THOUGHTS ON THE DEFINITION OF “STREET” AND “PUBLIC PLACE”
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
1) The Town Police Clauses Acts 1847-1889 are construed as one with the Public Health Act
1875 (Section 171 of the PHA 1875);
2) Section 4 of the PHA 1875 [the definitions section] defines “street” as any highway… and
public bridge… and any road, lane, footway, square, court, alley or passage whether a
thoroughfare or not:
3) Section 4 of the PHA 1875 [the definitions section] defines “road” as a road to which the
public have access and which has houses at either side of it;
4) Section 4 of the PHA 1875 [the definitions section] defines “house” as including
buildings where persons are employed;
5) Section 3 of the Town Police Clauses Act 1847 defines “street” as extending to and
include ANY road, square court alley or thoroughfare, or public passage within the limits
of the special Act.
6) Section 192 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 [the interpretation section] defines “road” as in
relation to England and Wales means any highway and any other road to which the public
has access and includes bridges over which a road passes.
7) Section 192 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 [the interpretation section] defines both
“bridleway” and “footpath” by reference to a public right of way albeit a restricted one.
Section 167 of the Criminal Justice & Public Order Act 1994 [Touting for taxis and hire
cars] defines a “public place” as anywhere to which the public have access whether by
payment or not.
9) Statutory Instrument 2000, No. 726 is as follows:
Council Directive 72/166/EEC (OJ No. L103, 2.5.72, p. 2), as modified by Council Directives
84/5/EEC (OJ No. L8, 11.1.84, p. 17) and 90/232/EEC (OJ No. L129, 19.5.90, p. 33) requires a
Member State to take all appropriate measures to ensure that civil liability in respect of
the use of motor vehicles normally based in its territory is covered by insurance.
Under section 143 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 ("the 1988 Act") it is an offence to use, or to cause or
permit someone to use, a motor vehicle on a road unless its use is covered by an appropriate policy of
insurance or security ("the insurance requirement"). "Road" is defined in section 192(1) of the
1988 Act, in relation to England and Wales, as any highway or other road to which the
public has access and, in relation to Scotland, as any road or other way to which the public has
access. In the case of Cutter v. Eagle Star Insurance Company Ltd, [1998] 4 All ER 417, it was held
by the House of Lords that the expression did not include a car park or similar public place.
For the purpose of complying with the directives these Regulations amend the 1988 Act first by
extending the insurance requirement to the use of vehicles in public places other than roads and,
secondly, by making provision for the reporting of accidents and the production of insurance
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documents where an accident occurs in a public place.
PERTINENT CASE LAW
1) Young v Scampion [1988] RTR 95 and references contained therein;
2) Strettle v Knowsley MBC
3) Cutter v. Eagle Star Insurance Company Ltd, [1998] 4 All ER 417;
SKELETON POINTS TO CONSIDER
1) The purpose of the Act-to protect the public at large by licensing controls;
2) The enforcement authority is the Council for the District;
3) The date of the Young decision and the changes brought about by the new requirements to
give EEC legislation effect within national law;
4) The latest parliamentary definition of “road” and;
5) The mischief rule of statutory interpretation.
ARGUMENT FOR CONSIDERATION
1) The RTA 1988, S192 defines “road” without reference to public right of access [unlike
the definition of bridleway and footpath] but by reference merely to public access.
2) The TPCA 1847, S3 defines “street” as including ANY ROAD……;
3) The PHA 1875, S4 defines “street” again as ANY ROAD……;
4) SI 2000, 726 gives effect to the requirement on all member states to ensure civil liability
is covered by insurance whether on a road or other public place.
In Young and Scampion [107B-E] the learned judges cited Curtis v Embery [1872] as
requiring proof that the street must be a public street. It should be noted Curtis v Embery
concerned a railway property case and the position on that type of site was specifically
amended by S76 of the Public Health Act 1925. It is my contention that that case can be
distinguished from the Strettle v Knowsley MBC decision of recent date.
In Strettle the carriage was on a road to which the public were permitted access albeit that this
was by licence and not a right. I am informed that, in the absence of obstruction or
misbehaviour, no traveller along the road would be prevented from going wherever he wished
on the roads within the hospital grounds by anyone at any hour of the day or night. No
barriers are installed on the roads. I am informed it is possible for persons to use the grounds
as a short cut without ever attending any part of the hospital and so I submit it falls both
within the definition of thoroughfare and also road.
As an aside until 1966 the House of Lords held that it could not over rule its previous
decisions. The Practice Direction of that year changed that to allow for changes in
circumstances in Society and practice. It now can in exceptional circumstances over rule itself
and has done so. The law of 100 years ago is open to challenge.
CONCLUSION
In 2001 in reality any person may enter the grounds of Whiston Hospital with a car and drive
upon those roads. The law now requires such use to be covered by insurance. Since 1988 the
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main definition of a road is “a place to which the public have access” and not a place to
which the public have a right of access.
Street is defined in the 1847 and 1875 Acts as a total of 15 types of place of which only 2 are
connected to the word “public”. The learned judges in Young, I respectfully submit, stand to
be over ruled or at least distinguished.
Any vehicle used or standing for hire in a street, where the public may be found, [privately
owned or otherwise] should therefore fall within the S45 TPCA 1847 offence. I submit that
the decision of the Crown Court, if challenged, could be over turned and distinguished from
Young & Scampion in the circumstances of the Strettle case.
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