Quote:
The Act is essentially silent as to how a licensed operator may deal with persons seeking bookings, other than mandating that they keep records. The only provision of the Act that might be said to have anything to do with regulating how operators accept bookings is s. 56(1) [24-25]. It sets out that:
“(1) For the purposes of this Part of this Act every contract for the hire of a private hire vehicle licensed under this Part of this Act shall be deemed to be made with the operator who accepted the booking for that vehicle whether or not he himself provided the vehicle.”
But s. 56(1) is clearly a deeming provision: it does not impose a requirement that operators actually do enter into a contract for hire (as principal), but insists that the law will treat them as incurring contractual liability once a contract of hire is made, regardless of the actual mechanics of the contract of hire (whether the operator contracts as principal, or agent, or the contract of hire is made by the driver) [26-27].
The above is the really important bit of the judgment, or in the case above, the summary given to the press, and in my view, the reason the judgment was given so soon after the hearing.
In short, the justices all agree that the 1976 Act doesn't mandate operators to be principal in respect of contracts between them and the passenger. They can if they wish, but if they don't wish they don't have to.