Taxi Driver Online

I don't think I have posted the Cameron case in full before but I have posted a summary. I have refered to this case many times in the past and it is one which allows a council to defer a hackney carriage proprietors application for a short period of time until it has had a survey. The short period of time in this particular instance was ten weeks. Whether or not ten weeks is a legal yardstick I do not know because the reference short period of time time has never been tested in a court of law. However in my judgement this case remains one of the most significan't for both license applicants and councils who limit numbers. I might add that you will not find this case online anywhere other than TDO.

R v Middlesborough Council Ex parte IJH Cameron (Holdings) Limited

Court of Appeal (Civil Division)

HEARING-DATES: 25 November 1992

25 November 1992

COUNSEL:
M Beloff QC and M Gill for the Applicant; S Hockman QC and P Forbes for the Respondent

PANEL: Dillon, Butler-Sloss, Simon Brown LJJ

JUDGMENTBY-1: DILLON LJ

JUDGMENT-1:
DILLON LJ: This is an appeal by the applicant, IJH Cameron (Holdings) Limited, against an order of Mr Justice Popplewell of 13th November 1991, which refused an application by the applicant to quash, by way of judicial review, a resolution of the Direct Services Committee of the Middlesborough Borough Council of 19th April 1989 in respect of an application by the applicant for hackney carriage licences in the Borough of Middlesborough.

The actual resolution of the Direct Services Committee on 19th April 1989 was that the issue of additional hackney carriage licences be deferred pending a survey to ascertain whether there is unmet demand for hackney carriages to satisfy section 6 of the Transport Act 1985. The resolution went on to authorise the borough engineer and Direct Services Officer to engage a consultant to undertake a survey. That survey was received by the council on 15th June 1989, and as a result of it on 29th June the parking and transportation subcommittee refused to grant the applicant's application for a hackney carriage licence.

The refusal of 29th June is not challenged, or at least is not directly challenged. What is challenged is the deferment of consideration on 19th April. It is said that, unless the council or its relevant committee knew at 19th April that there was no unmet demand, it was bound to grant the applicant the hackney carriage licence for which he applied, there being no other objection to the application, and that it had no power whatever to defer consideration until further information relevant to unmet demand could be obtained.

It is not in doubt that the powers which the local authorities previously had by way of discretion over the licensing of hackney carriages, were curtailed by section 16 of the Transport Act 1985 which had the effect that:

". . . the grant of a licence may be refused, for the purpose of limiting the number of hackney carriages in respect of which licences are granted, if, but only if, the person authorised to grant licences is satisfied that there is no significant demand for the services of hackney carriages (within the area to which the licence would apply) which is unmet."

The general effect of that section has been helpfully set out in the judgments of Lord Justice Woolf and Lord Justice Bingham in this court in the case of Regina v Great Yarmouth Borough Council, ex parte Sawyer [1988] 86 LGR at 617. The actual facts of the Great Yarmouth case were concerned with a wholly different aspect of the restriction of licensing, looking at it rather from the point of view of the supposed unreasonableness of a derestriction policy from the point of view of those who already had licences.

What is in point however is that in the Great Yarmouth case Lord Justice Woolf did correctly say, as had Mr Justice Nolan in the case of Egan, to which I will come, that there was no transitional provision providing an interim period during which the authority can adjust to the new requirement contained in section 16. Of course an interim period for adjustment is not the only factor that arises because the needs for fresh hackney carriage licences change from time to time either because those who have the licences retire or give up business or go away, or because more people come to the area or there is a change in the needs of users.

In the present case it seems to me to be an entirely sensible policy that the local authority should have a survey to find whether or not there is unmet demand before deciding on the issue of a further hackney carriage licence. It is said by Mr Beloff that that is unlawful under the statutory provision of section 16. In my own judgment, in the Great Yarmouth case, I commented that the local authority "were not bound to make further inquiries or have surveys conducted in order to see more clearly whether there was or was not unmet demand". It never occurred to me that it might be suggested that the local authority could not make further inquiries or have surveys conducted in order to find out whether there was an unmet demand so that they could deal with a particular application. But the consequence of Mr Beloff's submissions, as he has acknowledged, is that if the council had commissioned a survey to find if there was unmet demand, having had the previous survey at some earlier period, and the result of the survey was due to be available in a week or 10 days after the meeting at which a new application would fall to be considered, the council would have no power whatsoever to defer the consideration of the new application until after the result of that survey was available.

I find that a wholly unnecessary restriction on the administrative powers of the council in dealing bona fide with applications which are brought before them. It is not in dispute that, if there were other possible objections to the suitability of the applicant to become the holder of a hackney carriage licence, consideration could be deferred so that inquiries could be made by the council. I do not see why they could not also be deferred if the council bona fide wanted to find out whether indeed there was or was not surplus capacity.

Mr Beloff has submitted that Parliament has made express provision in section 57 of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 to enable a District Council to seek information about other matters which they may consider it necessary for them to have in order to determine whether a licence should be granted to a particular applicant. But section 57 is concerned with requiring the applicant himself to provide information. It is also concerned to make the refusal by the appellant to give information under that section a criminal offence. It is not concerned with the council finding information from other sources in the exercise of their administrative powers.

Mr Beloff has accepted that the axe does not fall the moment an application for a new hackney carriage licence lands on the door mat of the licensing authority. He says that the licensing authority has the time for consideration which would follow in the ordinary course until the application is put before the relevant committee in due time for consideration. But I cannot see why the ordinary administrative course, which is not specifically referred to in the section itself, should not include any reasonable deferment on which the committee may resolve to obtain further information whether that further information relates to whether or not there is an unmet demand for hackney carriages or to anything else that is relevant.

The sheet anchor of Mr Beloff's submissions is a decision of Mr Justice Nolan on 11th June 1987 in a case of Regina v Reading Borough Council, Ex parte Egan [1990] RTR at page 399. That case was decided some five days before the decision of this court in the Great Yarmouth case. The court in the Great Yarmouth case did not have before it a full transcript of Mr Justice Nolan's judgment. It merely had the reports in The Times and The Independent newspaper, which were necessarily abbreviated and to some extent, it seems, had concentrated on different aspects. There was a suggestion later in another case, which I need not go into, that Mr Justice Nolan might have not had in mind some provisions; but from the full transcript it is clear that he did.

The position in the Reading Borough Council case before Mr Justice Nolan is that, on the coming into operation of section 16 of the Transport Act 1985, the Reading Borough Council, as the authority responsible for the licensing of hackney carriages in the borough, decided that 30 new hackney carriage licences should be issued and that other applications should be deferred until the effects of granting those additional licences had been assessed. Mr Justice Nolan commented, as did Lord Justice Woolf, on the fact that there were no transitional provisions and he found that somewhat surprising. It may be that some of his observations are wider than the case before him required. It was not the same position as we have to consider because the deferment was not for the purpose of finding out what the current situation was, but for the purpose of finding out what the situation would be at some future time when the effect of the 30 additional licences which the council proposed to grant could be ascertained, and it could then be seen whether at that time there was unmet demand.

The judge's conclusion was that it was not open to the council to go that way around it and that particular decision was quashed. But, as I have indicated, I do not think it governs the present case. I find nothing in the statute as I construe it -- and I agree entirely with Mr Justice Popplewell that it is a short question of construction of the statute -- which prevents the council in the ordinary course of deliberation and bona fide to conduct an inquiry whether there is currently an unmet demand before deciding whether to grant or refuse a licence.

I agree entirely with the trenchant judgment of Mr Justice Popplewell and I would dismiss this appeal.

JUDGMENTBY-2: BUTLER-SLOSS LJ

JUDGMENT-2:
BUTLER-SLOSS LJ: I agree.

JUDGMENTBY-3: SIMON BROWN LJ

JUDGMENT-3:
SIMON BROWN LJ: I agree too. The crucial distinction between this case and Egan seems to me to be this: the authority in that case, Reading Borough Council, apparently felt that they could only measure unmet demand by reference to a future state of affairs, ie the situation that would be brought about by the grant of an initial batch of licences. The position here was different. Here, the authority were concerned to decide this appellant's application by reference to the existing position. They merely needed a reasonable time to determine what that position was. Mr Justice Nolan in Egan posed the question before him at page 404A of the report in these terms:

". . . whether a council which is unsure of the presence or absence of unmet demand, but which fears that immediate and total derestriction may cause over-provision, is entitled to issue a limited number of further licences as a temporary measure, and as a means of obtaining the evidence by which the presence or absence of unmet demand can finally be established."

I stress the words "as a means of obtaining the evidence". They highlight the difference between the two cases. True, the judge continued as follows:

"By its own admission the council was not satisfied on 28 January 1986 and for that matter is not satisfied now as to the absence of unmet demand."

I interpose that that was the date of the application in that case.

"It is surprising, but clear, that the Act of 1985 made no provision for any interim period during which a licensing authority might have an opportunity to establish, by market research or otherwise, the presence or absence of unmet demand. It follows that from the time section 16 came into force on 6 January 1986 the council and any other council which is unable to feel satisfied that there is no significant unmet demand had been obliged to grant applications for licences in respect of suitably qualified vehicles without limit of number."

I would respectfully disagree with this last passage if and to the extent that the learned judge was there suggesting unnecessarily to the issue before him, that the authority were debarred by the legislation from spending a reasonable time investigating the question of current unmet demand so as to determine whether or not they were satisfied of its existence.

Clearly, as Lord Justice Woolf observed in R v Great Yarmouth Borough Council, ex parte Sawyer [1989] RTR 297.

". . . the authority will be required to grant a licence if they cannot be satisfied with regard to the proviso, and the only ground for refusal is for the purpose of limiting the number of hackney carriages in the area in relation to which the licence is granted." He further pointed out that they "require to be satisfied about a negative which can create evidential difficulties for the authority."

Those passages however, in my judgment, beg rather than answer the question as to the period within which the authority can properly take steps to satisfy itself of the critical question whether or not unmet demand exists. I agree with my Lord that the respondent authority in this case were well entitled to take the steps that they did.

I too therefore would dismiss the appeal.

DISPOSITION:
Appeal dismissed with costs.

SOLICITORS:
Levinsons Donnelly, Hartlepool; Lee Bolton & Lee, agents for Middlesborough Borough Council

I couldn't let this one go without posting the judgement of popplewell which lead up to the appeal I have already posted.

R v Middlesborough Borough Council Ex parte IJH Cameron (Holdings) Limited

Queen's Bench Division (Crown Office List)

HEARING-DATES: 13 November 1991

13 November 1991

COUNSEL:
M Gill for the Applicant; S Hockman QC for the Respondent

PANEL: Popplewell J

JUDGMENTBY-1: POPPLEWELL J

JUDGMENT-1:
POPPLEWELL J: This is an application by the applicant to quash a resolution of the Direct Services Committee of the Middlesborough Borough Council of 19th April 1989 in refusing to grant the applicant's application for hackney carriage licences, and purporting to defer the said applications for future consideration.

The Middlesborough Borough Council are the licensing authority for its area in respect of applications for the licensing of hackney carriages pursuant to the provisions of the Town Police Clauses Act 1847, and in particular section 37 thereto, as amended by section 16 of the Transport Act 1985.

The facts are not in dispute and they can be shortly stated. On 6th January 1989 the applicant submitted written applications for 25 hackney carriage licences. On 20th January 1989 the licensing sub-committee ordered that the matter should be referred to the Transportation Sub-committee for consideration. The Transportation Sub-committee is a sub-committee of the Direct Services Committee.

In March 1989 the applicant's solicitors wrote complaining, in effect, that the Council were defering the applicant's application indefinitely and asking for a decision. There was correspondence. On 19th April 1989 the Direct Services Committee deferred issue of additional licences pending a survey. It was anticipated that that survey would take some four to six weeks. The survey was in fact received on 15th June. On 29th June, as a result of that survey, the Parking and Transportation Sub-committee refused to grant the applicant's applications, and that decision was notified to the applicant on 13th July. He received it on 15th July 1989.

It is against the decision of deferral on 19th April 1989 that this application is brought. It is an application to quash that resolution and there is a further application for mandamus which, as will appear, is not now regarded as an appropriate ground for relief. There is also sought a declaration if I take the view that the resolution passed on 19th April 1989 was contrary to the provisions of section 16 of the Transport Act 1985.

The granting of hackney carriage licences is primarily governed by two Acts of Parliament. Section 37 of the Town Police Clauses Act 1847, as amended by section 16 of the Transport Act 1985, reads:

"The Commissioners may from time to time license to ply for hire within the prescribed distance, or if no distance is prescribed, within five miles of a General Post Office of the city, town or place to which the special Act is refers (which in that case shall be deemed the prescribed distance) such number of hackney coaches or carriages of any kind or description adapted to the carriage of persons as they think fit."

It is not in dispute that by the Act of 1985 the discretion which the licensing authority had previously had was affected. Section 16 of the Transport Act 1985 reads:

"The provisions of the Town Police Clauses Act 1847 with respect to hackney carriages, as incorporated in any enactment (whenever passed), shall have effect -- . . . (b) as if they provided that the grant of a licence may be refused, for the purpose of limiting the number of hackney carriages in respect of which licences are granted, if, but only if, the person authorised to grant licences is satisfied that there is no significant demand for the services of hackney carriages (within the area to which the licence would apply) which is unmet."

To put it into simple language, if the local authority are going to refuse a licence, they have to be satisfied when they refuse it that there is no significant demand for the services of hackney carriages which is unmet.

What this authority did, when they received the applications, was to consider what the position of demand for the services of hackney carriages was. They have to be satisfied about that before they can refuse a licence. To that end they had this survey carried out. In order to allow time for the survey to be carried out, they deferred a decision on the applicant's applications.

It is inevitable that on an application for a licence time may of itself pass. For instance under section 57 of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976, a district council may require an applicant for a licence under the Act of 1847 or under this part of this Act to submit to them such information as they may reasonably consider necessary to enable them to determine whether the licence should be granted and whether conditions should be attached to any such licence. For instance a council may want to make some inquiry as to the state of the vehicles that the applicant is going to use, as to the character of the applicant, and so on. There appears to be no time limit within which an application has to be considered.

Mr Gill in the course of his argument has observed that deferring an application is not the same as an ongoing consideration, because if you defer, you are stopping the process and then, when you have come to a conclusion, you are re-opening the process. If you are considering it, you are not stopping it, you are continuing to consider.

The issue which arises in this case can be put very simply. Under section 16 of the Act is a deferral for the purpose of satisfying yourself whether there is a demand or not a refusal? It is obvious that if the deferral is of a sufficiently long length, as a matter of fact it may be construed as a refusal. But the question which really arises is, is any deferral for the purpose of satisfying the council about the demand a refusal? I do not think it is suggested in this case, although a period of time did elapse, that the deferral, because of the passage of time, was tantamount to a refusal. What is urged is, if an application is made and is not granted but is deferred, that is a refusal. It is either to be granted or to be refused.

Support for that argument is sought from the nature of the language which is used and from a decision of Nolan J in a case to which my attention was drawn, called R v Reading Borough Council Ex parte Egan (unreported -- 11th June 1987) of which I have been provided a transcript.

In that case Nolan J (as he then was) was concerned with two motions brought before the court by Mr Egan who represented the Reading and District Owners and Drivers Association and a Mr Sullman, who was the proprietor of a firm of private hire operators. There were applications for licences. The decision which was under challenge was this, that the Chief Executive and Town Clerk be authorised to issue up to 30 new hackney carriage licences and that other applications be deferred until the effect of granting these additional licences have been assessed. I think it is sufficiently clear from the judgment that Mr Egan was complaining about the issue of 30 new hackney carriage licences and their method of selection, and that Mr Sullman must have been one of those whose application was deferred until the effect of granting additional licences had been assessed.

In that judgment Nolan J expressed some views about the power of the Council to grant unlimited number of licences. His view was not accepted by Webster J in a decision in a case called Ghafoor v Wakefield Metropolitan District Council (unreported -- 18th July 1990). The difference between those two views is not germane to the issue I have to decide.

At page 4 of the transcript Nolan J said this:

"The critical questions before me were (1) whether the Council were entitled on the information before them to set a limit of 30 upon the number of new licences to be issued, and to defer the consideration of applications in excess of that number until the effects of the initial issue had been assessed . . .".

In that case it was anticipated that the applications would be deferred for a period of six to nine months in order to ascertain the effect of the granting of the additional licences. Nolan J said this:

"The question before me, however, is a different one, namely, whether a council which is unsure of the presence or absence or unmet demand, but which fears that immediate and total derestriction may cause over-provision, is entitled to issue a limited number of further licences as a temporary measure, and as a means of obtaining the evidence by which the presence or absence of unmet demand can finally be established.

"I wish I could answer this question in the affirmative. The dangers of over-provision were clearly accepted by the law prior to 1985, as is shown by the judgment of Lord Goddard in the Teletax case . . . If there is an unnecessarily large number of taxis, there may be great and unnecessary difficulties in supervising and controlling them. The fact that a policy of total derestriction has worked without problems in other areas does not mean that it will work without problems in Reading. But in my judgment the language of section 16 is too clear to allow these considerations to prevail. By its own admission the respondent council was not satisfied on 28th January, 1986, and for that matter is not satisfied now, as to the absence of unmet demand. It is surprising, but clear, that the 1985 Act made no provision for any interim period during which licensing authorities might have an opportunity to establish, by market research or otherwise, the presence or absence of unmet demand. It follows that from the time section 16 came into force on 6th January 1986 the respondent council and any other council which is unable to feel satisfied that there is no significant unmet demand has been obliged to grant applications for licences in respect of suitably qualified vehicles without limit of number."

In the instant case the applicant is applying as a new applicant. The applications for licences are governed by the Town Police Clauses Act 1847. By section 43 they are to be in force for one year only.

It is quite clear that under section 16 of the Transport Act 1985 the Council will have from time to time to ascertain whether there is a demand for the services of hackney carriages, because if they do not carry out some proper inquiry at some intervals, they may find, if they refuse, they are taken to judicial review on the ground that they cannot be satisfied because they have not carried out proper inquiries. Because applicants may apply at any time during the year, there may never be a period of time when it can be said for certain that they may not be carrying out inquiries at a time when an application is made.

What is said by Mr Gill in answer to that is that if they are presently satisfied as to the position, that is to say that they will issue 20 for the next year, once that 20 has been granted, then they will grant no more until they carry out a further survey. What they must do is refuse and then carry out a further survey before they deal with other applications. But in fact to defer is simply another way of refusing.

He drew my attention to a decision in another sphere, but analogous, of R v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council Ex part Kayne-Levenson [1975] KB 431, where the court were dealing with the issue of licences for pitches in Petticoat Lane street market. It is not necessary to set out any of the facts. It is only necessary to refer to one passage in the judgment of Lord Denning at page 441H:

". . . the borough council have taken this course: they have a number of applicants for one pitch; they grant the licence to one, and put the others on the 'waiting list'. They write to each of the unsuccessful applicants and tell him that his name will be placed on the 'waiting list'. This 'waiting list' is a list of applicants for a pitch in that street. Names are added in order of date. Then when any pitch in that street becomes vacant, it is offered to the names in that list. If the first one does not want it, it is offered to the next, and so forth. If any applicant refuses it twice, he goes down to the bottom of the list. The waiting list for some streets is so long that a person may have to wait for years before he will be offered a pitch in it."

"It appears that, in practice, when the borough council put a name on a waiting list, they do not treat it as a refusal, and accordingly they do not given him formal notification, or tell him that he can appeal.

"I see no objection to the council keeping a waiting list or operating it as they do. It is a convenient piece of administration. But I think they should alter their form of notification. To put an application on the waiting list is tantamount to a refusal. They should treat it as such and tell him so."

Mr Gill relies on that and by analogy says "If you defer consideration of the application you are in fact refusing to grant the application at that time".

Mr Hockman seeks to distinguish the decision in Egan on three bases: first, that Nolan J must have decided that the six to nine months period of deferment was so long that it was tantamount to a refusal; secondly, what he was considering was in effect the numbers that should be issued and was not really considering the question which is before me; alternatively that I should come to a different conclusion.

I am quite satisfied that Nolan J did not decide the case on the basis that the six to nine months deferment was equivalent to a refusal. I think the matter which is before me was directly in point in his decision. I would hesitate long before disagreeing with Nolan J because of course any decision of his commands enormous respect from this court.

The argument in favour of interpreting the word "refuse" as not covering a deferment can be put in a number of ways. First, if somebody makes in general terms an application to a court, the court may grant the application. It may refuse the application. It may adjourn it. In ordinary language adjourning the application could not be described as a refusal of the application. It is something which is totally neutral. It is keeping the position open. It is not putting somebody on a waiting list, because putting somebody on a waiting list for a vacancy presupposes that there is no vacancy and therefore the application is refused, but the applicant has first refusal next time. So that putting someone on a waiting list is not analogous.

Secondly, it is argued that section 16 deals with refusal, that is to say it does not require the council to make a grant "unless . . .": it simply deals with the position if there is a refusal and sets out the basis on which a refusal may be made. It does not require the council to grant.

Mr Gill replies to that by saying in effect that an obligation to grant is simply the mirror image of an inability to refuse: that if you are unable to refuse because you have not carried out the inquiry, you are obliged to grant.

The other argument which was canvassed during the course of these proceedings was this. As I have indicated, a deferment plainly could constitute a refusal given sufficient length of time. The position of somebody whose application is renewed, whether the deferment of that application constitutes a refusal, is relied on by Mr Gill as showing that "deferment" and "refuse" are identical words. It is quite clear that separate provisions govern the approach to somebody who has a licence who wants it renewed. But if consideration of that is deferred over the period when the licence is due to expire, and is for instance deferred for a period of three months, the effect is to refuse the renewal of the licence, or refuse the licence for that period of time. If "refuse" is to be interpreted in that way in a renewal case, so, as an additional argument it is said, it should be interpreted in relation to the grant of an original licence.

I look at this as a matter of straightforward construction looking as best one can at the purpose of the Transport Act. The purpose of the Transport Act under section 16 is fully set out in the decision (which otherwise is of no assistance in the instant case), of the Court of Appeal in Sawyer v Great Yarmouth Borough Council (unreported -- 16th June 1987) in transcript before me. In that case Woolf LJ sets out the effect of section 16 and the purpose of the Transport Act.

But for the decision of Nolan J I would have no doubt at all in my mind that "defer" in this case, for a comparatively short period of time in order to carry out the inquiry which it was proper for the local authority to carry out, could not on any proper construction in the English language be called a refusal. As I have indicated, there may be cases where the period of time is so great that it was tantamount to a refusal -- but that is not this case.

I am therefore put in the invidious position of having to disagree, because I do not think that the case of Egan can properly be distinguished on its facts or in the rationale of the decision from the instant case. I am therefore driven to take, regrettably, a contrary view to that which Nolan J (as he then was) took in Egan's case. He found, as I have already indicated, that the language of section 16 was too clear for him to come to any other conclusion. I sadly also take that view but come to a different conclusion. In my judgment a refusal means saying "No". It does not mean "We are going to consider your case within a comparatively short period of time when we have made some inquiries as to the demand which is required."

I have therefore come to the conclusion that the contentions for which the council contend are to be preferred to those of the applicant.

The question of delay was raised in this case and I deal with it in case it transpires that my view on section 16 is incorrect.

What the applicant is asking for is certiorari to quash the decision of 19th April. There has undoubtedly been delay. The chronology I can shortly set out. The 19th April 1989 was when the decision was made. I was told that it was not communicated until 19th May. This application was not in fact made until 17th November 1989. The reasons why it was not made are set out in the applicant's Form 86A and in the affidavit of Mr Wilson.

Webster J has given leave in this case. It is clear that the approach to the question of delay is different at the leave stage from the position on the actual hearing. It is only necessary to refer to Order 53 rule 4 and section 31(6) of the Supreme Court Act 1981, and the decision in R v Dairy Tribunal Ex parte Caswell [1990] 2 AC 738 and the speech of Lord Goff. In effect there having clearly been undue delay, the court may refuse to grant any relief sought on the application if it considers that the granting of the relief sought would be likely to cause substantial hardship to or substantially prejudice the rights of any person or would be detrimental to good administration.

I have no evidence before me of any of those matters. There will be cases where the matter will be self-evident, and the court can take a view that it is detrimental for instance to good administration without any evidence. But in the instant case what I am being asked to do is to make a ruling as a matter of law on section 16. If I am in favour of the applicant, I would then have quashed the resolution. Mr Gill accepts that an order of mandamus, which was originally sought, requiring the Council to grant a hackney carriage licence, is inappropriate, as it is only for a period of a year. A declaration which sets out, if I had found in the applicant's favour, that a deferal of an application constitutes refusal, is not in my judgment in any way affected by the undoubted delay that has taken place in this case.

It is said that the Council has been put to expense and so on in having the survey, and if this application had come in earlier it would have affected that. There is no evidence about that. That is the most unlikely situation. The council were going to have the survey, which they needed, in order to consider the subsequent applications. If I had been minded to find in the applicant's favour, the question of delay would not have affected that decision. But for the reasons which I have given, this application is dismissed.

DISPOSITION:
Application dismissed

SOLICITORS:
Levinson, Walker & Lister, Hartlepool; Lee Bolton & Lee