring pedicabs within the definition of a hackney carriage and thus make them subject to the hackney carriage licensing regime. B submitted that T was guilty of abuse of process by (1) seeking to re-open matters that had previously been decided by the court; (2) concealing its changed stance on pedicabs and the way it intended to proceed to achieve a licensing regime for them, and displaying a lack of frankness about its knowledge of the issues raised in previous authorities.

Appeal dismissed. (1) The issue of the status of pedicabs had previously been considered in two cases. In the first, Begg, Unreported December 6, 1999 it was held that a pedicab was not a hackney carriage and that Sch.1 para.16 of the 1985 Act was not intended to convert a "stage carriage" to a hackney carriage as defined by s.4 of the 1869 Act. In the second, R. (on the application of Oddy) v Bugbugs Ltd [2003] EWHC 2865 (Admin), the court found that a pedicab was a "stage carriage" and not a hackney carriage. However, it was not clear that the stipendiary magistrate in Begg had considered the material words of Sch.1 para.16 of the 1985 Act. In Oddy, the court had not considered the issue of Sch.1 para.16 at all. That being the case, it could not properly be said that the issue of the legal status of pedicabs had been decided by a court of competent juridsiction so as to preclude, of itself, future challenge, Begg and Oddy considered. Moreover, it could not be said that T's argument should have been pursued in either Begg or Oddy, there being insufficient privity of interest between T and the prosecution in either of those cases. Further, a failure by a party to raise an issue involving itself in litigation being conducted by a third party should not, save in the most exceptional circumstances, automatically render the raising of the same issue by that party in later proceedings abusive. (2) In deciding whether T had sought to abuse the process of the court, the whole picture had to be considered. Though T could have acted more promptly in informing B of its changed position, there had been no deliberate or dishonest attempt to conceal matters from the court. A system of regulation was necessary for the safe and efficient operation of pedicabs and was plainly in the public interest. T had decided that the most effective way forward was to include pedicabs in the hackney carriage regime and it could not proceed with that course until it had an authoritative decision as to whether, in law, a pedicab was a hackney carriage. Public bodies such as T would inevitably have changes of policy and direction and T's actions had not been those of a party seeking to harass or act unjustly. The master had been fully entitled to dismiss B's application to strike out T's claim.

Judge: Swift, J.

Counsel: For the appellant: David Wolfe. For the respondent: James Pereira

Solicitor: For the appellant: Richard Buxton. For the respondent: In-house solicitor

Significant Cases Cited

R. (on the application of Oddy) v Bugbugs Ltd
[2003] EWHC 2865 (Admin); (QBD (Admin))

Legislation Cited

Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (SI 1998 3132) Part 8

Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (SI 1998 3132) r.3.4

London Cab Order 1934 (SI 1934 1346)

Metropolitan Public Carriage Act 1869 (c.115) s.6

Metropolitan Public Carriage Act 1869 (c.115) s.7

Metropolitan Public Carriage Act 1869 (c.115) s.4

Private Hire Vehicles (London) Act 1998 (c.34)

Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 (c.14)

Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 (c.14) s.1(1)

Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 (c.14) s.82(1)

Town Police Clauses Act 1847 (c.89)

Transport Act 1985 (c.67) s.1

Transport Act 1985 (c.67) s.137(1)

Transport Act 1985 (c.67) Sch.1 para.16

Transport and Works Act 1992 (c.42)
________________________

R. (on the application of Leeds City Council) v Taxi Centre (Newcastle-Upon-Tyne) Ltd

Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court)

01 November 2005

[2005] EWHC 2564;

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Adm ... /2564.html

Subject: Licensing

Summary: licences; taxis; delay by local authority in determining application; lawfulness of authority's reliance on new conditions.

Background: The appellant local authority (Leeds) appealed by way of case stated against a decision of the Crown Court whereby it allowed an appeal by the respondent taxi company (Taxi Centre Newcastle upon Tyne ltd) against the decision of Leeds Licensing and Regulatory Panel to refuse to admit Taxi Centres Fiat Doblo adapted wheelchair accessible motor vehicle onto Leeds councils approved list of hackney carriage vehicles.

The original application for the vehicle to be placed on the approved list was made in November 2002. The application was refused in May 2004.
The issue before the Crown Court was whether Leeds panel should have considered the application under the provisions of new conditions, which had taken effect in April 2004, or under the provisions of the previous conditions which prevailed at the time of the application in 2002.

The Crown Court found that in April 2003 the local authority officer to whom the application had been assigned had indicated to Taxi Centre that its application would be granted if certain issues were addressed, that the application had then been transferred to a second officer after the first one had fallen ill, and that the second officer had delayed in reaching a decision and been responsible for "moving the goalposts". The court concluded that Taxi Centre had had a reasonable expectation that its application would be processed with reasonable expedition and under the old conditions that prevailed until April 2004; that had the appellants applied the old conditions, safety would not have been compromised; and that it had been unreasonable of appellants not to consider the application under the provisions of the old conditions.

The question posed for the court was whether the Crown Court had erred in finding that the appellants had been entitled to determine Taxi Centres application on the basis of the old conditions. The appellant argued that the effect of the adoption of the new conditions was that it did not have the power to decide the application on the old conditions, and that if it had taken that course, it would have failed to take into account its own relevant policy.

Held, dismissing the appeal, that (1) the case concerned the exercise of a discretionary power. A public authority could not lawfully fetter itself so as to follow blindly an adopted policy. It had to maintain at least the possibility of departure from an adopted policy in an appropriate case, and it had to keep an open mind as to whether it should depart from the accepted policy in any given case. Whether, and if so to what extent, an authority could depart from its adopted policy would, in the first instance, be a matter for the authority concerned, but its decision to depart had, of course, to be lawful when tested against the well established criteria of public law.

There were situations in which the appellant could depart from the new conditions and apply the old ones without falling into illegality by failing to have proper regard to its new policy. The instant was such a case. Four matters were worth highlighting. Firstly, there had been no suggestion that vehicles which conformed with the old conditions were in any way unsafe or placed the public at risk. Secondly, the appellant had been entitled to retain to itself the right to continue to use the old conditions for good reason. Thirdly, the resolution of May 2004 refusing Taxi Centres application recorded the appellants acknowledgement of the possibility of departing from the new conditions. Fourthly, no vehicle as manufactured could meet the requirements of the new conditions. If there were found to be reasonable grounds to consider for approval and to licence a vehicle under the old conditions, then the appellant had the right to do so. There were reasonable grounds. Accordingly, the Crown Court had not erred when finding that the appellant had been entitled to determine Taxi Centres application on the basis of the old conditions.

(2) (Obiter) (incidental opinion not binding) It had not been necessary for the Crown Court to find, as a precondition of its decision, that there had been a breach of legitimate expectation, or Wednesbury unreasonableness, or an excess of authority on the part of the appellants officer. There did not have to be a ground for judicial review; instead, there simply had to be a good reason for departing from policy.

Judge: Lloyd-Jones J.

Counsel: For the claimant: Ruth Stockley. For the defendant: Alex Offer
Solicitor: For the claimant: Local authority solicitor. For the defendant: Hay & Kilner

Legislation Cited

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.47
Public Health Acts Amendment Act 1907 (c.53) s.7
Supreme Court Act 1981 (c.54) s.48
Supreme Court Act 1981 (c.54) s.48(1)
Supreme Court Act 1981 (c.54) s.48(2)(c)
Town Police Clauses Act 1847 (c.89) s.37
Town Police Clauses Act 1847 (c.89) s.45
Town Police Clauses Act 1847 (c.89) s.68
__________________________________

Green v Kis Coaches and Taxis Ltd

County Court (Plymouth)

07 March 2008

Unreported

Subject: Personal injury

Related To: Buses; Evidentiary facts; Fixed costs; Occupiers' liability; Road traffic accidents; Statutory definition

Summary: Road traffic accidents; Statutory definition; Personal injury claims for falls from parked coaches; Avoiding restricted costs regime by alternative basis of claims

Background: The court was required to determine costs following the acceptance by the claimant passenger (G) of a Part 36 offer made by the defendant coach company (K) in a claim for personal injury. G had sustained injury alighting from one of K's coaches that was parked in a public car park. The basis of the claim was the Occupiers' Liability Act 1957 s.2 . G accepted K's Part 36 offer, saying that the payment of her reasonable costs were to be on the standard basis to be the subject of costs-only proceedings pursuant to CPR r.44.12A , the cost to be determined by detailed assessment in the absence of agreement. K replied that in the instant case fixed costs applied, but G stated that, as it was not a road traffic accident, fixed costs did not apply. A bill was prepared for detailed assessment, which K did not contest. K was subsequently ordered to pay G's reasonable costs of the claim on a standard basis. In the points of dispute, K stated that, notwithstanding the fact that the claim had been pursued as a breach of s.2, the accident actually came within the definition of a road traffic accident in CPR r.45.7 , and therefore the costs recoverable were limited to fixed recoverable costs, since the other provisions of CPR r.45.7(2) were met on the facts of the case.

Thus, the issue in the case was whether the accident arose out of the use of a motor vehicle.

Judgment for defendant. G had travelled in the coach and her injury had been caused as she was alighting from it. As a result, her injury arose out of the use of the coach, Dunthorpe v Bentley Unreported February 26, 1996 CA considered. Therefore, the accident fell within the definition of a road traffic accident in CPR r.45.7(4)(a) and it was not possible to evade the restricted costs regime imposed by r.45.7 by basing the claim on other grounds.

Judge: District Judge Tromans

Counsel: For the claimant: Non-counsel representative. For the defendant: Lucy Wyles

Solicitor: For the claimant: Nash & Co (Plymouth). For the defendant: McCullagh & Co

Legislation Cited

Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (SI 1998 3132) r.44.12A

Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (SI 1998 3132) r.45.7

Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (SI 1998 3132) r.45.7(2)

Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (SI 1998 3132) r.45.7(4)(a)

Occupiers' Liability Act 1957 (c.31) s.2
______________________

Bugbugs Ltd v Transport for London

Queen's Bench Division

21 December 2007

[2007] EWHC 2987 (QB); [2008] R.T.R. 21; Official Transcript

Subject: Transport

Abuse of process; Licences; Public transport; Taxis

Summary: Public transport; Taxis; Legal status of pedicabs

The appellant (B) appealed against the refusal of its application to strike out as an abuse of process a claim by the respondent (T) for a declaration that a pedicab was a hackney carriage for the purposes of the Metropolitan Public Carriage Act 1869 s.4 . A pedicab was an adaptation of a rickshaw, tricycle-like in appearance and having a passenger compartment over the back wheels. Whilst most pedicabs relied on pedal-power, a few were electronically assisted.

B leased a number of pedicabs to self-employed riders who plied them for hire. Fares were charged at a set rate per passenger and, unless arranged in advance, the fare did not cover the hire of the whole pedicab, merely a seat therein. T was the public body responsible for licensing hackney carriages, and had sought a declaration that pedicabs were hackney carriages in order that they could be brought within the hackney carriage licensing regime. Prior to T's application, the courts had twice considered the legal status of pedicabs. T's predecessor had been involved in the first case, and T had been invited, but had declined, to intervene in an appeal in respect of the second. Moreover, T had explored the possibility of securing legislation for a separate regime for the licensing and regulation of pedicabs, and had contributed to a draft bill providing for the enforcement of traffic and parking legislation against them.

It had not, however, informed either B or the Opposed Bills Committee of its intention to seek, by way of declaration, to bring pedicabs within the hackney carriage regime. In respect of the declaration, the issue was whether the effect of the Transport Act 1985 Sch.1 para.16 was to import the construction of a "stage carriage" contained therein into the definition at s.4 of the 1869 Act so as to bring pedicabs within the definition of a hackney carriage and thus make them subject to the hackney carriage licensing regime.

B submitted that T was guilty of abuse of process by (1) seeking to re-open matters that had previously been decided by the court; (2) concealing its changed stance on pedicabs and the way it intended to proceed to achieve a licensing regime for them, and displaying a lack of frankness about its knowledge of the issues raised in previous authorities.

Appeal dismissed. (1) The issue of the status of pedicabs had previously been considered in two cases. In the first, Begg, Unreported December 6, 1999 it was held that a pedicab was not a hackney carriage and that Sch.1 para.16 of the 1985 Act was not intended to convert a "stage carriage" to a hackney carriage as defined by s.4 of the 1869 Act. In the second, R. (on the application of Oddy) v Bugbugs Ltd [2003] EWHC 2865 (Admin), the court found that a pedicab was a "stage carriage" and not a hackney carriage. However, it was not clear that the stipendiary magistrate in Begg had considered the material words of Sch.1 para.16 of the 1985 Act. In Oddy, the court had not considered the issue of Sch.1 para.16 at all. That being the case, it could not properly be said that the issue of the legal status of pedicabs had been decided by a court of competent juridsiction so as to preclude, of itself, future challenge, Begg and Oddy considered.

Moreover, it could not be said that T's argument should have been pursued in either Begg or Oddy, there being insufficient privity of interest between T and the prosecution in either of those cases. Further, a failure by a party to raise an issue involving itself in litigation being conducted by a third party should not, save in the most exceptional circumstances, automatically render the raising of the same issue by that party in later proceedings abusive. (2) In deciding whether T had sought to abuse the process of the court, the whole picture had to be considered. Though T could have acted more promptly in informing B of its changed position, there had been no deliberate or dishonest attempt to conceal matters from the court.

A system of regulation was necessary for the safe and efficient operation of pedicabs and was plainly in the public interest. T had decided that the most effective way forward was to include pedicabs in the hackney carriage regime and it could not proceed with that course until it had an authoritative decision as to whether, in law, a pedicab was a hackney carriage. Public bodies such as T would inevitably have changes of policy and direction and T's actions had not been those of a party seeking to harass or act unjustly. The master had been fully entitled to dismiss B's application to strike out T's claim.

Judge: Swift, J.

Counsel: For the appellant: David Wolfe. For the respondent: James Pereira

Solicitor: For the appellant: Richard Buxton. For the respondent: In-house solicitor

Cases Cited

R. (on the application of Oddy) v Bugbugs Ltd
[2003] EWHC 2865 (Admin); (QBD (Admin))

Legislation Cited

Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (SI 1998 3132) Part 8

Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (SI 1998 3132) r.3.4

London Cab Order 1934 (SI 1934 1346)

Metropolitan Public Carriage Act 1869 (c.115) s.1

Metropolitan Public Carriage Act 1869 (c.115) s.6

Metropolitan Public Carriage Act 1869 (c.115) s.7

Metropolitan Public Carriage Act 1869 (c.115) s.4

Private Hire Vehicles (London) Act 1998 (c.34)

Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 (c.14)

Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 (c.14) s.1(1)

Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 (c.14) s.82(1)

Town Police Clauses Act 1847 (c.89)

Transport Act 1985 (c.67) Sch.1 para.16(1)

Transport Act 1985 (c.67) s.1

Transport Act 1985 (c.67) s.137

Transport Act 1985 (c.67) s.137(1)

Transport Act 1985 (c.67) Sch.1 para.16

Transport and Works Act 1992 (c.42)

Transport and Works Act 1992 (c.42) s.62
_______________________

R. v St Albans DC Ex p. St Albans & District Taxi Association

Queen's Bench Division

19 January 2000

Case Digest

Subject: Local government

Licences; Local authorities powers and duties; Taxis

SADTA applied for judicial review of SADC's decision to end restrictions on the number of hackney carriage licences and to only issue new licences to wheelchair accessible vehicles. The court held that SADC's overall goal was to abolish all restrictions on the number of licences and not simply to increase the number of wheelchair accessible taxis, therefore proportionality was not relevant. There was sufficient consultation time and SADC was not obliged to have conducted surveys on unsatisfied demand for hackney carriages or the financial impact on licensees of its decision.

Judge: Lightman, J.

Counsel: For SADTA: D McPherson. For SADC: K Leigh

Solicitor: For SADTA: Michael Devidecki. For SADC: Council Solicitor
______________________

R. v Crewe and Nantwich LBC Ex p. Barker

Queen's Bench Division

08 March 1996

Licensing

Licensing; Taxis

Taxis; revocation of Hackney carriage licence; failure to reveal guilty plea to offences of dishonesty; conviction valid to revocation

B sought judicial review of a decision of C to revoke his Hackney carriage licence under the Local Government (Miscellaneous) Provisions Act 1976 s.61. B had failed to reveal that he had pleaded guilty to four offences of dishonesty involving an MOT certificate. He only revealed the convictions once he had been sentenced which was after the licence had been granted. B argued that the council was not entitled to consider the convictions when exercising its power under s.61(1)(b), as there had been no conviction until the sentence was passed.

Held, dismissing the application, that C was entitled to consider the convictions when exercising its power under s.61(1)(b).

Judge: MacPherson, J.

Counsel: For B: G Wood. For CNLBC: A Russell

Solicitor: For B: Keith Cutler & Co (Crewe). For CNLBC: Council Solicitor
Legislation Cited

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.61

Local Government (Miscellaneous) Provisions Act 1976 s.61.
_________________________

Benson v Boyce

Divisional Court

20 January 1997

[1997] R.T.R. 226; Independent, February 24, 1997

Subject: Criminal law

Road traffic offences; Taxis

Road traffic offences; private hire minibus; driving without licence

B appealed by way of case stated against his conviction for driving a private hire minibus within a controlled district, contrary to the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 s.46(1)(b) . B contended that the vehicle was not being used for private hire when he carried his employer's son and eight of his friends as passengers to a neighbouring controlled area, and therefore the offence was not made out.

Held, dismissing the appeal, that the definition of a private hire vehicle in s.80(1) of the 1976 Act referred to characteristic and not present use and, therefore, applied to all driving of a licensed private hire vehicle, whether for hire or otherwise, within a controlled area. The 1976 Act was similar to the Town Police Clauses Act 1847 s.38 and s.46 which referred specifically to hackney carriages, Hawkins v Edwards [1901] 2 K.B. 169 and Yates v Gates [1970] 2 Q.B. 27 considered.

Judge: Kennedy, L.J.; Mance, J.

Counsel: For the appellant: Brian Cummings. For the respondent: John Horan

Solicitor: For the appellant: HFT Gough & Co (Whitehaven). For the respondent: Council Legal Services (Whitehaven)

Significant Cases Cited

Hawkins v Edwards
[1901] 2 K.B. 169; (KBD)

Yates v Gates
[1970] 2 Q.B. 27; [1970] 2 W.L.R. 593; [1970] 1 All E.R. 754; [1970] R.T.R. 135; 68 L.G.R. 250; (1970) 114 S.J. 93; (QBD)

Applied by

Arun DC v Spooner
[2007] EWHC 307 (Admin); (DC)

Legislation Cited

Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982 (c.45) s.16

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.45(2)

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.46

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.46(1)

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.46(1)(a)

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.46(1)(b)

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.48

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.49

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.50(1)

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.50(2)

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.51

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.55

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.56

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.68

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.75

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.75(1)(a)

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.75(1)(c)

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.75(1)(d)(ii)

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.75(2)

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.80

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.80(1)

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.80(2)

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 Part II

Metropolitan Public Carriage Act 1869 (c.115)

Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 (c.14) s.1(1)

Town Police Clauses Act 1847 (c.89) s.38

Town Police Clauses Act 1847 (c.89) s.46

Town Police Clauses Act 1847 s.38 and s.46

Transport Act 1980 Part II

Transport Act 1980 Sch.5

Transport Act 1985 (c.67) s.139(2)

Transport Act 1980 (c.34) Part

Transport Act 1980 (c.34) s.43(1)

Journal Articles

Nature and use of "private hire vehicle"
Licensing; Road traffic offences; Taxis.
J. Crim. L. 1998, 62(3), 200-202
____________________________

Yates v Gates

Queen's Bench Division

22 January 1970

[1970] 2 Q.B. 27;

Criminal Law

Consent; Licences; Passengers; Taxis

Taxicabs; consent of hirer

1. The consent of a hirer of a taxicab to other persons being carried must be given positively; it cannot be inferred from mere acquiescence. 2. No person may drive a vehicle licensed as a hackney carriage unless he has the appropriate licence to drive it, no matter that it may not be plying for hire. Per curiam: An act, such as a nod of the head, might amount to consent. D, a taxi driver, was observed with a woman and child entering his hackney carriage, which had been stationary outside a house without the "for hire" sign being lit, and driving away. Two hours later two council employees approached the carriage which was again standing outside the house but with the sign lit. As D, with a woman and child, went towards the vehicle, the council employees asked him whether it was for hire. D asked where they wanted to go and, upon being told, said he would take them first, then the woman and child. All five got in and D drove away. Informations were preferred charging him (1) with permitting a person to be carried in the hackney carriage during the hire without the hirer's express consent, and (2) with acting as the driver of a duly licensed hackney carriage without a licence.

The justices dismissed (1) on the ground that the hirer, knowing that D proposed to carry two other persons, had expressed consent by entering the vehicle. They convicted D of driving without a licence when the "for hire" sign was lit but dismissed an information relating to the earlier occasion, when it was not, on the ground that D was not then plying for hire and so did not need one.

On appeal by the prosecutor, held, allowing the appeal (1) that "express consent" in the Town Police Clauses Act 1847 s.59 meant a positive consent; and (2) that the Town Police Clauses Act 1847 s.46 meant that no person should drive any vehicle licensed as a hackney carriage unless he had a licence, whatever it might be doing at the particular moment, so the fact that D was not plying for hire was no defence. Case remitted with a direction to convict. (Hawkins v Edwards [1901] 2 K.B. 169 applied).

Judge: Lord Parker of Waddington, L.C.J.; Ashworth, J.; Talbot, J.

Significant Cases Cited

Hawkins v Edwards
[1901] 2 K.B. 169; (KBD)
Cases Citing This Case

Considered by

Benson v Boyce
[1997] R.T.R. 226; Independent, February 24, 1997; (DC)

Legislation Cited

Town Police Clauses Act 1847 (c.89) s.38

Town Police Clauses Act 1847 (c.89) s.46

Town Police Clauses Act 1847 (c.89) s.47

Town Police Clauses Act 1847 (c.89) s.59

Town Police Clauses Act 1847 ss. 46, 59
_________________________

Brentwood BC v Gladen

Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court)

28 October 2004

Licensing

Operators licences; Private hire vehicles; Statutory interpretation; Taxis

operators licences; private hire vehicles; operation of licensed hackney carriage as private hire vehicle; statutory interpretation

The prosecutor appealed against the district judge's acquittal of the defendant (G) of knowingly operating a vehicle as a private hire vehicle in a controlled district without having an operator's licence. Both the vehicle and G were properly licensed as a hackney carriage and a hackney carriage driver respectively.

The district judge posed a question for the opinion of the High Court: whether it was necessary to hold a licence under the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 s.55 , in an area where that Act was in force, to operate a hackney carriage, duly licensed as such under the Town Police Clauses Act 1847, as a private hire vehicle.

The answer to that question was NO.

Held, dismissing the appeal, that it was not necessary to hold a licence under s.55 to operate a hackney carriage, duly licensed as such, as a private hire vehicle. Section 46(1)(d) of the 1976 Act was not breached where a licensed hackney carriage and a licensed hackney carriage driver were provided for the relevant conveyance of a passenger, albeit that they were provided through an operator. In those circumstances, an operator's licence under s.55 was not appropriate, since that section did not cover hackney carriages. It was apparent that s.80 of the 1976 Act excluded hackney carriages from s.46(1)(d).

Judge: Collins, J.; Silber, J.

Counsel: For the claimant: James Findlay. For the defendant: Peter Maddox

Solicitor: For the claimant: Sharpe Pritchard. For the defendant: Kearns & Co

Legislation Cited

Criminal Justice Act 1967 (c.80) s.9

Criminal Justice Act 1967 (c.80) s.10

Criminal Justice Act 1967 (c.80) s.46

Criminal Justice Act 1967 (c.80) s.46(1)(a)

Criminal Justice Act 1967 (c.80) s.46(1)(b)

Criminal Justice Act 1967 (c.80) s.46(1)(c)

Criminal Justice Act 1967 (c.80) s.46(1)(d)

Criminal Justice Act 1967 (c.80) s.46(1)(e)

Criminal Justice Act 1967 (c.80) s.48

Criminal Justice Act 1967 (c.80) s.48(1)(a)(ii)

Criminal Justice Act 1967 (c.80) s.51

Criminal Justice Act 1967 (c.80) s.55

Criminal Justice Act 1967 (c.80) s.67

Criminal Justice Act 1967 (c.80) s.67(1)

Criminal Justice Act 1967 (c.80) s.67(3)

Criminal Justice Act 1967 s.80

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.46

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.46(1)

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.46(1)(b)

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.46(1)(d)

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.46(1)(e)

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.47

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.48

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.51

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.55

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.55(1)

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.56

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.58

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.67

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.68

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.80

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.80(1)

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 Part II

Town Police Clauses Act 1847 (c.89)

Town Police Clauses Act 1847 (c.89) s.37

Town Police Clauses Act 1847 (c.89) s.38

Town Police Clauses Act 1847 (c.89) s.46

Town Police Clauses Act 1847 (c.89) s.46(1)

Town Police Clauses Act 1847 (c.89) s.68

Transport Act 1980 Part II

Transport Act 1980 Sch.5

Transport Act 1985 (c.67) s.80(1)

Transport Act 1985 (c.67) s.139(2)

Transport Act 1980 (c.34) s.43(1)

Transport Act 1985 Sch.7

Transport and Works Act 1992 (c.42) s.46(1)(d)

Transport and Works Act 1992 (c.42) s.46(1)(e)

Transport and Works Act 1992 (c.42) s.62(3)

Transport and Works Act 1992 (c.42) s.67
Journal Articles

Private hire licensing - Town Police Clauses Act 1847
Operators licences; Private hire vehicles; Statutory interpretation; Taxis.
L.R. 2005, 60(Jan/Feb), 15-19
___________________________

Just a note about injunctions.
________________

Attorney General v Chaudry

Court of Appeal (Civil Division)

08 July 1971

Civil procedure

Statutory duty; injunctions; remedies

Injunction; hotel; fire precautions certificate

The High Court may grant an injunction to restrain breaches of a statute, even where the statute provides other remedies. The defendants used a building as an hotel without obtaining the necessary certificate relating to fire precautions from the local authority. The local authority commenced proceedings in the magistrates' court, as laid down in the statute, for a prohibition order, but the case could not be heard in that court for several months, and in the meanwhile the defendants continued to take guests in the hotel. The local authority started a relator action against the defendants and sought an interlocutory order prohibiting the defendants from using the building as an hotel.

Held, that the injunctions should be granted. (Decision of Plowman J. affirmed; Attorney General v Harris (No.1) [1961] 1 Q.B. 74 applied).

Judge: Lord Denning, M.R.; Megaw, L.J.; Phillimore, L.J.

Significant Cases Cited

Attorney General v Harris (No.1)
[1961] 1 Q.B. 74; [1960] 3 W.L.R. 532; [1960] 3 All E.R. 207; 58 L.G.R. 242; (1960) 104 S.J. 704; (CA)

Cases Citing This Case

Applied by

Attorney General v Wellingborough Urban DC
72 L.G.R. 507; (CA (Civ Div))

Considered by

Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers
[1978] A.C. 435; [1977] 3 W.L.R. 300; [1977] 3 All E.R. 70; (1977) 121 S.J. 543; (HL)

Legislation Cited

Civic Amenities Act 1967 (c.69) s.15

London Building Acts (Amendment) Act 1939

London Building Acts (Amendment) Act 1939s.34 London Building Acts (Amendment) Act 1939s.148

London Buildings Acts (Amendment) Act 1939 s.148

London Buildings Acts (Amendment) Act 1939 s.33

London Buildings Acts (Amendment) Act 1939 s.34

London Buildings Acts (Amendment) Act 1939 s.39

Manchester Police Regulation Act 1844

Town and Country Planning Act 1962 s.62
____________________

01 January 1991

Times, May 30, 1991

Subject: Licensing

Cars; Hiring; Licensing

Summary: Private hire vehicle; vehicle used to drive pre-booked customers; no payments made; whether vehicle "operated" as a private hire vehicle

Case: L, on behalf of St Albans DC appealed by way of case stated against the decision that T, a licensed private car operator, had not contravened the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 s.46(1) . T had instructed his wife who was unlicensed to drive pre-booked customers in an unlicensed car. No payment was asked for or received.

Held: Appeal allowed. T was operating the vehicle as a private hire vehicle within the meaning of s.80 of the 1976 Act in view of T's acceptance of bookings made by his customers. Payment of money was not a prerequisite for hiring. T had been able to protect the goodwill of the business and had made a commercial gain.
Legislation Cited

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.46(1)

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.80
_____________________

DPP v Computer Cab Co Ltd

Queen's Bench Division

07 November 1994

[1996] R.T.R. 130; [1995] C.O.D. 361

Licensing

Licensing; Taxis

Summary: Taxis; licensing conditions imposed on taxis; whether point of hire commenced when drivers stopped plying for hire

Case: Within the Metropolitan Police District licensing conditions impose geographical restrictions on the areas in which taxis can ply for hire.

Taxis with green badges were entitled to ply for hire anywhere in the District and those with yellow badges were entitled to ply for hire only within a particular sector which excluded the central London area. It was alleged that the yellow badge drivers had permitted their taxis to be hired within the central area, contrary to their licences, as set out in the London Cab Order 1934 Part 31(1)(ii) .

It was alleged that C had aided and abetted the drivers to commit these offences. C operated a system whereby jobs in the central area were given to drivers licensed outside the area, although all drivers were in their licensed area when they accepted the calls; the "For Hire" light was simply switched off.

The magistrates referred to the High Court the point whether for the purposes of Part 31, the drivers permitted their cabs to be hired at the time and place at which the customer was physically picked up. DPP argued that the hiring took place at the pick-up point. C submitted that the hiring took place once the driver ceased plying and had turned off the "For Hire" sign.

Held, dismissing the appeal, that (1) hiring was a matter of agreement between the customer and the driver. Whether or not hiring took place in an area where drivers were not licensed depended on what remained to be agreed between driver and customer in that area. Once terms had been agreed, the driver ceased to ply for hire, considering himself hired and contractually bound to pick up the customer, and (2) where nothing remained to be agreed then it was clear that hiring had taken place in the area where drivers were licensed. The allegations must therefore fail.

Judge: Rose, L.J.; Scott Baker, J.

Counsel: For the appellant: J. Carter Manning Q.C. and J Regden. For the first respondent: A. Scrivenor Q.C. and W Hibbert. For the second respondents: R. Beckwith Q.C. and C Pitt

Solicitor: For the appellant: CPS. For the first respondent: Charles Patel (Wokingham). For the second respondent: Michael Demidecki (London)

Legislation Cited

Criminal Justice Act 1982 (c.48

Criminal Justice Act 1967 (c.80

London Cab Order 1934 (SI 1934 ) Part 31

London Cab Order 1934 Part 31

London Cab Order 1934 Part 31(1)(ii)

Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 (c.43) s.44

Metropolitan Public Carriage Act 1869 (c.115) s.9
_____________________

R. v Blackpool BC Ex p. Red Cab Taxis Ltd

Queen's Bench Division

29 April 1994

(1994) 158 J.P. 1069; [1994] R.T.R. 402; [1994] C.O.D. 513; (1994) 158 J.P.N. 637; Times, May 13, 1994

Licensing

Conditions; Licensing; Local authorities powers and duties; Taxis

Summary: Local Government; Hackney carriages; private hire vehicles; imposition of condition by licensing authority on private hire vehicle licences; prohibition on standing on private land; whether fair; whether judicial review appropriate remedy

Abstract: The applicants were owners and operators of private hire vehicles. There had been a long-running dispute with the local hackney carriage drivers relating to private hire vehicles touting for trade. As a result of representations made by the hackney carriage drivers, the licensing authority decided to impose a condition on the private hire operators' licences that precluded them from standing at any public place, including privately owned land or premises to which persons had access whether as of right or not, without a pre-arranged booking. The applicants sought judicial review of the decision.

Held, dismissing the application on the basis that the applicants should have pursued their right of appeal to the justices rather than seek judicial review since other remedies were available, that the decision itself created a perception that one group had been disadvantaged at the behest of another and also created an opportunity for muddle and confusion. The decision- making process was unfair and flawed and the decision itself was arguably unreasonable (R. v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police Ex p. Calveley [1986] C.L.Y. 2542 , R. v Birmingham City Council Ex p. Ferrero [1993] 1 All E.R. 530 applied).

Judge: Judge, J.

Counsel: For RTC: Philip Engelman and Joanne Briggs. For BBC: Timothy Straker

Solicitor: For RTC: Betesh Partnership (Manchester). For BBC: David Eccles (Blackpool).

Significant Cases Cited

R. v Birmingham City Council Ex p. Ferrero
[1993] 1 All E.R. 530; (1991) 155 J.P. 721; 89 L.G.R. 977; (1991) 3 Admin. L.R. 613; (1991) 10 Tr. L.R. 129; [1991] C.O.D. 476; (1991) 155 J.P.N. 522; (1991) 155 L.G. Rev. 645; Times, May 30, 1991; Independent, May 24, 1991; (CA (Civ Div))

R. v Chief Constable of Merseyside Ex p. Calveley
[1986] Q.B. 424; [1986] 2 W.L.R. 144; [1986] 1 All E.R. 257; [1986] I.R.L.R. 177; Times, November 28, 1985; (CA (Civ Div))

Legislation Cited

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.48

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.48(2)

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.48(7)

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.51(2)

Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 (c.57) s.77

Public Health Act 1936 (c.49) s.300
_____________________

DPP v Sikondar

Divisional Court

15 May 1992

Road traffic

Actus reus; Hiring; Offences; Passenger vehicles

Case: Public service vehicle; "hire or reward"; no right to travel; motorist using own minibus to carry own and others' children to school; intermittent payment to cover petrol; whether carrying for hire or reward; whether beyond mere social kindness; whether public service vehicle.

It is not necessary to show that there is a legally enforceable agreement or a right to be carried on the part of the passengers before a driver can be said to have been driving a public service vehicle. S was stopped in his minibus in which there were 11 schoolgirls, two of whom were his own daughters. S admitted that for some months he had been ferrying the girls to and from school rather than have them take public transport. He had received occasional sums of about GBP 1.50 to GBP 2.00 from the girls' parents to cover his petrol although he had never demanded payment. S was charged with various offences of using or driving a public service vehicle contrary to the Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981.

The justices found that S had not been paid money in return for a right to be carried as set out at Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 s.1(5)(c) of the Act and so did not fall within the definition of one who carried for hire or reward under the Act as set out by the House of Lords in Albert v. Motor Insurers Bureau. The justices dismissed the charges and the prosecutor appealed.

Held, allowing the appeal and directing convictions to be entered, that s.1(5)(c) of the Act did not define the only circumstances in which a vehicle used for carrying passengers was used for hire or reward. The construction of hire or reward set out in Albert v. Motor Insurers Bureau was to be applied to that expression when used in s.1 of the Act and it was not necessary to show an enforceable agreement or right to be carried. Here there was a systematic carrying of passengers which went beyond the bounds of social kindness and, had the justices properly directed themselves, they would have found that S came within the definition of one who was driving a public service vehicle (Albert v Motor Insurers Bureau [1972] A.C. 301, Motor Insurers Bureau v Meanen [1971] 2 All E.R. 1372 (Note) applied).

Judge: Watkins, L.J.; May, J.

Counsel: For the DPP: Roger D H Smith Q.C. For S: Unrepresented.

Solicitor: For the DPP: CPS (Birmingham).
Significant Cases Cited

Albert v Motor Insurers Bureau
[1972] A.C. 301; [1971] 3 W.L.R. 291; [1971] 2 All E.R. 1345; [1971] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 229; [1972] R.T.R. 230; (1971) 115 S.J. 588; (HL)

Motor Insurers Bureau v Meanen
[1971] 2 All E.R. 1372 (Note); [1971] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 251; 1971 S.C. (H.L.) 148; 1971 S.L.T. 264; (HL)
Cases Citing This Case

Applied by

Rout v Swallow Hotels
(1993) 157 J.P. 771; [1993] R.T.R. 80; [1993] Crim. L.R. 77; [1993] C.O.D. 73; (1993) 157 J.P.N. 313; Times, September 9, 1992; Guardian, October 7, 1992; (DC)
Legislation Cited

Criminal Justice Act 1967 (c.80) s.9

Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 (c.14) s.1

Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 (c.14) s.1(1)(a)

Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 (c.14) s.1(5)(a)

Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 (c.14) s.1(5)(c)

Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 (c.14) s.6

Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 (c.14) s.6(1)

Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 (c.14) s.12

Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 (c.14) s.12(5)

Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 (c.14) s.22

Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 (c.14) s.22(9)

Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 (c.14) s.82(1)

Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 s.12 Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 s.22

Road Traffic Act 1988 (c.52) s.47

Road Traffic Act 1988 (c.52) s.47(2)(3)(a)

Road Traffic Act 1988 (c.52) s.143

Road Traffic Act 1960 (c.16) s.203(4)

Road Traffic Act 1988 Part IV

Road Traffic Act 1988 Part VI

Transport Act 1985 (c.67) s.1(3)

Vehicles (Excise) Act 1971 (c.10)

Journal Articles

Transport - Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 - definition of "public service vehicle"

Consideration; Offences; Passenger vehicles. Crim. L.R. 1993, Jan, 76-77

Hiring a minibus
Clubs; Minibuses; Operators licences; Universities.
S.J. 1998, 142(27), 644

Carriage for hire or reward

Consideration; Offences; Passenger vehicles. J. Crim. L. 1993, 57(4), 315-317

Commentary on D.P.P. v Sikondar and Rout v Swallow Hotels; the meaning of "hire or reward"

Consideration; Offences; Passenger vehicles. Road L.R. 1993, 9(7), 201-202

The legal status of "courtesy" cars and coaches

Passenger vehicles; Tourism. Road L. 1992, 8.8, 267-271
________________________